In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Reviewing and Assessing the Proposal of 5+1
Introduction

- According to the agreement made in Istanbul II talks and Baghdad, there is a need for adopting a "road map" or "framework" or "process" for the talks.
- There roadmap should include: "guiding principles", "objectives", "structure of the process", "issues" (nuclear and non-nuclear) and "steps".
- Features of reciprocal steps: they should be equipollent, compatible and simultaneous.
Introduction

- But the proposal of 5+1 has some shortcomings both in context and in the essence.

1. Some of the requests made from Iran are not clear.
2. The reciprocal steps of 5+1 are too general and vague.
3. 5+1 proposal lacks a time frame.
4. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} phases of 5+1 proposal are back to the past, and therefore they are illogic and unrealistic.
Shortcomings of 5+1 proposal

- Request for "stopping 20 percent enrichment" means depriving Iran from its rights in contradiction to international documents such as the followings:
  1. Article IV of NPT
  2. NPT review conferences documents
  3. The final documents of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament
  4. NAM documents
  5. G77 documents
  6. Organization of Islamic Cooperation documents

- Request for "stopping 20 percent enrichment" is contrary to international practices/procedures including the followings:
  1. Practices on implementation of NPT during the last decades
  2. No objection to the nuclear fuel cycle of countries such as Brazil, Japan, Argentina etc. even by 5+1
Article 4 of the NPT considers no limitation on the kind of technology or the level of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including the fuel cycle (enrichment activities).

Paragraph 1 of article 4:
Nothing in this treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Article I and II of this treaty.

Paragraph 2 of article 4:
All the parties to the treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other states or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear—weapon states party to the treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
1. Islamic Republic of Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear activities within the framework of the NPT and the IAEA regulations.
2. Supply the fuel needed for research reactors such as TRR.
3. Avoiding selling fuel needed for TRR by those countries that have the technology.
4. Rejecting the framework proposed by one member of 5+1 to swap the fuel (Tehran Declaration) by this group.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

A. "Stopping all activity at Fordow, including both 5% enrichment and 20% enrichment and the installation of additional centrifuges and centrifuge components"

- Points:
  - 5 percent enrichment activities and installing more centrifuges and their components do not correlate with 20 percent enrichment.
  - In Fordo there are other activities which are not related to 20% enrichment.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

B. "Transferring 20% enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody"

Points:

- There is no correlation between transferring 20 percent materials out of the country with 20 percent enrichment. All materials are under the "supervision" and "seal" and "unannounced inspections" of the IAEA.

- There is no correlation between transferring 20 percent materials out of the country with 20 percent enrichment as in the third country materials would be under the supervision of the IAEA, as this the case in Iran.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

C. "Shutting down the Fordow facility will address concerns that the facility is intended for military use"

Points:

◦ This facility is not a military base and there is no reason to consider it so.
◦ None of the equipments and items used, especially the one used to collect enriched material, neither the design nor the system can be used to collect highly enriched materials.
◦ IAEA director has explicitly confirmed that all the equipment and activities in Fordo are for peaceful purposes and under the supervision of IAEA.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

D. “Fordow facilities ... concerns ... since it is located on a military base"

Points:

◦ These facilities are not located on a military base.

◦ There is no limitation to international authorized access (IAEA access) to this facility.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

E. "Fordow facilities … concerns … since it is heavily fortified"

Points:

◦ Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities is not only permissible but necessary
◦ Established international mechanisms for nuclear security highlight the need for strong protection of nuclear facilities.
◦ The sustained threats against nuclear facilities and enrichment activities, as well as ongoing threats against nuclear scientists, which are in contradiction to the UN charter and resolutions, necessitate more security from such facilities.
◦ Facing constant threats, we need a back up facility to safeguard our enrichment activities.
F. "Fordow facilities ... concerns ... since it is too small for commercial purposes”

Points:

- Fordow facility has never been constructed for commercial purposes.
- The main purpose of Fordow facility is to protect it against threats, but it is also being used for 20% enrichment, R&D activities, labs, storage places, etc.
- Facing constant threats, we need a back up facility to safeguard our enrichment activities.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

G. "Agreement on these interrelated elements (stopping, shutting down, shipping) is necessary"

Points:

◦ Shutting down Fordo facility has no relation to 20%, as various activities other than producing 20 percent materials are done at Fordow.
◦ Transferring the materials out of the country is not related with 20 percent enrichment because all materials in Iran are under the supervision of the IAEA, sealed by the IAEA and inspectors of the agency do the unannounced inspections.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

H. "5+1 will cooperate with Iran to provide fuel complexes for the Tehran Research Reactor"

Point:

• A few months before, Iran put its home-made fuel complexes inside TRR. Therefore, cooperation of 5+1 to "provide fuel complexes for TRR" is far from the actual needs and real time requirements of Iran.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

I. "With provision of fuel for the TRR, there is no rationale for further production of 20% material"

Points:
- Continuation of 20 percent enrichment to supply needed fuel for TRR in the next few years,
- Calculating the amount of 20 percent materials that due to technical issues, including relevant tests, get out of the cycle,
- Supplying fuel needed for at least 4 other research reactors because of the territorial extent of Iran and the short lifetime of medical isotopes,
- Right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to sell fuel complexes to other countries
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

J."The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical Cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR"

"The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical Cooperation projects ... and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them"

Points:

- Technical cooperation of the Agency with Iran for its peaceful nuclear activities is an obligation of the IAEA and one of the rights of IR. Iran as a member state of the agency and the NPT.
- IR. Iran voices its readiness to share its software and hardware services in the area of research reactor safety if other countries need and at discretion of the IAEA
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

J. "The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR"

"The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical cooperation projects ... and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them"

Points:

• Placing technical cooperation of the Agency in the shadow of political measures is contrary to the dignity and specialized status of the IAEA.
• Under Article 4:2 of the NPT, 5+1 are required for fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and information with Iran.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

L. "E3+3 has put together a detailed package … to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran"
"E3+3 … to ensure no gap in treatment for your cancer patient"
"The United States is prepared to … permit safety-related inspection and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft"

Point:
- Providing isotopes for patients, treating cancer patients as well as repairing and providing spare parts for commercial aircrafts are among basic human rights, and mixing them with political issues demonstrates non-constructive objectives of the other side.
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

M. "The E3+3 would cooperate with Iran to provide Iran fuel elements for the Tehran Research Reactor"
   "The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical Cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR"
   "Cooperation on the early stages of acquiring a modern light water isotope producing research reactor"
   "The United States is prepared to ... adjust its sanctions policy ..."
   "The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical Cooperation projects ... and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them"
Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

Points:

- Regardless of the substance of the above propositions as the reciprocal steps of 5+1, it should be said that:
- First, using general terms such as "cooperation", "support", "adjustment", "review" and "recommendation" in these propositions are in contradiction with the basic goal of the very same proposal “which is creating confidence and trust in the first stage.”
- Second, the above-mentioned suggestions are not compatible with the requests such as “stopping enrichment”, “transferring of materials” and “shutting down the Fordo”.
- Third, taking into consideration the record and history of the western countries attitudes regarding Iran's nuclear issue, it would increase and deepen the distrust and uncertainty on the Iranian side.