Still flushed with their success in capturing Saddam Hussein, a joint CIA-military commando unit called Task Force 121 has been dispatched to Afghanistan with a new mission to get Osama bin Laden.

The elite unit is part of a growing host of intelligence resources joining the hunt along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. The momemtum prompted US military officials here in January to predict confidently that America's most wanted man would be taken this year.

But interviews with top Afghan and US intelligence officials reveal a number of reasons the US has failed so far to catch Mr. bin Laden and his coterie of fighters. The difficulties, which cannot be easily overcome, are numerous:

• Few of America's local spies trust the US military or US intelligence agents, who by one account rotate in and out within three months.

• Most of America's human intelligence comes from local interpreters, many of whom have their own personal scores to settle, and have a history of giving false information.

• American technological advantages in satellite imagery and phone intercepts are almost useless in a country with few phones to monitor.

"Without human intelligence, this operation will be meaningless," says a senior Afghan intelligence officer, who requests anonymity. "Instead of catching Osama, the Americans will only create more opposition for themselves."

Most Afghans want the Americans to stay and rebuild the country, this Afghan intelligence officer adds, noting that Afghans regularly provide American intelligence agents and soldiers with tip-offs of Taliban movements. But individual American agents don't spend enough time in Afghanistan to know who is telling them the truth.

"American intelligence agencies change their staff every three months," he says. "How is it possible for a foreigner to come to Kandahar or Khost, to understand the society or the psychology, to know a man's tribal relations, his past behavior, his personal motives, whether he is honest or if he is telling a lie? It is not possible in three months."

Poor intelligence has led to mistakes.

In December 2001, a tip from the warlord, Badshah Khan Zadran, sent American AC-130 gunships and Navy fighters to attack a convoy of vehicles full of Afghan tribal elders on their way to show allegiance to the post-Taliban government; 65 civilians were reportedly killed.

In July 2002, at least 48 people were killed and 117 wounded when US warplanes attacked a wedding party in the town of Deh Rawud in central Afghanistan. The US military said a gunship had come under fire in the area.

More recently, on Dec. 6, 2003, US forces admitted mistakenly killing nine children when they bombed the home of a suspected Taliban commander near the town of Ghazni. The attack, prompted by "extensive intelligence" was precise, but the target left the location an hour before.

"I believe as long as you use local, infamous warlords, you'll always have problems," says Ali Ahmed Jalali, the Afghan interior minister, who maintains an extensive intelligence service. "Some of these warlords wanted to ensure mistakes were made, to keep the war going. There are cases where misinformation has been fed into the system."

What the US and Afghan intelligence agencies need to start doing, an Afghan intelligence official says, is look for friends in lower places.

"There are rumors now that [bin Laden] is in Pakistan, in Wana, in Pakistani Kashmir, or in Nooristan near the Chinese border," says the Afghan intelligence officer. "What the intelligence people should do is go to these places and find farmers, or shepherds, or nomads, and build good relations with them," he says, rubbing fingers together in the symbol for money. "This is how you get information."

Information received from local sources, however, doesn't come in English. And the US's own interpreters - the crucial first filter for tipoffs - are often untrustworthy.

"Most of the interpreters and translators have links with Hizb-e Islami and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar," says Mr. Jalali, referring to a former US ally in the anti-Soviet insurgency who sided with the Taliban two years ago.

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