
Q&A: Neocon power examined
The Monitor asked award-winning author, US military historian, and self-described neocon Max Boot to discuss the extent of neocon power.
How much power do neoconservatives have within the Bush
administration? Within Washington?
The power of neocons is much exaggerated – unfortunately. On the question of
Iraq their views generally won the day. Not because they were all-powerful
but simply because 9/11 brought various doubters including Bush and Cheney
around to the neocon point of view.
But on many other issues the
administration policy remains unsettled and neocons are by no means in the
drivers seat.
One example: Iran. The neocon position is to push for regime
change by encouraging Iranian democrats. Is this the administration
position? Hard to say; some elements in the administration clearly favor
this view – the Defense Department for one – while others, like the State Department,
favor a more status quo policy. The president hasn't made a clear policy
decision.
The reason why neocons are said to have so much influence is that their
ideas are clearly and forcefully articulated – and they were proven right
about so many things – such as the need to remain engaged in the world in
the 1990s. I do think they have a lot of influence on the foreign policy
debate but that doesn't mean that even in this administration they're going
to win every argument over policy.
How does the push to implement a neoconservative vision
affect
the war on terrorism? Would a neoconservative America breed more terrorist
attacks, as some critics fear?
A neocon approach to terrorism would address the "root causes" more, that
being the lack of liberal democracy in the Muslim world and the surfeit of
hate-spewing regimes. Encouraging democracy in Iran and other places would
a centerpiece of this strategy. This would be combined with military
attacks on obvious terrorist outposts like the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Over
time this dual-prong approach is more likely to deliver "victory" in the
"war on terrorism" than any other strategy I'm familiar with. I don't see
any evidence that it will breed more terrorists; on the contrary, it should
reduce their number.
What type of foreign policy/security strategy would an Al
Gore administration have set after Sept. 11? How different would it have been
from the one that emerged from the Bush White House?
I think it's likely that the Gore administration would have invaded
Afghanistan after 9/11. I think it's unlikely they would have invaded Iraq.
That's the big difference.
The Gore administration probably would have
deferred to the doubts of various European countries, the UN, etc.
– everyone who was opposed to intervening in Iraq. In the short term, this
might have been a smart strategy politically, in that the consequences of
leaving Saddam Hussein in power would not immediately be obvious (it would
take him years to acquire nuclear weapons) while the costs of intervening
(such as the continued guerrilla attacks on US soldiers) are immediately
apparent.
But long term, I think the Gore approach would have been a
continuation of the Clinton approach of letting dangers fester, and that
this would have been an irresponsible policy from the longterm security
needs of the United States. Of course there would be many similarities
between the Gore and Bush foreign policies. Both would try to promote
democracy, free markets, etc. Both would be willing to undertake
humanitarian interventions in places like Liberia, both would try to get
along with China and Russia, both would clash with some European nations
over issues like Kyoto, etc.
How significant is the emergence of neoconservative thought
within the broader history of American foreign policy? What kind of shift
are we witnessing? Which American president best embodied neoconservative
beliefs?
I think the emergence of neocon thinking is very significant. In essence, I
think neocons combine the best of the two dominant strains of US foreign
policy thinking: Wilsonian idealism and Kissingerian realpolitik. They have
Wilson's devotion to promoting democracy while at the same time recognizing
” as Wilson did not – that this often requires force and that the US cannot rely on international treaties alone. Many presidents have embodied this
thinking: both Roosevelts, Truman, Reagan, George W Bush.
What's next for the 'axis of evil'? How do neocon
strategists intend to confront N. Korea and Iran? What about China?
I think North Korea and Iran are the two biggest threats to the United
States at the moment because of their nuclear weapons programs and
tyrannical governments. Our policy in both cases should be preemption –: not
necessarily military preemption, which is a last resort, but rather seeking
to democratize those countries so that they no longer seek to threaten
their neighbors or the US.
In the case of Iran, we need to do more to back
the democracy demonstrators who want to overthrow the mullahs. In the case
of North Korea we need to more to bring pressure on the government to cause its
collapse. Among the steps we should take: apply more pressure to South Korea
and China to cut off all subsidies and fuel shipments to the North and also
undertake selective intercepts of North Korean ships carrying illicit weapons
and drugs, a main revenue source for the regime. Only if democracy
eventually prevails in Pyongyang and Tehran can the West breathe easy.
China is a much more cautious state and not an immediate threat. Here, too,
we should encourage the forces of democracy. Recent developments in Hong
Kong are very positive. Eventually China may become a serious competitor to
the US militarily but this won't happen for decades. We don't need to worry
about China nearly as much as we worry about N. Korea or Iran.
Will neoconservative policies endure after Bush is out of
office?
Yes. In the case of Iraq, regime change is something that both Democrats
and Republicans are committed to. More broadly, I think there is a wide
consensus in US politics in favor of what are essentially neocon policies
of promoting US ideals while keeping America strong.
Is America comfortable taking on the role of empire?
It's hard to speak for all Americans. Some are, some aren't. I would say
most are comfortable with the role but not the actual title "empire."
America has been an empire of liberty – Jefferson's phrase – since at least the Louisiana Purchase.
Now we are acting like a liberal empire by getting involved in the internal workings of Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and other countries. I think most Americans realize this is vital to our
national security broadly interpreted – that if we don't address sources
of terrorism, ethnic cleansing, instability, nuclear proliferation, etc.,
we will suffer a heavy price, as we already did on 9/11.
• Max Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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