What the West needs in Afghanistan: humility

That institution, however, deflects focus from the political framework required for long-term change, stability, and prosperity. The military's commendable work in building schools, digging wells, opening healthcare centers, and bolstering local security forces is no substitute for a political agenda that is inevitably messy, complex, and fraught with setbacks and compromise, only progressing as the locals want.

Donor governments don't like this, of course. In a media age, they prefer delivery on things that can be seen and counted rather than dealing with more nebulous and inevitably high-maintenance local and regional political alliances. Problems also arise because the international parties routinely underestimate their opponents, militarily, politically, and in terms of their staying power. It is also because, in their eagerness to help themselves by helping others, they risk appearing not only messianic but imperialistic.

But beyond grandstanding attempts at international gatherings such as the myriad "G summits," today's actors are badly equipped to bring about the sort of integrated political actions required for long-term solutions aimed at transforming failed states.

Among the West's political elite, there are many savvy spinmeisters, but fewer diplomatic dealmakers, the sort who can broker deals with the Taliban, unspeakable publicly until recently, with which the insurgency can more quickly be countered. They are what we most need now – realists who can concede where necessary and link national, regional, and international agendas for action. This holistic approach would be a welcome change from the West's aimless targeting of geographic areas such as Helmand Province in the south, and issues such as poppy-farming. The unintended costs and consequences of such actions help explain why the West has struggled to keep the Afghan people – and its leadership – on its side.

The embedding of foreign bureaucrats within the Afghan government can also make a difference, if they have field experience and the ability to work outside their own department. Such skills have proved few and far between, not least since they should be willing also to put themselves in harm's way, a scarcity of talent compounded by overly quick rotation periods between deployments. But overall Afghanistan needs fewer foreign consultants and more money channeled for projects, especially the long-term drivers of development, such as education. Finally, and most important, it needs to prioritize policies that create jobs and grow the economy.

Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan may be a war of necessity rather than choice, but to date it is a campaign constructed on little more than hope, caricature, and hubris. Since its success or failure depends on how seriously Afghans take each other and the task at hand, a little humility and a little less external enlightenment and direction could work wonders. It would certainly help to take the shine off the imperial reflection and outline a cause worth fighting for – or not.

Greg Mills heads the Brenthurst Foundation, based in Johannesburg, South Africa, which fosters policies to boost Africa's economic performance. He served in 2006 as an adviser to the commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He is currently on leave as a visiting scholar at Cambridge University.

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