How Iranian dissidents slip through Tehran's airport dragnet

“Those on the list are normally allowed entry, only to have their movements inside the country monitored and [later] be arrested at the airport when they are leaving Iran,” said Nader Uskowi, a Washington-based Iran expert and consultant to the US government on Afghanistan.

A former regime insider, who goes by the name Saeed Pakniat, claims that one reason several dissidents have slipped through is that the MOIS list is manually updated every twelve hours, allowing fugitives a slim window of opportunity.

“The regime is so worried about MOIS being hacked over the Internet that they record the details of all those entering and exiting the country onto a tape, which they transfer by car to Tehran and then upload onto the MOIS and Foreign Ministry internal networks with a 12-hour delay,” he said.

Pakniat, who claims he was an arms-buyer for the Ministry of Defense and did a stint in a military jail in 2003, escaped Iran through IKIA by simultaneously buying tickets to several destinations and taking advantage of the half-day lapse in updating watchlists to slip through.

Nicola Pedde, the director of the Rome-based Institute for Global Studies and a frequent visitor to Iran, said that the Turkish-constructed IKIA is a “middle-level security standard international airport like a Turkish or Egyptian one.” Although cameras are fitted, it is unknown whether they are equipped with facial recognition technology or the equipment to machine-read passports. Officers tap names and passport codes manually into their computers.

The authorities may also be alerted to Individuals of interest when their tracked cellphones enter the airport cellphone towers’ coverage area.

A foreign businessman who preferred to remain anonymous because he visits Tehran frequently describes seeing “something red flashing on the screen” every time his name is tapped into the IKIA database. On several occasions he has been directed to a waiting room, then allowed to proceed into the city about an hour later.

“Knowing the Iranians, the idea they’re so scared of being hacked that they would keep me waiting while they checked with Tehran whether I could enter the country,” he said.

“Mobile phone networks and how they connect is one of the IRGC’s key priorities because it’s one of the key tools for opponents of the regime to coordinate their actions,” said Pedde, suggesting that the regime is improving its connectivity and information-sharing and extending its street surveillance capability. “Now, a stay in Tehran is Soviet-like – people are constantly accompanying you.”

Ultimately, one of the simplest ways to identify persons of interest is also one of the most time-tested. Spotters keep watch for up to 200 suspects whose pictures they memorize.

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