History's lessons call for stamina

Guerrilla wars of the last half century cast a sobering light on the US-led occupation of Iraq: Insurgents often win - and when they do not, quelling them can take years of hard effort.

After a spate of helicopter downings and other attacks that signify an intensifying Iraqi insurgency, military strategists say a long-term US presence is all the more vital to bolstering fledgling Iraqi security forces and bringing hope of a viable representative government.

In nondescript offices inside the Pentagon, military planners are already projecting troop deployments to Iraq as far out as 10 years.

But a looming US election and public concern over casualties are pressuring President Bush to speed the transfer of power to Iraqis. The Pentagon has outlined a possible troop drawdown next year. Meanwhile, Iraq administrator Paul Bremer held urgent meetings here this week, amid intelligence reports that Iraqi support for the resistance may grow.

Military experts warn that a premature hand- -off to Iraqis could leave a power void, undermining Mr. Bush's stated goal of building a democratic, antiterrorist Iraq as an example for the entire Middle East.

"By staying, the United States will face a protracted insurgency," explains Steven Metz, director of research at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute in Carlisle, Pa. "But by withdrawing forces before the new Iraq is able to stand on its own, the ultimate strategic objective - a unified, stable Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors and does not support international terrorism - will not be met."

"Iraqis will not be ready for several years to run a stable nation on their own," he predicts. Currently the US-led coalition includes about 130,000 US troops, 25,000 other foreign troops, and 130,000 Iraqi security forces, according to the Pentagon. But some US military officials question whether the number of Iraqis is that high, and say they lack adequate training (see related story).

Lessons from past counter-insurgency campaigns - from the 1950s Malayan Emergency to Vietnam - suggest that success will require a broad civil-military strategy that emphasizes political and economic development and patient police work as much as infantry kicking in doors and hunting down guerrillas.

Past guerrilla wars also underscore a common mistake that experts say was repeated in Iraq: the failure of governing authorities to grasp the complexity and scope of the challenge early on.

"The insurgency in Iraq that is killing American soldiers daily has been incorrectly and simplistically characterized by US President George Bush's administration," wrote Ahmed Hashim, a professor of strategic studies at the US Naval War College in Newport, R.I., in July.

That's not to say Iraq is Vietnam redux. Most Iraqis are glad Saddam Hussein's regime is over, for example, and the rate of US casaulties is far lower.

But the danger of misreading the situation is real nonetheless.

US officials initially depicted attacks on American forces as the work of a handful of "bitter-ender" supporters of the Saddam Hussein regime. Viewing the Iraqi opposition as a monolith reflected "pervasive cultural ignorance and arrogance" by the administration, wrote Mr. Hashim.

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