Iran's new quest for nuclear submarines: dangerous and needless

If we put aside for a moment the question of if, whether, and when Iran will make good on its proclaimed intent, this is what it could mean in terms of enrichment for Iran.

Iran would need to produce approximately 50 kg of 90 percent highly enriched uranium or 100 kg of 45 percent highly enriched uranium to power a small submarine. The highly enriched uranium produced under the first scenario is equivalent to the amount needed for two nuclear weapons.

But before that, a land-based test reactor of the same scale would need to be constructed. In sum, with those two reactors and additional materials needed for testing and manufacturing, such a project would require highly enriched uranium amounts equal to half a dozen nuclear weapons.

Should Iran proceed to design and construct a reactor for oil tankers or liquid-natural-gas tanker, the power of the reactor would be double. The suggested Iranian plan would mean the design of two different types of reactors: one for submarines and another one for merchant vessels. If we use the Canadian and Brazilian experiences as models, such projects would likely costs billions of dollars, and will likely require foreign assistance and know-how.

Apart from the required substantial costliness and effort poured into such an exercise, an additional problem in verification arises. Highly enriched uranium fuel for the naval program could be diverted for other purposes. This is also the case for low-enriched uranium produced, as it could be diverted as plausible feedstock for high enrichment to an undeclared/unknown facility.

The recent Iranian paper distributed in the Istanbul technical meetings does not mention naval needs. Yet the matter is being taken up at the Majlis, and some statements made by Iranian officials point to the direction of Iran using highly enriched uranium as a future fuel. The IAEA safeguards agreement provides an option to exempt finished submarine or other military fuel from safeguards, but fuel for the oil tankers or liquid natural gas tankers would remain under IAEA control.

With a nuclear program that has generated international concern over its purely peaceful nature, an Iranian move in the direction of upping the ante with nuclear powered vessels is both dangerous and needless.

Diplomacy powered with sanctions has brought Iran back to the negotiating table with the P5+1. If nuclear-powered vessels are being used as leverage, it would likely result in even more pressures brought to bear on Iran. If Iran intends to develop nuclear-powered submarines, it is difficult to justify, with the limited feasibility and greater financial sanctions that would result from such a difficult and costly exercise.

Yet the naval-propulsion-program debate in the Majlis could not have come to this stage without a tacit approval of the leadership, which means that this may not be just a bargaining chip given easily away.

Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, is a former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, where he headed its Department of Safeguards.

A version of this piece first appeared on the Power & Policy blog at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

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