Iran Faces Serious Post-Khomeini Divisions
NO country like Iran, and no leader like the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, have generated such obsessive fascination, deep anger, and revulsion in the West. Now, the political focus has shifted to his successors and their differences. Most observers estimate that these differences - covering the entire spectrum of issues relating to Iran and to its future relations with the outside world - will tear the Islamic regime apart. Iran is challenged by a variety of opposition forces - though luckily for the leadership, there is no united front with a leader capable of galvanizing the Iranian masses into action, as the ayatollah did against Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi.
But these differences mask even deeper divisions, dichotomies, and contradictions, reflecting problems dating back to the mid-19th century but submerged by the superior and repressive power of the Pahlavis and the religious hysteria of the post-revolution years.
The first division is between the Islamic and nationalist poles of Iran's identity, culture, and psychology. Some Iranians feel more loyal to Iran than to Islam and put the greater value on their pre-Islamic traditions. An even larger number feel more committed to Islam. But at heart, for centuries most Iranians have felt committed to the country and to Islam. Indeed, the dichotomy between Islam and nationalism in Iran has been a relatively recent phenomenon, resulting from the manipulation of these two concepts for political purposes. The Pahlavis used nationalism to consolidate and legitimate their rule. In the process they undermined Islam, creating a religious backlash. Nationalism suffered because of its identification with the Pahlavis.
By contrast, the Islamic regime manipulated Islam to delegitimate its opponents, attacked Iran's cultural heritage, and denigrated its past. The result was popular opposition, some anti-Islamic backlash, and a gradual reassertion of Iranianism, to which even the regime grudgingly had to adapt.
Political battles are still fought under the banner of Islam and nationalism. Yet to survive, Iran must once more draw strength from both heritages, as it has done for most of 12 centuries. Otherwise, the division will weaken Iran and could cause its destruction as a unified country.
The second division is between the haves and the have-nots. The Iranian revolution was about class as well as about religion and politics. Indeed, it was a classic case of a revolution of rising expectations. Part of Khomeini's appeal was based on his promise of social justice to Iran's disadvantaged people - although he was unable to follow through.
To distribute wealth, however, it is necessary to generate it. Obviously, state-controlled economies have proved inefficient. But the fruits of private enterprise take time to trickle down. In the meantime, this approach tends to accentuate rather than diminish the social gap.
Clearly, to generate wealth Iran must allow free enterprise. But its poor are angry, frustrated, and thus politically dangerous: Hence the regime vacillates on economic policy. Ultimately, either the current government or a successor must reconcile the twin imperatives of economic efficiency and social justice.
The third division is between modernism and cultural authenticity, which also dates from the nineteenth century. To develop economically and to acquire minimum technological self-sufficiency - both essential for political independence - countries like Iran must modernize. But that usually means opening society and culture to foreign influences which dilute a people's cultural identity.
Moreover, culture is not neutral, and cultural influence means political influence. Iran's efforts to develop economically after World War II opened it to foreign cultural and hence political penetration, which reached high levels by the end of Pahlavi rule. As a result, many Iranians felt psychologically disoriented and culturally alienated; and they worried about losing their Iranian-Islamic identity. The Islamic revolution and the national xenophobia that followed were in part responses to this phenomenon. Nevertheless, Iran cannot cut itself off from the world if it hopes to acquire technology and to achieve economic development. Indeed, whoever rules in Iran must find a way to promote modernism while maintaining cultural identity and independence. In the post-Khomeini era, therefore, it will be more important for Iran-watchers to focus on how these fundamental issues are debated and settled rather than constantly to measure the political fortunes of individual leaders.
