Pope Benedict XVI waves to crowds in Leon, Mexico from the popemobile. (Tomas Bravo/Reuters)

Mexicans host Pope Benedict XVI, but say he's no Juan Pablo

By Sara Miller Llana, Staff writer / 03.25.12

There is really no better place to measure the pulse of a country than in a beauty salon. And in Mexico City, in Vanessa Gonzalez's salon, the trip of Pope Benedict XVI to Mexico measures at, she pauses, approximately zero. “I have not heard one client talking about it,” she says.

But during the last papal visit to this country ten years ago – by the late Pope John Paul II – the swirling chairs and shampoo stalls were abuzz. “People adore Juan Pablo,” she says.

Pope Benedict XVI arrived in Mexico on Friday, and today celebrates an open mass in a park in Silao, Guanajuato, a deeply Catholic state in central Mexico, before heading on to Cuba tomorrow.

His trip has not been without controversy. He comes amid gruesome drug violence that has claimed 50,000 lives, and while most victims are rival traffickers, anyone can end up a target, including a public figure. He is bypassing Mexico City altogether, leaving some residents feeling snubbed and others speculating that he is avoiding the capital's embrace of gay marriage and abortion (the Vatican says the altitude is what's keeping him away). And Guanajuato state happens to be run by the ruling, Catholic-friendly National Action Party (PAN), which some see as a political message. They say it's no coincidence that the pope is visiting the country as it is about to kick off its presidential race.

But away from the political chatter, regular Mexicans are hardly paying attention. Mexico is devoutly Catholic, home to the second-largest Catholic population in the world behind Brazil. But the current pope has done little to move Mexican Catholics the way his predecessor did – John Paul II often brought the faithful to tears.

Ms. Gonzalez says even her father, a man not easily moved, broke down crying upon passing a caravan carrying John Paul II on his first-ever trip to the nation in 1979. He would visit Mexico five times in total.

Her mother, meanwhile, is devoutly Catholic and easily moved, praying a full hour each morning and another hour each night. But she hasn't even talked about Benedict XVI's visit – Gonzalez didn't even exactly know when he was scheduled to arrive. If it were John Paul II, she says, she'd probably know his entire itinerary.

In fact, mention the current pope and the first words out of everyone's mouth is “seco,” meaning dry. That's usually followed by “serio,” or serious. Some say he seems harsh, and most of all, he's not “charismatic.”

“He doesn't have charm,” says Julio Valdez, a parking valet outside a local Catholic parish.

“I don't know anything about this pope,” says Elizabeth, who makes tortillas outside the same church and says she's too shy to share her last name. “Everything that John Paul did and said was good, just good,” she says, her face lighting up. “You just say his name, and I am full of emotion.”

Their feelings are reflected in a survey by Demotecnia, which showed that 77 percent of Catholics surveyed said that if they are moved at all by the pope's visit, it doesn't compare to how they felt ahead of John Paul II's visits. Only 20 percent of Catholics polled said they were “very excited” about the trip.

A good portion of those must live in Guanajuato. The state hosting Benedict this weekend is among the most religious in Mexico, with 94 percent calling themselves Catholic, according to the Mexican census. It may be a coincidence but when the Monitor was recently in Guanajuato to write about the pope's visit, the first three people interviewed were named in order: Jesus, Magdalena, and Moises.

Moises Silva, leaving the main basilica of the state capital Guanajuato on Ash Wednesday, said he was planning on battling the mobs to capture a glimpse of the pope. “It is a blessing that he is going to visit,” said Mr. Silva.

Magdalena Vargas, a city accountant, said her feelings of joy were “infinite.” “One can hardly believe that the highest representative is coming here,” she said. “We are overjoyed.”

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Guatemala's President Otto Perez (L) and his Panamanian counterpart Ricardo Martinelli chat during the 30th Expocomer International Trade Fair opening ceremony at the Atlapa Convention Center in Panama City March 21. (Carlos Jasso/REUTERS)

Guatemala's Perez lowers expectations for drug legalization

By James Bosworth, Guest blogger / 03.22.12

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.bloggingsbyboz.com. The views expressed are the author's own.

Some analysts got excited when President Otto Perez Molina announced several weeks ago that the Central American presidents would meet in Guatemala to agree to a decriminalization proposal prior to the Summit of the Americas. It was never going to be that easy.
 
 Several of the region's leaders, most recently Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, have rejected Perez's proposal outright. Others, like Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes, were initially receptive but have backed away after seeing the political and public opinion reaction at home.

Perez is now pushing for this Saturday's meeting to be about a coordinated strategy on drug policy and security issues, but does not believe that the region will agree on a decriminalization proposal given the differences. The expectations are lowered to something a bit less radical and a bit more realistic. Hopefully the region's presidents can deliver on that agenda and not disappoint.
 
 That said, Guatemala's president continues to push for other alternatives. He met with the business community in his country yesterday and asked them to think of alternatives because a pure military strategy doesn't bring the necessary results. Again, it's good to hear the former military leader acknowledge that the military isn't the solution.
 
 Perez still isn't even 100 days into his term in office. Once the "shock and awe" of his decriminalization suggestion wears off, it will be important to see whether he can sustain the dialogue for some policy changes over the coming years and accept realistic compromises that still move the ball forward.

– James Bosworth is a freelance writer and consultant who runs Bloggings by Boz.

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Support for crime boss 'Dudas' Coke still strong in Jamaica

By Hannah Stone, Guest blogger / 03.21.12

• A version of this post ran on the author's site, Insightcrime.com. The views expressed are the author's own.

As the case against Christopher "Dudus" Coke drags on, with his sentencing delayed for the fourth time, reactions from Jamaica give an insight into the complex nature of the power wielded by him and other crime dons.

After a long struggle to capture "Dudus" Coke, the Jamaican drug boss was extradited to the US in June 2010. He made a deal with the authorities, pleading guilty to drug trafficking and assault charges in August, avoiding a possible life sentence. The prosecution asked for him to be given the maximum sentence of 23 years, arguing that he had committed horrifically violent acts, including cutting one victim to pieces with a chainsaw. On Friday, however, a New York judge ruled that prosecutors needed to produce more evidence to back their claims. There will be another hearing in May, with sentencing to follow on a later date, reported Reuters.

The news was greeted with euphoria by Coke supporters outside the court, according to the Jamaica Gleaner, with relatives and friends telling reporters that the delay was due to divine intervention.

There is still support and sympathy for Coke from some in Tivoli Gardens, the territory in west Kingston where his Shower Posse gang is based. A Jamaica Gleaner video report before the sentencing shows residents professing support for the jailed gang boss and calling on the judge for leniency, arguing that he had done good things for people in the community. One resident said that Coke had only committed his crimes in order to get money to help local people. The newspaper reported that many Coke supporters did not wish to be filmed, fearing reprisals from the police.

The Associated Press spoke to Kingston locals who said the area was far less safe than when the drug lord ruled over it, and called for his return. A group of residents signed a petition that was submitted to the judge, listing Coke’s good deeds in the community and appealing for leniency.

One of the arguments made by the prosecution was that public demonstrations in Kingston in support of Coke showed that there was a danger he would return to Jamaica and continue his criminal activities if he was not given the longest possible sentence. There were fears that the sentencing could spark protests in the city, and on Friday police imposed tight security measures in west Kingston, including curfews in some areas.

In another sign of the popular support for Coke, one of Jamaica's most popular singers, Kingston-based reggae artist Horace Andy, wrote a laudatory song about Coke for his forthcoming album, referring to the crime boss by his nickname of "Presi," for president, reports the Gleaner:

Dudus we know a you rule
Presi yeah
Presi we miss you
Things no calm since you gone
The people them nah live right
Every day them a fuss an' fight ...

These responses to Coke’s case are a sign of the complex nature of the power he wielded, which is closely tied to politics. As a recent Center on International Cooperation report sets out, Jamaican “dons” like Coke are used by the political class to exert control over poor neighborhoods. They receive protection and funds from the government in exchange for making sure the area votes the right way in elections. In some areas these gang bosses take over the functions of the state, holding a monopoly over violence, and providing security and services to local people.

Coke reportedly helped poor people in his Tivoli Gardens neighborhood to pay for food and school fees, throwing Christmas parties and keeping streets clean, while keeping the authorities out. Prosecutors in the case asserted that "Because Coke's heavily armed soldiers patrolled the Tivoli Gardens community, it was largely closed to Jamaican law enforcement.” The US indictment against Coke, meanwhile, described the area as a "garrison" community, "a barricaded neighborhood guarded by a group of armed gunmen."

When the police and army were sent in to Tivoli Gardens in May 2010, they did little to win over the population. The government forces faced massive resistance from Coke’s troops, with days of fighting which the Brookings Institute said “resembled urban warfare.” Seventy-three people died in the clashes, with claims that some were executed in cold blood by the police. More than 1,000 complaints of civil rights violations were submitted to the public defender after the incident.

Coke’s political power is one of the things that made it so hard for Bruce Golding – Jamaica's prime minister at the time of the extradition request – to hand him over to the US. Tivoli Gardens was in the constituency of Golding, and he resisted the extradition for nine months, even hiring a law firm to help fight it, as InSight Crime has reported. When the prime minister resigned last year he cited the Coke affair as one of the main reasons for his departure.

The case contributed to the heavy defeat of Golding’s Labour Party in December’s elections, with the rival People's National Party candidate Portia Simpson Miller winning. Coke’s lawyers asserted that political deal-making is to blame for his plight, telling reporters after the sentencing delay; "He left Jamaica; the ruling party was thrown out of office, and the Government hand-picked by the United States … There was a lot of politics by the US to have him extradited. He's never been charged with one crime in his own country." Indeed, the change of government may have brought better relations with the US. On a visit earlier this month, State Department officials expressed the US’s commitment to giving security aid to Jamaica, and announced plans to send a team of prosecutors to help the government build its capacity in the fight against organized crime.

Murders dropped sharply in the wake of Coke’s arrest in June 2010, falling in 2011 to their lowest rate in eight years, at around 41 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In April of that year, the government attributed the drop to their policy of saturating gang territories with the security forces. However, NGO Jamaicans for Justice reported a rise in human rights violations following the arrest, warning that since the operation the security forces felt that they could disregard the rights of citizens without consequences.

After Coke’s capture, Golding promised to clean up Tivoli Gardens, bringing security to the population and breaking the control of the gangs. However, the continued expressions of support for Coke show how much work remains to be done for the authorities to bring the rule of law to areas like Tivoli Gardens, and win the trust of residents.

– Hannah Stone is a writer for Insight – Organized Crime in the Americas, which provides research, analysis, and investigation of the criminal world throughout the region.  Find all of her research here.

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Mexican residents are seen after evacuating their buildings after feeling the tremors from an earthquake in the southern state of Guerrero, in Mexico City Tuesday. The USGS reported a magnitude 7.6 earthquake near the country's southwestern coast. Mexico's government initially said there were no reports of serious damage. (Edgard Garrido/Reuters)

Mexico's earthquake: A reporter's notebook

By Sara Miller Llana, Staff writer / 03.20.12

I have lived in Mexico City for six years and never worried much about earthquakes. But now I have a baby. And as all parents will understand, earthquakes have now joined the list of things like airplane turbulence and speeding taxis, to name but a few, that I now care desperately about.

So when the unusually long and strong earthquake shook this city right after noon local time, as I was typing away at a local Starbucks where I often work, I slammed shut my laptop and ran as fast as I could home (losing a powercord and mouse along the way).

The streets were packed with people who had evacuated, looking up at the highrises around us, wondering if there was damage and if buildings would hold. As I looked up and ran, I kept thinking not about what lay in my own path, but that the buildings standing firm must mean that mine probably did too.

Everyone was fine at home, my sweet baby outside with her caretaker and the rest of our neighbors. But the earthquake was the biggest that I felt since living here. It measured in at 7.4 according to the US Geological Survey, which initially put it at 7.9, and the center was in Guerrero state. On Twitter, President Felipe Calderon said there appears to be no serious damage. "The health system is operating normally, except for some broken glass and other minor damage," he wrote in a Twitter post.

The quake shook central and southern Mexico, with damage including a fallen bridge and swaying office towers in Mexico City. Some 60 homes are reported damaged near the epicenter of the quake, and there are currently no reported deaths, according to the Associated Press.

I am writing this “reporters on the job” from outside my house right now on the sidewalk. For the first time in about a half dozen temblors that have prompted us to evacuate the house, we do have damage. Our walls are cracked, as it appears that our apartment and that of our neighbor slammed into one another. (Their windows are blown out.) Right now we are waiting for the authorities to assess whether there is structural damage. 

It's certainly not dramatic, but we do have broken shards of glass across our entrance and plaster across the front hallway. As I am sitting here, I see the front walling of our apartment blown off, and it immediately brings me back to the horrors of Haiti's earthquake in January 2010, my first and only first-hand experience with a disaster that devastating.

But for millions of Mexicans, it is their 1985 earthquake in this capital city that killed close to 10,000 people that spooks them, bringing panic to the streets each time a temblor hits. Quite simply, it is really scary, but especially if you have lived through the possibilities.

About two months ago, on a Saturday night, another big quake struck. We were watching a movie and flew down the stairs, grabbed the baby, and went outside. I had trouble sleeping that night, but at least we were together. There is nothing worse than being separated from family when there is a possibility that someone is hurt.

Cell phone service was out, so neighbors were unable to reach their relatives. I had gone upstairs briefly and brought down my US Vonage phone, and from that people were able to reach the landlines of their neighbors.

People always ask me how I feel living in Mexico City with all the gruesome drug violence. Honestly, I rarely think about it, except to take precautions against kidnapping. But after the last quake I kept imagining the ground shaking for weeks afterwards. Who knows how long it will last this time....

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Women coca growers hold coca leaves during the so-called 'National day of coca leaf-chewing' in La Paz, Bolivia, last week. (Juan Karita/AP)

Bolivia says no to cocaine, but yes to coca

By Jackie Briski, Guest blogger / 03.20.12

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, jbriski.wordpress.com. The views expressed are the author's own.

In many parts of the Andes, tourists can purchase t-shirts, shot glasses, coffee mugs, and all manner of other merchandise with the proud slogan “la hoja de coca no es droga,” a simple yet profound statement that means “the coca leaf is not a drug.”

The slogan itself is an indication of a deep tension between those who would use coca leaves for traditional religious and medicinal purposes, and those who would use coca to profit from its narcotic derivative, cocaine.

Nowhere is this coca-cocaine tension more prevalent than in Bolivia. For many Bolivians, it’s a matter of national identity.

Richard Craig provided some background on this in “Illicit Drug Traffic: Implications for South American Source Countries,” published in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2 back in 1987:

In one way or another most Bolivians are involved in a cocacultura. They grow the leaf, ceremonialize it, chew it, drink it, cook it, stomp it, refine it, smoke it, sell it, and seek to eradicate it. Predating the Inca period, coca’s impact on Bolivian culture is such as to render it a virtual national resource.

Domestic policy under President Evo Morales – the Coca Sí, Cocaína No program – is an attempt at striking a balance between supporting traditional uses of coca leaves while cracking down on illicit production and trafficking of cocaine.

In addition to this domestic policy, some refer to the foreign policy strategy of the Morales Administration as “coca diplomacy.”

Since his election in 2006, Morales has advocated global decriminalization of traditional uses for the coca leaf – but not decriminalization of cocaine – through amending the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 to remove all references to the coca leaf.

He raised some eyebrows at his first UN General Assembly in September 2006 by holding up a coca leaf as he made the following remarks:

I should like to take this opportunity to speak of another historical injustice: the criminalization of the coca leaf. This coca leaf is green, not white, like cocaine. … Conditionality-based policies implemented in the past focused on zero coca-leaf production. But zero coca-leaf production is equivalent to zero Quechuas, zero Aymarás, zero Mojeños, zero Chiquitanos. All of that ended with another Government. We are an underdeveloped country with economic problems resulting from the pillage of our natural resources. We are here today to begin to regain our dignity and the dignity of our country.

It turned out that the new head of state had technically smuggled the coca leaves past US Customs officials by hiding them in the book he carried with him onto the plane in order to bring them to UN Headquarters in New York.

In 2008, Morales took a stronger stand for the national dignity of the Bolivian people by expelling US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials. After suspending DEA operations indefinitely in Bolivia, Morales explained that ”We have the obligation to defend the dignity and sovereignty of the Bolivian people.”

Coca in the Constitution

The Bolivian Constitution was amended in several ways in 2009. Among other things, Bolivia is now officially defined as a  unitary plurinational state, or a country comprised of many different people groups, but with one sovereign central government.

But the Constitution also provides the following provision on coca in Part Four, Title II, Chapter Seven, Section II, Article 384 (in Spanish):

The State shall protect native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, a renewable natural resource of Bolivia’s biodiversity, and as a factor of social cohesion; in its natural state it is not a narcotic. Its revaluing, production, commercialization, and industrialization shall be regulated by law.

This particular amendment has served to formalize the tension between international convention and constitutional law in Bolivia.

More recently, Morales made a strong statement by formally withdrawing Bolivia from the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in June 2011, effective Jan. 1, 2012, since diplomatic efforts had failed to lead to the Convention’s amendment.

The Morales Administration was careful to specify that the objection was only with the classification of the coca leaf, and that the Bolivian government would ensure continued compliance with the rest of the terms of the 1961 Single Convention and the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1972.

Comparative Advantage

The coca-cocaine tension is further complicated by an economic theory known as comparative advantage.

This principle states that when it comes to trade relations, states should specialize in trading the goods that they can produce with the greatest relative efficiency at the lowest relative cost when compared to other states–giving them a comparative advantage in that particular good.

In other words, it’s more cost effective for everyone to export what they can produce more efficiently than anyone else while importing what they can’t.

Unfortunately for the Bolivian-law-abiding coca growers, the Andean Region has a clear comparative advantage in coca production. A recent report on cocaine in Stratfor’s Criminal Commodities Series explains it this way:

Coca can be grown in a number of geographic locales, including Mexico, but only the South American geography is ideally suited to naturally cultivate the plant in large enough quantities for mass production.... According to the 2011 UN World Drug Report, three countries – Colombia, Peru and Bolivia – harvested all known coca in the world.

Under previous presidential administrations, the official policy was to promote alternative development. While this is still part of the Coca Sí, Cocaína No program, alternative development is more voluntary now.

It’s a great idea to train and equip farmers to grow coffee and chocolate instead of coca – an initiative that has found great success in some regions – but coca is still easier to cultivate than chocolate and less fickle than coffee.

The Legalization Debate

Given the historical context, it comes as little surprise that the Morales Administration was quick to clarify a statement by Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos.

Following the recent bilateral meetings between the two presidents, El País reported (in Spanish) that Santos explained a plan for a Colombian-Bolivian tag team during the upcoming Summit on the Americas:

Bolivia – with its knowledge and experience in the traditional use of the coca leaf and the processes of alternative development – and Colombia – with our experience in combating drug cartels – have a lot to contribute to this discussion, which should be open and without prejudice.

He went on to use the phrase “we” several times as he explained plans to propose a “comprehensive and wide” discussion about the results of “the so-called ‘War on Drugs’” and the “diverse strategies that we can take on together to end this scourge.”

According to the El País article, Morales was standing next to Santos when he made these remarks.

However, the next day, Los Tiempos reported (in Spanish) that the Bolivian government rejects the debate on regional drug legalization.

Bolivian Government Minister Carlos Romero, who accompanied Morales on the trip to Colombia, explained that they had discussed many topics, one of which had been the fight against narcotrafficking. However, drug legalization “is not the appropriate way.” The Minister went on to say:

We have said many times that if there is no joint work between all of the countries we cannot face up to this scourge, so our proposal is to work together. Migration control, databases, international police operatives, in technology.

Several countries in Latin America came under sharp criticism from the UN in 2010 for the trend of decriminalization that swept through some countries in 2009. The report stated that Latin America was undermining the war on drugs.

This was before Santos began the process of decriminalizing personal drug possession in Colombia (a 180° turn from the policy views of his predecessor, Álvaro Uribe) and Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina – whose presidential campaign was based on the promise of crushing crime “with an iron fist” – initiated the drug legalization discussion at the regional level. .

President Morales is in a tight spot, facing pressure at home and abroad. As former head of the Bolivian national coca growers union, he has to show his electoral base that he will uphold the 2009 Constitution.

At the same time, he has to prove to the international community – especially the international drug control system – that he’s serious about upholding the rest of the Single Convention, even though Bolivia has officially withdrawn from it.

– Jackie Briski is a Latin Americanist and author of the blog cuando asi no sea.

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Shooting of Chilean diplomat's daughter underscores security threat in Venezuela

By James Bosworth, Guest blogger / 03.20.12

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.bloggingsbyboz.com. The views expressed are the author's own.

The murder of the daughter of a Chilean diplomat has received major attention in Venezuela and the region. Various police officers have been arrested in the case and it has been condemned by all sides of the political spectrum. Unfortunately, in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, killings by the police are quite common.
 
The issue rose to the surface in 2009 with several important media articles and the government's admission that as much as 15 to 20 percent of all violent crime in the country is committed by police officers. At the time, there were between 600 and 900 murder accusations against police officers in the previous 12 to 15 months. The statistics suggest the extrajudicial execution rate was even higher as police claimed they were killing criminals in firefights when they were really executing innocents. Several years ago, I called it Venezuela's version of the "false positive" scandal that occurred in Colombia.

There hasn't been quite as much coverage and commentary about the issue over the previous two years, but little has been done to reverse the trend. Police still engage in a significant number of extrajudicial executions and kidnappings. One private estimate I saw placed the number killed by Venezuelan police in 2010 at over 1,800 people. I haven't seen estimates for 2011. Certainly, some of those cases were the killings of criminals during a firefight. Some of it is political violence against opponents of the government. Other cases are corruption or organized crime related, people out for money with no political agenda. Some were cases in error in which the police opened fire on unarmed civilians like the Chilean consul's daughter and then tried to cover up their error.
 
Sadly, it takes high profile cases like the murder last week to highlight this tragic issue. It's an issue where the Chavez government has repeatedly promised reform (and will certainly do so again), but failed to deliver as crime statistics have worsened and the media attention has turned elsewhere. Chavez's government should face the full blame after over a dozen years in power. Cleaning up the police force must be one of the top agenda items if and when a new government is elected to national office.

– James Bosworth is a freelance writer and consultant based in Managua, Nicaragua, who runs Bloggings by Boz.

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Is El Salvador negotiating with criminal street gangs?

By Geoffrey Ramsey, Guest blogger / 03.16.12

• A version of this post ran on the author's site, Insightcrime.com. The views expressed are the author's own.

A new report by El Faro suggests that El Salvador's government may have struck a deal with its two largest street gangs to reduce violence, indicating that the country may be adopting a less militaristic security strategy.

El Salvador is facing a security crisis. Despite the introduction of hardline security policies in 2003 designed to minimize gang violence, the murder rate has nearly doubled, rising from 36 in that year to 70 per 100,000 in 2011. Since President Mauricio Funes took office in 2009, he has struggled to reduce violence.

Recently, he caused a stir by giving former members of the Salvadoran military prominent positions in his security cabinet. As InSight Crime has pointed out, this has led some to conclude that the government is returning to the heavy-handed (and failed) “mano dura” (iron fist) policies of the past. However, a new investigation (link in Spanish) co-authored by El Faro’s Oscar Martinez, Carlos Martinez, Sergio Arauz, and Efren Lemus, suggests that the government may have adopted a less combative approach to dealing with the powerful street gangs.

Last week, Salvadoran prison officials transferred around 30 imprisoned leaders (link in Spanish) of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 from maximum security institutions to prisons with more relaxed rules on visitors. Following that, cells of both gangs around the country were told to keep their violent activities to a minimum, according to El Faro's sources. El Faro spoke to one gang leader, who confirmed the story. As the authors write:

“El Muchacho” received a call on his cell phone on Friday morning. The call came from the prison in Ciudad Barrios and the voice on the telephone explained the new policies of the MS-13: jailed leaders had decided that the gang needed to “calm down,” which in the group’s slang is the same as saying that killings and new extortion attempts would be prohibited until further notice.

El Muchacho is an individual with whom we had scheduled an interview in a San Salvador shopping mall. He is a boss, or “palabrero,” of a local MS-13 “clica” (band). Orders that come from prison are non-negotiable, so he called up his crew and relayed the message. “We’re on vacation,” he joked.

The clica led by this 30-something had to suspend some plans immediately. According to El Muchacho, the orders caused them to put off two hits they had planned for that very same day. The only reason the gangster obeys orders like this is his utter fear of the Mara Salvatrucha’s punishment system. If a subordinate disobeys, he will be punished with anything from a severe beating to death. If El Muchaho defied his orders, both he and his boss in the Ciudad Barrios prison would be punished.

By way of comparison, El Muchacho gave the following example: “If your boss tells you ‘find this report,’ you have to go rummaging for it, because your job depends on it. It’s the same. An order’s an order.”

The explanation he was given for these orders was that a group of imprisoned gang bosses in a maximum security facility in Zacatecoluca had been transferred to other facilities, and the new orders were given so that they would stay there. What he heard was this: there had been a negotiation between some mara leaders and the government, and as long as the gangs kept things calm the government wouldn’t have any motivation to return them to Zacatecoluca.

The negotiations, if they indeed happened, have apparently worked. There has been a significant drop in homicides of late, with March 12 being the least violent day the country has seen in three years, with only two killings registered (link in Spanish). The average for the first few weeks of this year was 13 a day. Although police claim that this recent improvement is due to “improved coordination and intelligence,” (link in Spanish) law enforcement and intelligence sources told El Faro a different story, and even mentioned a financial incentive for the drop in homicides.

The first news of the transfer came to this newspaper on Friday, April 9. It came in the form of a few lines from a report generated by the Police Intelligence Center (CIP). It claimed that the "green," referring to the military, had moved all the "junk" of the Mara Salvatrucha. "The information is confirmed," concluded the extract, which also spoke of thousands of dollars offered to the highest-ranking gang members if homicides fell this month.

That same day, an intelligence agent claimed that, according to officials who were closely involved, this strategy was led by Colonel Simon Molina Montoya, who served as an intelligence adviser to the current Security and Justice Minister, David Munguia Payes, when the latter was minister of defense. Currently, Molina Montoya is the second-in-command of the State Intelligence Agency (OIE).

When reached by phone on Wednesday, Montoya Molina said simply: "Sorry, I know nothing." El Faro attempted to interview General Munguia Payes on Tuesday to discuss the transfer of prisoners, but there was no response. This Wednesday the minister’s phone was called repeatedly, but none of our calls were returned. When El Faro called a ministry press official, the periodical relayed the contents of the article and asked for a response from the authorities. This official told El Faro that they had passed on the request to the minister, but that he still had no comment.

The CIP report and the claims of the intelligence agent suggest that negotiations are still in a sort of trial period this month, as the transfers have only one purpose: to bring the most important leaders of the two main gangs to prisons where security measures are more lax, so it is easier for them to spread the message to other leaders in prison, which in turn will contact their gang cells to relay the message.

A source in the OIE confirmed all this to El Faro. The informant added that some officials have voiced concerns about the negotiations, with some believing that reports of the talks have leaked more than expected despite the fact that they began less than a month ago.

El Faro spoke with yet another intelligence agent about the matter, who admitted that the government has undertaken negotiations with gangs in order to lower homicides. However, the sources disagree on the nature of the exchange. Two contacts mentioned the delivery of $10,000 to the families of five Mara Salvatrucha leaders, while another source spoke of simpler benefits, such as more comfortable living arrangements for those who have been transferred.

The assertion that these negotiations are led by a secretary with ties to Minister of Justice and Security Munguia is surprising. Mungia has appeared to favor a return to the more hardline security policies of the past. Just last month, he suggested that the civil liberty guarantees in El Salvador’s legal system were too strong, and stated that he was prepared to lock up an additional 10,000 gang members if need be (link in Spanish).

If the allegations are true, it would suggest that El Salvador’s government has attempted a major shift in its anti-crime strategy, opting to negotiate with the “maras” instead of confronting them head on. This could be a positive sign for the future of citizen security in the country, as the iron fist strategy failed to rein in violence, and instead contributed to the expansion of the gangs.

However, if negotiations with just 30 gang leaders can bring about an immediate and drastic drop in homicides, this suggests that the gangs are responsible for a large percentage of murders in the country, as the government has claimed. It would also mean the gangs may be more hierarchically organized than previously thought. This would lend weight to claims that the gangs recently adopted a nationally-coordinated campaign against security forces, carrying out hits against members of the army and police. If this is all true, then in addition to threatening citizen security, these groups could pose a dire threat to El Salvador's institutions.

– Geoffrey Ramsey  is a writer for Insight – Organized Crime in the Americas, which provides research, analysis, and investigation of the criminal world throughout the region. Find all of his research here.

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Florida bill targets firms doing business with Cuba

By Anya Landau French, Guest blogger / 03.16.12

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, thehavananote.com. The views expressed are the author's own.

Only in Florida can you have legislators so obsessed with another country that they routinely pass laws designed to punish said country even when they harm that state's own interests.

On Friday (March  9), the Florida legislature passed a law that would ban any of the state's public contracts to be awarded to companies that also do business with Cuba.  The obvious target of the bill is Brazil's Odebrecht, which has done quite well in Miami over the past couple of decades, and which is also behind the transformation of Cuba's port at Mariel into a major Caribbean shipping hub (no doubt in preparation for the day when US-bound liners are again allowed to stop freely in Cuba).  I'm not in a position to wade into whether Odebrecht should or shouldn't win public contracts, except to say it seems to me they should win or lose on the merits, not the politics. 

The National Foreign Trade Council's Dan O'Flaherty says the just-passed Florida law is unconstitutional – the constitution prohibits states legislating foreign policy matters in conflict with federal laws. O'Flaherty cites a Massachusetts law that would have enforced a similar restriction on companies dealing with Myanmar (Burma).  That law was struck down by the US Supreme Court in 2000. 

Perhaps the Florida legislature might be forgiven for its short memory on the subject.  Except that not quite three years ago, a 2008 law it passed to force US charter companies to pay exceedingly high bonds to operate their flights to Cuba (which, had it taken effect, would have likely forced them out of business altogether) was struck down by a Federal District Judge in Miami. 

“The State of Florida is not entitled to adopt a foreign policy under our Constitution or interfere with the exclusive prerogative of the United States to establish a carefully balanced approach to relations with foreign countries, including Cuba,” the judge ruled.

The 2008 law never took effect.  I imagine that Florida taxpayers were thrilled to know their tax dollars were nonetheless spent to defend a state law that was designed to put Florida businesses out of business and destined to be struck down by well-established judicial – Supreme Court, no less – precedent.

If Florida taxpayers ever figure out this vicious cycle of a boondoggle, they ought to be pretty steamed about it.  Defenders of the law claim this bill is needed to keep taxpayer dollars from going to companies that do business with the likes of Cuba.  Maybe there also needs to be a bill that keeps taxpayer dollars from being used repeatedly to defend the state legislature's forays into what the constitution considers to be federal foreign policy.

– Anya Landau French blogs for The Havana Note, a project of the "US-Cuba Policy Initiative,” directed by Ms. Landau French, at the New America

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A soldier stands guard as a policeman searches men for drugs and weapons during an operation in San Salvador January 23. As Mexican cartels are moving into Central America, this forces governments to call in army troops to support local law enforcements efforts against drug trafficking. Drug gangs have also established connections with local kingpins and gangs, known as Maras, increasing the levels of violence in the area. (Leonardo Baldovinos/REUTERS)

Street gangs on the rise in South America: Are Central America's 'Maras' among them?

By Geoffrey Ramsey, Guest blogger / 03.15.12

• A version of this post ran on the author's site, Insightcrime.com. The views expressed are the author's own.

In recent years, officials have expressed increasing concern about the influence of Central American street gangs, known as “maras,” in South America; but while street gangs are on the rise in the region, they are a different beast.

On May 25 last year, 19-year-old Peruvian Oscar Barrientos shot and killed his father in their home in Callao, a city just west of Lima. When Peruvian police arrested him last month, however, his confession was less shocking than his reported motive. According to officials, Barrientos considered himself a member of the Mara Salvatrucha (link in Spanish) – also known as MS-13 – and may have killed his father as part of an initiation rite into the gang (see original post for photo of his tattooed lower lip). This revelation set off a wave of speculation in Peru on the influence of the Central American street gang in the country, and prompted local police to claim that Callao is home to at least one MS-13 crew of about 20 individuals.

Alarm over the spreading influence of Central American “maras” is nothing new. Groups like MS-13 and their rivals, Barrio 18, have expanded across Central America, as well as operating in Mexico and the United States. In recent years, analysts have become concerned about the potential for their growth in South America. Since as far back as 2005, US law enforcement officials have been warning that cells of the Mara Salvatrucha have sprung up in Ecuador, and there have been reports of members of both the MS-13 and Barrio 18 in countries as distant as Bolivia, Venezuela and even Argentina.

But while there may be small cells active in these countries, these groups do not pose anything like the same menace that they do in Central America. Claims to the contrary overlook a primary feature of the maras’ history: the fact that they first formed in the US, and that their spread throughout Central America is due mostly to a wave of deportations of gang members from the US that began in the 1990s.

Both MS-13 and M-18 began as small scale street gangs made up of mostly Central American (and some Mexican) migrants in the barrios, or slums, of Los Angeles in the late 1980s. They eventually became some of the most powerful gangs in the California prison system. By the end of the 1990s, the US started to see these groups as a serious criminal threat. Partly as a result, the Clinton administration significantly strengthened US deportation policies, beginning to send large numbers of foreign-born convicts back to their home countries.

This resulted in a spike in the number of gang members being sent to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and elsewhere. By some estimates, as many as 20,000 criminals were sent to Central America between 2000 and 2004, and the trend has continued to this day. Sources in US law enforcement have told InSight Crime that around 100 ex-convicts are deported every week to El Salvador alone.

But because South American migrants never formed a significant portion of the membership of these LA gangs, large-scale maras are not likely to develop south of the Darien Gap. However, this is not to say that domestic gangs are not a major threat to security in South America. Countries across the continent are seeing a steady rise in the incidence of homicides, extortion, drug distribution, and kidnapping, mostly driven by urban street gangs.

In countries like Colombia and Brazil, which are plagued by more organized criminal groups, the problem is more complex. These organizations often “subcontract” street gangs to serve as their enforcers, using them to cement their control over urban areas. Like the groups in the US, many South American gangs use prisons as a kind of home base and recruiting ground. Prisons in Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia are often almost entirely controlled by the gangs themselves, and it is not uncommon for gang leaders to run their organizations from behind bars.

South American street gangs may not be as notorious as Central America’s maras, but they pose a significant threat to security. What’s more, it could be set to worsen. UN officials have warned of a surge of cocaine consumption among youths in South America, led by Uruguay, Chile and Argentina (link in Spanish). With the domestic market rising, the incentive to control it is higher, meaning that gang violence in the region could become even more serious.

– Geoffrey Ramsey  is a writer for Insight – Organized Crime in the Americas, which provides research, analysis, and investigation of the criminal world throughout the region. Find all of his research here.

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