How the D's and R's faded in 9/11 commissioners' task

When we were appointed chair and vice chair of the 9/11 commission, we faced two overwhelming challenges: a mandate of astonishing breadth, and the poisonous partisan waters of Washington. In many ways, the latter was the more daunting. We knew our report would receive scant attention if we failed to achieve unanimity on our findings and recommendations - the worst outcome, in the eyes of the American people, would have been one report endorsed by five Republicans, and another endorsed by five Democrats. Yet each commissioner was appointed by party leaders in a time of extraordinary partisanship. Some in Congress opposed the commission's very creation, the original chairman and vice chairman stepped down over hotly debated conflicts of interest, and many in Washington were wary that the commission would be an exercise in assigning blame to President Bush or President Clinton.

Throughout our hearings, our work was used by members of both parties to issue charges and counter-charges, and was often juxtaposed in media coverage along with political controversies like the publication of the memoir by former antiterrorism chief Richard Clarke. We began our work in the wake of the bitter 2002 midterm elections and proceeded through the presidential primary campaign. Everyone noted that our report was due to come out squarely in the midst of what was shaping up to be a bitterly contested presidential campaign. We were, it seemed, set up to fail.

How did we navigate these partisan waters? To begin with, we rejected a lot of advice from people who told us to be confrontational with the White House, just as we rejected advice to pursue a quiet investigation behind closed doors. We chose a balanced approach, and that made all the difference.

Issuing subpoena after subpoena could have split the commission, and almost certainly would have provoked the White House to claim executive privilege, prompting drawn-out legal proceedings that could have lingered through our deadline. We did issue subpoenas to agencies when we felt they were not being fully responsive. But by approaching the White House with an eye toward negotiation and cooperation - not confrontation - we were able to achieve unprecedented access.

There was no magic to this process. We simply sat down and worked out our differences by remaining in constant touch with the White House - we met and talked a lot. By keeping these lines of communication open, both the commission and the White House were able to gain a full understanding of the others' positions. They appreciated our determination to see everything and everybody necessary to fulfill our mandate, and we appreciated their concerns for national security and the privileges of the presidency. Because we spoke so often, misunderstandings could not impede progress. We ultimately did agree to some conditions on our access, but we talked to every official and saw every document necessary to fulfill our mandate: a satisfactory outcome to both sides.

We also worked hard to develop collegiality within the commission. Too often, in statehouses or Congressional committees, people see each other as only "D's" or "R's." When we met, we met as a commission, not in groups of five Democrats or five Republicans. And we made a concerted effort to get to know one another - for instance, to have dinner at Jamie Gorelick's house in Washington or John Lehman's apartment in New York. It may seem trivial, but the more we got to know one another as people, the more those D's and R's began to fade. Soon a rapport developed among commissioners, humor could defuse tensions, and disagreements emerged over issues, not party interests. Indeed, in the course of our work, the commission did not have a single vote that broke on partisan lines.

The same was true for our public appearances. As chair and vice chair, we decided to always appear together on television, and we encouraged other commissioners also to appear in bipartisan pairs. If a producer called and asked for one of us, the answer was: "not unless I can bring Lee" or "not unless I can bring Tom." In this manner, we became a unit: Instead of being seen as the chief representatives on the commission of our respective political parties, we were the chief representatives of a bipartisan set of commissioners.

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