Skip to: Content
Skip to: Site Navigation
Skip to: Search

US Must Build on Success In Dealing With Yemen

Supporting unity was right; now America should give postwar aid

By Mamoun Fandy. Mamoun Fandy is an assistant professor of political science at Mt. Mercy College in Cedar RapidsIowa. / July 28, 1994

AFTER two months of ferocious fighting, the civil war in Yemen is over. Three days after government forces captured Aden, the largest southern city, forcing the southern leaders to flee Yemen to the neighboring states of Oman and Djibouti, President Ali Abdullah Saleh declared his forces to be in control and invited Yemenis to participate in the formation of the new government of national unity.

Skip to next paragraph

The end of the civil war was not only a success for pro-unity forces in Yemen and the Arab world but also a success for United States policy toward Yemen. For the first time since the Suez crisis, the Arab public has applauded the US stance on a regional crisis. Against the advice of its regional allies, mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the US refused to recognize the state declared by southern separatists. Instead, the US worked for a peaceful settlement that would preserve Yemen's unity. It was a brilliant move not to go against pro-unity sentiments of the Yemeni people. Contrary to popular Arab perception that the US conspired against the will of the Arab people by encouraging separatism in order to ``divide and rule,'' the US now seems a power that encourages unity. This change in Arabs' perception of the US role in the region is important for fostering US interests. US policymakers should be proud of the success of their Yemen policy and their ability to gain support among the people of the region.

However, this success has the potential to dissipate if it is not followed by measures designed to help in the postwar reconstruction and maintain Yemen's democratic experiment.

As the US attempts to fashion a postwar position toward Yemen, it should carefully consider the results of the war. First, the US should recognize President Saleh's strength. Rarely has an Arab leader managed to deal with a crisis successfully without outside help, as Saleh was able to do. Moreover, Saleh's military victory boosts the morale of the Yemeni Army and reduces the socialist party of the south to just that - a political party - instead of a political party with an army. This confidence could lead the Yemeni Army to take a step toward disarming the tribal militias that are currently under the control of Abdullah al-Ahmar, the leader of the Islamic-oriented Islah Party. Depriving both the socialists and the Islamists of their weapons and their militias is the key to building a viable democracy in Yemen.

However, if the US fails to work with Saleh, US interests in the region could be harmed. During the war, Yemen's neighbor, Saudi Arabia, supported the vanquished southerners. Opposition Saudi groups, both Islamic and liberal, supported the north and Yemen's unity.

Support by Saudi Islamists for Saleh is of particular interest. The Saudi Islamists gained popular support by appealing to religious sentiments of the Saudi public. They accused the Saudi government of supporting Marxist atheists in the south against their Islamic brethren in the north. Since the Saudi royal family has little legitimacy beyond the appearance of piety, this erosion in royal legitimacy could lead to an eventual change of government. It is in the interest of the US that this change be peaceful.