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Ensuring Jordan's Position As Moderate Regional `Buffer'

Radicalization of Palestinians in Jordan remains a danger

By Alon Ben-Meir. Alon Ben-Meir is professor of International Relations at the New School for Social ResearchNew York. / January 25, 1994

THE question that troubles many Jordanian nationalists is whether or not the emergence of a Palestinian state resulting from the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization agreement will mean the beginning of the end of Hashemite rule in Jordan.

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The strategic interests of the United States and Israel require that Jordan remain politically moderate. This can best be secured by continuous Hashemite rule. In addition Jordan should maintain the democratization process that is contributing to Jordan's political stability. The creation of a Palestinian state would not threaten Jordan, provided that the US and Israel build into the peace process a special role for Jordan as a geopolitical buffer.

The Jordanians' concerns are rooted in their country's demographic composition, estimated to be 50 to 65 percent Palestinian and of Palestinian origin. From the Jordanian perspective, the Israeli-PLO agreement has rekindled Palestinian nationalism and removed any prospect of restoring Jordanian authority over the West Bank.

Palestinian nationalism has always contained a residue of hostility toward Jordan. The Palestinians resent Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1951, they blame King Hussein for losing it in the 1967 war with Israel, and they also hold him responsible for the 1970 civil war that left 10,000 Palestinians dead and three to four times as many expelled to Lebanon. Even though most Palestinians in Jordan are Jordanian citizens, very few participated in the 1989 parliamentary elections, leaving the political field wide-open to fundamentalist candidates. In the November 1993 parliamentary elections, the Palestinians by and large voted for candidates who supported the peace process, a factor that contributed significantly to the heavy losses sustained by fundamentalists. To what extent their sentiment could change in the future and how they might use their political power on both sides of the Jordan River are the core questions of the Jordanian dilemma. Soon after the ``Gaza-Jericho first'' agreement became known, King Hussein was quoted as having described it as ``a danger to the national security of the Jordanian Kingdom.'' But officially the Jordanians expressed reserved satisfaction with the agreement.

Should Jordan's stability be undermined by an extremist Palestinian takeover, not only Israel but also Saudi Arabia will lose a critical strategic buffer that separates the Saudi oil fields from the heavily populated northern belt that includes Iraq and Syria. A radical Jordan will be a natural partner to the Sunni Muslim-led Iraq. As the only homogeneous Arab country with a Sunni majority, Jordan shares long borders with Iraq and has the Red Sea port of Aqaba, which served as a vital outlet to the sea for Iraq during the Gulf war.

For Israel, to which national security is of paramount importance, and for the US, whose primary interest in the region remains the protection of oil resources, Jordan's future political stability is essential. A number of steps must be taken to ensure the continuity of the Hashemite rule and regional stability.