Even if NATO rushes to the exits, Afghan collapse is not inevitable (+video)

France’s absence will be felt, to be sure. France has been the fifth-largest contributor of troops and financial support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and its allies knew that in the crucial province of Kapisa, the gap between the restive provinces of Konar and Nooristan to the east and Kabul  and the Panjshir Valley to the West, French troops would contain any insurgent monkey business.

But, as security experts in Kabul told me on a recent reporting trip, the major lesson of the past 100 years or so is that insurgencies, while deadly, rarely succeed in Afghanistan without major outside support.

Without British support, former Afghan King Shah Shuja could not retake power in Kabul by force in 1832 and 1833. 

Without Soviet backing, the Khalq and Parcham parties would have been unable to launch their urban coup d’etat of April 1978, killing President Daoud, and paving the way for a Soviet invasion in 1979.

Without US-supplied arms, Pakistani training and logistical support, and Saudi funding, the Afghan mujahideen and foreign fighters who fought the Soviet occupation of the 1980s would have remained a village nuisance.

The current group of insurgents, a coalition of Taliban fighters, Hizb-e-Islami veterans, Al Qaeda adventurists, and tribal militias from Pakistan’s North Waziristan region, have a proven ability to blow stuff up. They have also managed to make certain areas of the country, such as the southeastern provinces of Khost and Paktika and the far eastern provinces of Konar and Nooristan no-go areas, not only for Western aid groups, but even for Afghan troops. (See a provincial map of Afghanistan here.)

But these groups, coming from different tribes, regions, and ideological backgrounds, show signs of being every bit as disunified and undisciplined as the various factions that make up the current Karzai government. Their ability to take, hold, and govern Afghan cities is still unproven, and given their preference for guerrilla warfare, instead of large coordinated set-piece battles, this ability is very much in doubt. Barring a complete dissolution of the Afghan National Army – a potentiality that is entirely possible without stronger national leadership – a small disparate undisciplined guerrilla force like the Taliban is likely to spend the next decade as they have the past decade: in small dusty villages, far from the halls of power.

In short, if the Afghan Army – even as ill prepared as they currently are – simply remain in their bases, lacking French or other NATO trainers, it will be very difficult for the Taliban to dislodge them.

Inertia, as well as time, is on the Afghan government’s side.

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