How the US can prevent the use and spread of Syria's chemical weapons
The conflict in Syria could become even more deadly if Bashar al-Assad uses or loses control of his sizeable arsenal of chemical weapons. The international community’s options to prevent these scenarios are limited, but they do provide a starting point.
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For instance, even precision airstrikes cannot destroy the stockpiles because there is imperfect intelligence on all possible storage locations, and attempts to destroy the depots could cause widespread civilian casualties. As we learned in the first Gulf War in 1991, attacks on chemical weapons depots risk release of deadly agents downwind over both troops and innocent civilians, and possibly cross-border into neighboring countries, with potentially long-term health implications.Skip to next paragraph
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Likewise, inserting foreign ground forces into Syria for the purpose of securing the dozen or so sites where Assad stores or produces chemical weapons would put those soldiers at very high risk. And doing so probably makes it more likely that Assad actually uses his chemical weapons.
In the end, the fate of Syria’s deadly arsenal may depend on the decisions of a few key Syrian officers and soldiers on the ground. Consequently, one of the most important steps that can be taken is for regional leaders to issue coordinated statements that reinforce Mr. Obama’s message to Assad, as well as to military personnel now directly in charge of the chemical stockpiles, that individuals will be held accountable if the weapons are used or pilfered.
Assad’s allies in Russia, as well as in Iran – which itself suffered from chemical warfare during the 1980-1988 conflict with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – can help reinforce this message by threatening to withdraw all forms of support if Assad orders the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian opposition.
The Syrian rebel command and its emerging political leadership must also make it clear that individuals who maintain security of the weapons will be given favorable consideration in the post-Assad future. And the opposition must commit to secure these sites in the short run, without major injury or deaths, and to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention to verifiably eliminate the stockpiles over the longer term.
The eventual destruction of Syria’s remaining chemical arsenal will require international support, including technical expertise and financing. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has inspected and verified the safe destruction of over 54,000 tons of chemical weapons in six of seven declared possessor countries since 1997 (the great majority in the US and Russia). The OPCW will be needed to verify and inspect any such post-conflict operation in Syria.
Syria’s chemical weapons cannot preserve Assad’s crumbling regime, but they can create an even more dangerous and deadly situation for Syria’s suffering people and its neighbors. The US and countries in the region with interests in Syria must overcome their differences to help preclude the use and spread of Syria’s deadly arsenals.
Daryl G. Kimball is the executive director of the independent Arms Control Association; Paul F. Walker is director of the Environmental Security and Sustainability Program for Green Cross International and its US national affiliate, Global Green USA.