Mr. Jalili projects a “common man” image, but upon his shoulders may rest the high-stakes result of the third round of nuclear talks, which begins tomorrow in Moscow.
Expectations are low that Iran and the P5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany) can strike a deal that will at once permanently prevent any Iranian push for an atomic bomb and preserve for Iran most of its advanced nuclear program.
Hopes raised in Istanbul, Turkey, in April were set back in Baghdad in May, when the P5+1 initial proposal went much further than Iran expected. It required Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment and give up entirely on higher-level enrichment, with no immediate easing of tough economic sanctions.
Since then, acrimonious exchanges and demands by politicians opposed to compromise in both the US and Iran, have made a breakthrough here even less likely.
Iranian diplomats charge that the P5+1 offer violated the framework agreed in Istanbul of a reciprocal, step-by-step exchange of concessions. P5+1 officials counter that Iran must first agree to take "concrete" action in Moscow.
But analysts say Iran's perception that it is being forced to accept a lopsided offer is unacceptable to the psychology of its leadership – and risks a collapse of the talks that could lead to military strikes by Israel or the US.
"You have this classic case of asymmetry," says John Limbert, a veteran diplomat who was US deputy assistant secretary of State for Iran until 2010.
"We're talking about one thing, all these legal and technical issues; and the Iranians are talking about their place in the world, their rights, their sovereignty," says Mr. Limbert. "We just talk past each other. And both sides come away saying, 'They are not listening to us.'"
For any deal to stick, both sides need to be able to sell it at home as their own victory, says Limbert, a Persian speaker who was one of the US hostages held in Iran from 1979 to 1981, and author of "Negotiating with Iran."
"We're stuck in this pattern we've been in so long of moralizing, sermonizing," says Limbert. The result can be little recognition of Iran's need, also, to declare success: "Somehow it has to be sold [in Iran] as, 'We protected our rights, we protected our dignity, we didn't give in. ' "
Enrichment an 'inalienable right'
That impulse was clear when Jalili briefed Iran's parliament last week. The Moscow talks would proceed under the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which describes an "inalienable right" of nations to produce nuclear energy.
There was "no prohibition" of "any kind of enrichment for peaceful purposes," Jalili told the chamber. "It's possible that we may need higher or lower enrichment for other peaceful applications. This is our right, and we must be able to exercise this right."
Several United Nations Security Council resolutions require Iran to suspend all enrichment, however, until it resolves questions about past weapons-related work.
Iranian officials have stated a readiness to deal on their 20 percent enriched uranium, which is a few technical steps from weapons grade of more than 90 percent.
But giving up all enrichment, they say, will not happen. And for any deal, Iran expects something it values in return, like sanctions relief.
"If trust helped in Istanbul ... in Moscow on Monday we need reciprocity," wrote former Iranian nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian, and Tehran-based analyst Mohammad Ali Shabani, in the Guardian on Friday. "All sides need to be courageous enough to recognize a fair exchange is a central tenet of dialogue."
The P5+1 proposal
The P5+1 proposal includes stopping 20 percent enrichment and shutting down a deeply buried enrichment site where it happens at Fordow, which is currently under safeguard by UN nuclear inspectors but beyond easy reach of Israeli or US attack.
"The offer was deliberately ungenerous – some would say unrealistic" and probably an opening bid, the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in a report last Friday.
A US official told ICG that "the burden of proof is on the Iranians. They are the ones running an illicit nuclear program. We will engage in a step-by-step process, but our actions are not necessarily going to be equivalent to theirs." P5+1 diplomats frequently cite increasingly painful sanctions – with further measures against Iran's central bank, and a European oil embargo due at the end of this month – as the reason Iran is at the table. Iran denies that linkage.
"History shows that pushing Iran into a corner will backfire," says Kayhan Barzegar, director of the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran. The strategically important and widely supported nature of Iran's nuclear program means Iran can "easily resist against increased pressures."
"A win-win solution is inevitable. The other option is a lose-lose situation ... there is no [acceptable] win-lose [result] in this story," says Mr. Barzegar.
Iran says it takes the P5+1 strategy that hardened considerably between the Istanbul and Baghdad talks as a red flag about Western seriousness to make a deal.
Barzegar says this hardening has stirred up “distrust among Iranian decisionmakers” and "strengthen[ed] the hard-line view that Iran is only wasting its time [with talks] and that the main goal of the West is to bring the [nuclear] program to a complete halt."
Indeed, Iran's parliament speaker Ali Larijani said last week that the negotiating team "has no right to show leniency," and that Iran would determine its own enrichment levels – an indirect reference to 20 percent, according to Mehr News Agency.
Legislators weigh in
Parliament expected negotiators in Moscow to "consolidate what the Iranian nation has gained after years," said Mr. Larijani.
Senators in Washington likewise sought to shape the talks, with nearly half sending a letter to President Obama on Friday demanding an "absolute minimum" of immediate concessions by Iran in Moscow – halting 20 percent enrichment, and closing Fordow – if talks were to continue.
The 44 senators asked Mr. Obama not to ease sanctions, which needed to be "unremitting and crippling," and to boost pressure on Iran by "making clear that a credible military option exists."
"The idea of what we should be getting, and what we should be giving, on both sides, is completely at odds," says Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, a doctoral candidate at Oxford and lead writer of a recent Oxford Research Group study on breaking the nuclear deadlock.
Increasing sanctions may have helped bring Iran to the table, but they can also become a trap, he says.
"Once you get into this frame of mind, where you have to have sanctions and they keep piling up, it's very difficult to reverse it," says Mr. Sadeghi-Boroujerdi.