Skip to: Content
Skip to: Site Navigation
Skip to: Search

Europe gives soft answer to Carter trumpet on Iran

By Edward GirardetElizabeth Pond, and Rushworth M. Kidder, Correspondents of the Christian Science Monitor / April 10, 1980

President Carter's clear call for a trade embargo of Iran has brough an uncertain and muted response from the countries the United States is counting on: its Western European allies and Japan.

Skip to next paragraph

Two key countries, France and Japan, appear distinctly unhappy, if not opposed, to the idea of going along with a boycott.

French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing shows every indication of backing off from any kind of cooperative action that would help make the boycott stick. Right now he has presidential elections on his mind and for domestic po tical considerations is reluctant to take a stand that would be interpreted as cozying up to Washington.

Japan, the largest importer of Iranian oil among the Western allies -- it im ports about 10 percent of its oil from Iran -- is veering away from taking eco nomic sanctions. Tokyo feels it is far too dependent on Iranian oil to support the US-inspired boycott.

Europe has long since felt that it, too, had far more to lose from a boycott than the United States.

Canada, Britain, and West Germany are expected to react more favorably to President Carter's decision. Britain's pronounced pro- US stand has been obvious for some time, but the United States is looking to West Germany -- which has much more economic and political clout in the European Community than Britain -- to promote the US position.

Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau has responded sympathetically to the plight of the United States, but is still consulting with the allies on the boycott.

As the following reports indicate the response, generally, from major European capitals suggests US allies are not yet jumping into the act of implementing a full trade embargo. Edward Girardet reports from Paris:

It seems doubtful that France will make any rapid, constructive moves in support of the American blockage against Iran. Although some French officials have privately welcomed President Carter's initiative and firmness, which they consider long overdue, the government is expected to tread cautiously before committing itself, if at all.

Analysts feel that if French President Giscard d'Estaing makes any forthright decision, it will bound to be influenced by electoral strategy. Compared to West Germany and Britain. France imports relatively little oil from Iran, but Mr. Giscard D'Estaing cannot appear to be too pro-American in his policies in view of the upcoming 1981 presidential elections.

"Right now Giscard is trying to be more Gaullist than the Gaullists," noted one Western diplomat, "so he can't appear to be at the orders of the American government."

For the past several months, the President has been trying to neutralize his gaullist critics in a bid for a wider spectrum of support from the right.

Although the French are perfectly aware that American sanction will prove less effective without European support, government sources say they consider it unlikely the French President will do anything so drastic as to adopt cooperative measures.

France is known to maintain close contacts with the Iranian government and tends to regard itself as the most obvious mediator to help resolve the crisis.

But Washington's message to the Europeans that they have nothing to gain by hoping to keep open oil supplies with Iran rather than demonstrate Western solidarity, has been interpreted by some French as yet another example of American pressure.

Some French analysts feel that by imposing sactions the United States has entered on a dangerous path. "Twenty years ago," wrote the highly respected Le Monde, "President Eisenhower contributed toward throwing Cuba into the arms of the Soviet Union by imposing rigorous economic sanctions." The appearance of an Iranian form of Castroism would have such consequences for the United States and the West, said the newspaper, that the present reserve among the allies must also be regarded as a form of wariness. Elizabeth Pond reports from Bonn:

The West German government has implied its willingness to take actions in support of the American economic sanctions against Iran. The indications are that it would be very cautious about any American blockade of Iran, however.

At this writing no specific action in support of the American embargo had been decided on by the nine foreign ministers of the European Community (EC) meeting in Lisbon. Diplomats here expect that the West German role in these talks will be to toughen the joint EC response.

The West German government has not gone as far as the British government in declaring its solidarity with the US actions. But to Americans, Bonn's behind-the-scenes role in the EC is more important than West German public rhetoric would be. As one diplomat put it, "The Germans are in and the British are out" of the real EC decisionmaking.

And private contacts and the Aesopian public language used by West Germany so far indicate to American diplomats that West Germany will support concrete action by the EC in the Iranian crisis.