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In Iraq, a clear-cut bin Laden-Zarqawi alliance
Audiotape of Al Qaeda leader, released Tuesday, coincided with deadly insurgent attacks.
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Both men's Salafy branch of Sunni Islam is highly intolerant of Shiites, as is Saudi Arabia, but it had seemed that bin Laden wanted to keep the focus on the US. Zarqawi, for his part, seemed to want to form his own organization.
But in an October Internet statement, Zarqawi announced he was changing the name of his group to "Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers,'' a reference to the Tigris and Euphrates. In Tuesday's tape bin Laden called Zarqawi his organization's "emir," or leader, in Iraq.
In bin Laden's other recent statements before this one, he sought to speak to Americans in a language of justice and democracy - a departure from his usually more religious and militant approach. Some analysts thought it was a sign that bin Laden was seeking not only to influence the US election, but to broaden his appeal among Muslims turned off by his earlier virulent words and actions.
While his latest tape may be a return to form, it doesn't mean that he's abandoning his attempt to influence politics. "Bin Laden needs to be understood as a crafty politician, a rational actor who tailors his comments to different audiences,'' says Toby Jones, a Saudi Arabia specialist for the International Crisis Group based in Cairo. "Perhaps different statements are designed for different publics, so he doesn't worry too much about consistency."
What's clearer is that bin Laden feels in a safe enough position, making three statements in two months after years or scarce public statements.
Islamist terror groups have been increasing in size and number inside Iraq since the US invasion in April 2003. While Zarqawi's group is the best known, the Ansar al-Sunnah, which has grown strong in the area around Iraq's third largest city of Mosul has also become a major player, carrying out assassinations of Iraqi police, politicians, and construction workers.
The group claimed responsibility for the infiltration of a suicide bomber into a US military base last week who killed 19 Americans and five Iraqis. It posted a video of a man it said was the bomber on its website, wearing an explosives belt and preparing to die. The attack was the largest loss of US life in a single incident since the war began.
"There's no doubt that Iraq has become a major battleground for the global jihad movement, which is composed of many different autonomous groups of which Al Qaeda is but one component,'' says M.J. Gohel, director of the Asia Pacific Foundation, a security think tank in London.
"Iraq is one place in the planet where they can hit very directly at US interests and with much tragic success, so naturally bin Laden wants a piece of the action. He's happy to give his blessings to [Zarqawi], who has operational capabilities in Iraq that Al Qaeda doesn't have, and expand his franchise in this way,'' says Mr. Gohel.
Gunaratna expects that the role of Islamist fighters, both foreign and local, will continue to rise in Iraq in the years ahead, mirroring the evolution of the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In the first few years of the conflict, there was only a trickle of foreign fighters into Afghanistan, but that accelerated as the war dragged on.
He says that more and more Muslims from the Middle East and Europe are seeking to fight in Iraq, and that Al Qaeda is seeking to position itself to integrate these fighters into its broader vision of a jihad against all American interests, not simply limited to the specifics of Iraq.
"One of the overarching trends of Al Qaeda's strategy has been to co-opt like-minded groups that start out with local interests in mind and seduce them into waging global jihad,'' says Gunaratna.
"In some ways Al Qaeda as an organization is dying, but it is influencing other groups to become like Al Qaeda. Iraq is now the major recruiting center," he says.
He also worries of another trend that may mirror the Afghan experience. "These fighters have been practicing terrorist tactics, car-bombings, in Iraq from day one and now they're much more radicalized. They'll take their tactics home with them when they leave."
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