See how it looked in 1979

Penning a fresh start for the Mideast

Egypt-Israel treaty gives old adversaries time, but long-term risks remain

By Daniel Southerland | Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

With a few strokes of the pen Egypt and Israel have cut through three decades of psychological barriers, opening the way to a new era of conciliation between them. If nothing else, the newly signed Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty stands as a monument to Egyptian president Sadat’s first strong battering of those barriers through his precedent-shattering trip to Jerusalem 17 months ago.

With the signing of the treaty on the White House lawn at 2 p.m. on March 26, Mr. Sadat gave Israel much of the recognition which it has sought from the most populous and powerful of Arab nations.

It was the first peace treaty to be signed between an Arab nation and the Jewish state, and it appeared to reduce considerably the chances that any combination of Arab nations would go to war against Israel any time over the next few years.

Egypt has in the past borne the brunt of four wars against Israel, and its removal from the side of the potential combatants clearly reduces for the near future the risks of any new war. What was less clear was whether the peace treaty either increased or decreased the longer-term risks of instability in the Middle East, given the new constellation of forces arrayed against Israel, including oil-rich Iran.

It was certainly less than clear whether the claims being made for the peace treaty by President Carter, President Sadat and Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin would stand the test of time.

“This peace treaty will be permanent” said President Carter two days before the signing ceremony, which was held on the front lawn of the White House under sunny skies and fleecy clouds.

“One of the greatest achievements of our time” said President Sadat, referring to Mr. Carter’s successful effort to bring Egypt and Israel together for this historic moment.

“Great turning point in the Middle East,” said Prime Minister Begin.

Despite all the rhetoric, however, there was a clear awareness on the part of all three parties involved that the real time of testing for the treaty may only come some months from now, when it will be more apparent whether progress is going to be made on that more difficult of issues – the Palentinian question – and whether President Sadat can stand up to pressures from Arab opponents of the treaty.
Curiously, President Sadat omitted one entire section in the speech he had prepared for the occasion which appeared to be addressed to the other Arabs and which called for support and backing for the Palestinians and a genuine transfer of authority.

Whatever the ultimate outcome, President Sadat’s psychological breakthrough has earned the Egyptian leader strong enemies in the Arab world.

For years, despite some secret contacts, it has been the policy of the chief Arab powers not to negotiate with the Israelis. President Sadat himself had vowed not to deal with anyone in Israel as long as there was a single Israeli soldier on Arab soil. He believed it would take a generation before Arabs and Israelis could enjoy normal relations.

With his flight to Israel in November, 1977, President Sadat swept aside the psychological walls barring the way to a recognition of Israel. And with the signing of the peace treaty, he appears to have made the step irreversible for his own country, if not for the other Arab states.

“I think that Sadat has done something irrevocable,” said Israel’s former foreign minister, Abba Eban, in a recent interview with this newspaper. “I think that he has dealt a fatal blow to the rhetoric of rejection.”

“When the leader of the Arab country with half of the Arab population recognizes Israel, how can you go back to an ideology which holds that Israel doesn’t exist?”

But from here on out, the peace treaty amounts to a gamble.

This is, as President Carter told a recent interviewer, a voyage into the unknown.

And for the next year or so, at least, the biggest part of the gamble is being taken by President Sadat.
The key question is whether Mr. Sadat can show enough progress toward Palestinian “self-rule” to interest other Arab nations, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in the peace process which had been undertaken by Egypt and Israel and sponsored by the United States.

Where to from here?

The difficulty of the task was underlined by the fact that the United States, on which falls much of the burden for pushing implementation of the treaty, does not seem to have a clear idea of how to proceed from here. Much more effort has gone into preparing the next step. In some ways, the U.S. appears at this stage to be, as one observer put it, “winging it.”