Does the Obama nuclear strategy put the US at risk?
Former Secretary of State George Shultz, a Republican, defends Obama’s nuclear strategy and discusses his vision of a world without nukes.
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Shultz: He is doing an excellent job. He has put the vision out there and keeps it out there. The nuclear posture review shows he is being careful about American national security at every step. The conference of world leaders on securing fissile material is the right thing to do. Who is going to disagree with that? So you get the whole world working on something and solving a problem. That is always a good step.Skip to next paragraph
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Gardels: Some American politicians (such as Sarah Palin) have criticized Obama’s actions for making America more vulnerable...
Shultz: ...I don’t see how he is making us more vulnerable. I just don’t see that at all.
But let me make a related point. One of the things in the nuclear posture review that has gotten zero attention – but deserves some attention – is the common sense notion that deterrence involves more than just nuclear weapons. There are all sorts of ways historically that you can deter an enemy. If you are an Al Qaeda fighter in the hills of Pakistan, you are much more worried about a drone than a nuclear missile.
We need to broaden our concept that deterrence is not just nuclear. That is part of the thinking that must go along with steep reductions in nuclear weapons.
Gardels: At Reykjavik, the stumbling block with Gorbachev was the proposed US missile defense. The Soviets regarded that as a first-strike weapon. This time around, the US-proposed missile defense based in Europe is also a stumbling block. The Russians worry it might be to their disadvantage in any conflict with the West. American critics of the treaty claim that the Russians can opt out of their commitments if we don’t come to terms on missile defense.
Shultz: That is what they say....
Gardels: What should be the approach here?
Shultz: It is a subject we should discuss with the Russians. If we are worried about a missile attack from Iran that could be detected from a radar station based in Russia, we should go and ask them, “how can we go about that?” We should work on this collaboratively.
President Reagan proposed to Gorbachev that we share missile defense technology with the Soviets. Gorbachev, of course, didn’t believe that he would.
But the fact today is that everybody would br better off if we can learn how to defend ourselves, particularly against rogue states that don’t have a huge arsenal. That can be done.
Gardels: In Reykjavik, the Soviet concern was that a space-linked missile defense on the part of the US would be equivalent to a first-strike weapon since it could block their missiles while ours got through.
This missile defense system in this case is very limited and aimed at Iran. It would seem the Russians would be more open to that, and find sharing technology more believable.
Shultz: You would think so. After all, they have rebellious provinces in the northern Caucasus that was demonstrated tragically in the Moscow subway recently. Maybe Iran would slip them something, who knows? For that reason a common missile defense system would seem to make sense.
Gardels: What are the next steps down the disarmament path?
Shultz: President Obama is taking the next step by trying to broaden the dialogue beyond just the US and Russia. He is trying to engage the whole global community. Certainly the preponderance of weapons is still in the hands of these two states, but issues such as securing fissile material and uranium enrichment are global issues.
And, as we were just discussing, dialogue with Russia is key to prevent substantial arms reductions from being derailed for one reason or another.
We have come a long way since Reykjavik. When this new START treaty goes into effect, there will only be one-quarter the number of nuclear weapons in the world that there were at the time of the Reykjavik summit in 1986. That shows that the path toward disarmament is not utopian. It is possible.