Bystanders look at damage from an improvised explosive device opposite the Nigeria Air Force bases in Kaduna, north central Nigeria, Tuesday. (Reuters)
Nigeria: is the recent oil violence connected to upcoming elections?
• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.sahelblog.wordpress.com. The views expressed are the author's own.
The Niger Delta is back in the news, both for the alleged return of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND – read a backgrounder here) and the upcoming gubernatorial elections in Bayelsa State, which was the site of a bitter primary election in November. Different sources give different views on how closely the recent oil violence is connected to Bayelsa’s electoral calendar. But clearly the Niger Delta is facing renewed political tension and renewed violence at the same time.
Nigeria last held national elections, including gubernatorial contests, in April 2011, but since then various governors have faced court challenges to their legitimacy. Some have won and remained in office, but others have not, reports the Daily Post. On January 27, the Supreme Court removed five governors from office (for the back story, see the Washington Post coverage here).
The situation in the state of Kogi is complicated by the fact that the state held a new election even before the ruling. But the other four states are holding gubernatorial elections this month. Adamawa State, in the Northeast, took place on Feb. 4, and delivered a win for Nigeria’s ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Sokoto State, in the Northwest, will go to the polls on Feb. 18. But before that, two Niger Delta states – Bayelsa and Cross River – will hold elections on Feb. 11. For an overview of the political situation in each state, see The Nation's coverage here.
Bayelsa State has attracted considerable attention not only because of the bitter primary there, but also because it is the home state of President Goodluck Jonathan. Bayelsa has been under the control of the PDP since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, but that does not mean the state’s politics are dull. In 1999, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha became governor, with Jonathan serving as his deputy. Alamieyeseigha was re-elected in 2003, but in 2005 he was arrested in London on charges of money laundering and was impeached. Jonathan became governor, only to be selected as vice-president in 2007 – and the rest of Jonathan’s story is well known. Back in Bayelsa, Timipre Sylva was elected governor in 2007, but faced a challenge in 2008 and had to contest a re-run election, which he won.
At some point before the PDP state primaries in January 2011, Jonathan and Sylva became foes. Sylva won the first primary, despite reported attempts by Jonathan to find a candidate who could defeat him, writes The Nigerian Voice. Sylva’s victory proved short-lived. The governor was barred from participating in a second PDP primary, held in November, and the party instead nominated Henry Seriake Dickson, “a member of the House of Representatives and close associate of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan,” as its candidate, reports The Nigerian Voice. Sylva has launched a legal case over his exclusion from both the second primary and this weekend’s election, but he remains barred from running in the latter, and the case looks like it will be tied up in court through April, writes PM News. Opposition parties like the Action Congress of Nigeria hope to capitalize on the PDP’s infighting, but the PDP is determined not to lose. Jonathan came home to campaign and, it seems, to make sure Sylva takes the blame for the state’s current woes.
This, then, is the political context in which recent violence in the Delta has taken place. The violence has targeted both politicians and oil production. Bayelsa is reputed to have a history of electoral violence, and a bombing on January 20 in Bayelsa’s capital Yenagoa brought the present campaign in line with that trend.
Then, just this past weekend, an oil pipeline was attacked in Bayelsa. MEND, which carried out regular attacks on oil production in the Delta before 2009, when many of its leaders agreed to an amnesty with the Federal Government of Nigeria, has claimed responsibility for the attack. If the claim is true, MEND’s return will worry both the government and foreign investors.
Yet the Nigerian military is denying MEND’s claim, pinning responsibility instead on criminal gangs. Whoever the true culprits are, Nigeria’s The Nation argues that the pipeline incident should not be seen in isolation, but rather as part of a pattern of violence and threats in the Delta that has been intensifying in recent weeks. These events suggest a “growing disenchantment with the amnesty package and rivalry among the ex-militants,” reports The Nation. Reuters also sees this disenchantment at work, and adds, “Some analysts suspect that regional power struggles ahead of an acrimonious election for the governorship of Bayelsa on Feb. 11 may be the root cause of the attack.”
To sum up, there is a dangerous mix of electoral tension, behind-the-scenes political struggles, grassroots anger, and violence at work in the Delta right now. I do not know whether MEND will return in full force or what will happen in the elections on Saturday, but I do think the problems in the Delta are yet another major headache for the administration, a headache which may grow worse in the coming months. As Reuters reports, “President Goodluck Jonathan can ill afford a flare-up of violence in his home state as he struggles to cope with almost daily attacks by radical Islamist sect Boko Haram in the north.”
– Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
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Batwing: an African superhero for an American audience
David Zavimbe is a young policeman in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and he harbours a secret. He is Batwing, a member of Batman Incorporated, the Dark Knight’s army of bat-like superheroes spread across the world. Having faced the wrath of rogue generals who recruited him to be a child soldier, he now battles a corrupt police system, as well as Massacre, a machete-wielding super villain hell bent on destruction. With Batman’s guidance, a high-tech bat suit, an underground lair, and a longtime friend Matu, Batwing fights Massacre in his own eponymous series by DC Comics.
Batwing was first introduced within the Batman Incorporated series, and his story follows very closely on themes made familiar by Batman’s own epic battles in Gotham City. Tinasha, the city in DRC where Batwing lives and works, is about as real as Gotham is. Batwing has the largesse of his mentor Batman, just as Bruce Wayne himself has a vast family fortune backing him. Both battle improbable super villains. Both have secret lairs, and both must carefully manage the tension of having real lives within a corrupt system, and alter egos that operate outside of the rules and norms of normal people.
David has been "Africanized" by DC Comics. His parents both died of HIV/AIDS while he and his brother were very young. They were kidnapped from the orphanage where they lived by General Keita, and press-ganged into his Army of the Dawn – a fictional militant group echoing the very real Lord's Resistance Army – as child soldiers. Both David and his brother showed an exceptional talent for taking lives, which saw them gain quick prominence in General Keita’s army as assassins. After an assassination attempt goes wrong (David and his brother are required to execute an entire village of women and children to get to the enemy general inside of it) and the brother is killed by General Keita, David escapes to a rescue center for former child soldiers before eventually making his way to the DRC police force.
As a series, Batwing is gripping and well-paced. Even though Batman himself is largely absent, the introduction of his African associate to the DC universe shouldn’t present any challenges to comic book fans. It was a bold move by DC Comics to introduce an entirely separate series on an “African Batman,” given the suspicion which Western popular culture evokes in certain parts of the continent. We all have the exploitative and reductive portrayal of Africa in the West to thank for that.
The tradition goes back years: Joseph Conrad’s novella Heart of Darkness portrays ivory trader Mr Kurtz as a Dionysian genius who lives as a demigod among simple natives in the Congo. Machine Gun Preacher opened in South African theatres a few weeks back, leaving a distinctly bitter taste in African mouths. Once again a saintly Westerner has ridden in from the dust to save bloodthirsty Africans from themselves.
The temptation to draw parallels between Machine Gun Preacher and the Batwing series is large, but the compassionate and thoughtful way in which DC Comics plants the ideals of Batman into Africa makes this story different. The almost complete absence of Batman from the story, save as a background detail, certainly helps. While the (largely) negative portrayal of the DRC chafes, the reality is that all too many children in Africa live as orphans thanks to HIV/AIDS. In large areas of eastern DRC, Uganda, and southern Sudan, the Lord’s Resistance Army runs amok, spreading chaos and death on a scale few of us can imagine. David Zavimbe’s story is that of all too many Africans.
But make no mistake – this is a story for Americans, even if it is set in Africa. The idea of an all-powerful superhero rising up to save the day is distinctly American.
If DC Comics is chasing an African customer by creating Batwing, it's not an uncanny move. In most major cities in the 54 countries on this continent of 1 billion people, you'll find a well-educated, bookish, nerdy, technologically savvy, and increasingly confident young elite niche audience who would definitely be attractive to a publisher like DC Comics. This is arriviste elite that are only just starting to make its financial clout felt. In Africa, this often means unmet entertainment needs. The opportunity is there for the publisher.
Sub-Saharan Africa is in the third decade of a change of heart. We have only just begun grappling with rapid economic expansion, and along with it, freedom of speech and democracy. In every single country where this is happening, no single man reached down and granted the people their freedoms (and despite what Clint Eastwood might want you to think, this is not what Nelson Mandela did in South Africa). It was thanks to a combination of factors, the least of them not being popular anger turning against dictators. As much as we have super villains, we don’t do super heroes here.
Batwing’s mask and extraordinary powers in Africa therefore leaves one with a slight sense of dissonance, like a picture on a wall that is not centered correctly. If Africa needs superheroes at all, it needs ordinary men and women who inspire by leading exemplary lives within the confines of democratic power. We need honest businesspeople, sportspeople, politicians and religious leaders.
As such, Batwing might have served his country better by unmasking himself.
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IN PICTURES: It's not Halloween, it's Comic Con
Gold miners form a human chain while digging an open pit at the Chudja mine in the Kilomoto concession near the village of Kobu, 62 miles from Bunia in north-eastern Congo, in this 2009 file photo. (Finbarr O'Reilly/REUTERS/File)
Nokia publishes policy on African conflict minerals
"Conflict minerals," those mined to support groups conducting armed conflict or engaging in human rights abuses, have been an issue since long before ReadWriteWeb first wrote about it in July of 2010. The mineral equivalent of blood diamonds, they include tantalum, tungsten, tin and gold, all of which are used to manufacture our electronics.
Nokia, the world's largest manufacturers of mobile phones, today published its policy on conflict minerals.
In a post on Nokia's "Conversations" blog, Ian Delaney lays out the company's public policy (PDF), which augments their supplier requirements.
Delaney boils the policy down to these four elements.
- We prohibit human rights abuses associated with the extraction, transport or trade of minerals.
- We also prohibit any direct or indirect support to non-state armed groups or security forces that illegally control or tax mine sites, transport routes, trade points, or any upstream actors in the supply chain.
- We have no tolerance with regard to corruption, money-laundering and bribery.
- We require the parties in our supply chain to agree to follow the same principles.
The policy delves at some length into Nokia's commitment to human rights "in accordance with accepted international conventions and practices, such as those of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO Core Conventions on Labor Standards, UN Global Compact, and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises."
Under the sub-heading, "Implementation of the Policy with Regards to Conflict Minerals," the document reads:
"We prohibit human rights abuses associated with the extraction, transport or trade of minerals. We also prohibit any direct or indirect support to non-state armed groups or security forces that illegally control or tax mine sites, transport routes, trade points, or any upstream actors in the supply chain. Similarly, Nokia has a no tolerance policy with respect to corruption, money-laundering and bribery. We require the parties in our supply chain to agree to follow the same principles."
The document outlines some of the company's process for oversight of suppliers, including the EICC-GeSI Conflict Minerals Reporting Template. It would be interesting to know how the suppliers will be reviewed, how often and what will happen to errant suppliers who use conflict minerals. We have asked Mr. Delaney exactly that and will update should we receive a response.
[Update: Nokia's Anna Bask contacted blogger Curt Hopkins on Thursday with this response:
"Nokia follows up the effectiveness of corrective actions and conducts on-site assessments as necessary. However, as stated in the article, the reality is that problems often lie upstream and not with our first tier suppliers. So as well as demanding proper due diligence from our direct suppliers to ensure that the material flows are conflict-free, we ask them to set policies and supplier requirements of their own and pass those on into the supply chain."
"Continued non-conformance and refusal to address issues of concern will lead to termination of business relationship."]
Conflict Minerals
Although conflict minerals could theoretically crop up anywhere, practically, East Africa is ground zero. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is certainly the worst-affected by conflict mineral mining. There, the Congolese National Army vie against three different rebel groups to extract and refine the valuable ores.
Here is how the various minerals are used in our electronics, including mobile phones, computers and music players.
- Tantalum: stores electricity in cell phones
- Tungsten: creates vibrations in phones
- Tin: circuit boards
- Gold: used to coat wiring
Curt Hopkins is a production editor and international reporter for the technology blog site, ReadWriteWeb.com, where this blog originally appeared on Feb. 3.
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African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) supporters protest outside the party's headquarters in Johannesburg, Saturday, as they await the outcome of the ANCYL president Julius Malema's appeal hearing against being suspended by the ruling party. (AP)
Fiery South African youth leader suspended, but the fire remains (+video)
Late on Saturday morning, in true African time, a ramrod Cyril Ramaphosa delivered a flinty speech that was not only a preamble to the ANC’s verdict on youth leader Julius Malema, but a warning sign to the rest of the party: Ill-discipline will not be tolerated. By upholding the guilty verdict, the National Disciplinary Committee of Appeals stripped Malema of his power and with no real support outside of the African National Congress Youth League structures, and with the tax collector, public protector, and Special Investigative Unit closing in on him, it would take a miracle of biblical proportions to resurrect this cadre’s political career from the tomb it’s been chucked in.
But was the ANC’s decision disciplining or silencing the ANC Youth League?
Before Julius Malema entered the political scene, there was very little public discourse on the acute socio-economic issues faced by a growing number of young South Africans today. After 18 years of political freedom, more than half of South Africans under the age of 25 remain unemployed -- among the highest jobless rates in the world. Many live idly with few prospects of ever being employed. The promise of education as the gateway to a better life remains questionable on a good day, as too few are able to meet the requirements necessary to enter into higher education institutions. For those who do qualify for university admission, the competition for a place in a university has intensified, as the country simply does not have enough institutions of higher learning. The bulk of South Africa’s youth has been relegated to front row seats to watch a small portion of the country live Mandela’s dream.
Malema’s political career may have been short-lived, but the issues that gave rise to his popularity continue to plague the country. Despite Malema not being the preferred candidate for the role of vanguard for the poor, there is concern that the ANC used its disciplinary processes to shut -down the debate on nationalization of mines in South Africa, rather than enforcing discipline within its ranks.
The ANC was forced to investigate nationalization as a possible alternative policy largely because of the pressure exerted by the league. Since 1994, the ANC has generally leaned toward mainstream growth development models supplemented by welfare and job creation initiatives as the main strategy to improve socio-economic conditions. Adam Smith’s promise of a trickling down of wealth has, however, failed in South Africa just as we’ve seen it fail in more “developed” economies. Like their global counter-parts, ordinary South Africans are no longer buying into capitalists’ solution and are ready to hear alternatives.
Albeit badly handled, the nationalisation debate was the first time that a larger portion of the country took part in a national discussion on the economic path that South Africa is on. Serious questions were raised on the efficacy of current policies, and even though it was from structures within the ANC, the debate was youth driven. It was not a sexy or nation-building topic, and it was bound to make those in the wealthier classes uncomfortable, but it was a natural next step for a country whose citizens had been cordial with each other for too long, afraid to ask the difficult questions about the inequitable status quo.
Malema’s call for nationalization of mines and banks and expropriation of land, although not on the official charge sheet, until this morning, was seen by many to be the real reason why the ANC acted firmly and decisively against the ANC Youth League leadership. Capitalists who had popped champagne at the young leader’s downfall were forced to spit their Moet back in the bottle when the ANC’s Secretary General Gwede Mantashe announced at a press conference in Luthuli house this morning, that nationalization was “not a Malema issue, but an ANC issue.” The ANC may have been seeking to reassure its youth members in particular, that the decisive actions taken against the ANCYL president were not meant to close the discussion on alternative economic policies for development. However, the nationalization debate is back in the corridors of Luthuli House and no longer encouraged for robust public debate.
If this was a move by the ANC to shut down dissenting opinion on economic policy, it is not a wise one, because South Africa’s youth will not go hungry indefinitely. Political and economic decisions cannot continue to be made far from the prying eyes of those who are expected to religiously vote for the ANC while accepting all its decisions without question.
More broadly, South Africans must accept that the honeymoon phase of the Rainbow Nation’s marriage is over. The Malema-induced fear that engulfed the wealthier classes is also a reflection of a nation that does not trust the strength of the democratic institutions in the country. Celebrating Malema’s demise simply because he made certain classes uncomfortable is not a win for the young democracy. If South Africa is to move toward a meaningful democratic and economic solution for all its citizens, there must be better engagement on difficult discussions required to move the country forward between people from different social and economic backgrounds.
Once the dust clears and wounds heal, the ANCYL will have to pick a new leader to carry its cause to the Mangaung conference. There’s already growing speculation that Ronald Lomola may be the next leader, a man described by a Mail & Guardian source as “more aggressive than Julius (Malema) and ... without the abrasiveness.” It’s still early to tell whether a new boogie-man is being created or whether, if elected, the lawyer will better articulate the youth message without the distractions from questionable lifestyle choices. What is clear is that Malema’s political career may be buried, but the issues remain unaddressed.
As South Africans, we assume that our society is stable, developed, and incapable of the kinds of outbreaks that occurred in North Africa early last year. But the recurring xenophobic attacks, and the violence of service delivery protests should be a signal that there is still much for this country to resolve. If there is indeed truth the saying that “democracy lives in the ANC,” it would not be in South Africa’s best interest for the ANC to muffle its youth.
--- Zama Ndlovu writes about South African news and social issues on the Mail & Guardian's blog page, Thought Leader.
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Democracy in sub-Saharan Africa: once rising, now stumbles
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Freedom at Issue." The views expressed are the author's own.
The progress that sub-Saharan Africa has achieved in building democracy over the past generation is coming undone. After two decades of significant gains, the continent has experienced a steady decline in democracy over the last several years.
In 1972, when Freedom House began publishing Freedom in the World, the state of political and civil rights in sub-Saharan Africa was bleak. With the exception of a few bright spots, dictatorships of one stripe or another ruled the majority of citizens on the continent. Coups and countercoups were commonplace, as were leaders who proclaimed themselves “president for life.” Elections, if held at all, were often manipulated to validate an incumbent leader’s rule.
In the mid-1980s, a wave of democratization began to transform Africa. The continent experienced close to two decades of steady and, in a few cases, impressive democratic gains, arguably reaching the peak of its development in 2005. For that year, of the region’s 48 countries, 11 were rated Free by Freedom House, while 23 were rated Partly Free and 14 remained Not Free.
From 2005 until today, democratic setbacks in sub-Saharan Africa have significantly outpaced its once promising gains. Political and civil rights improved in only 10 countries, largely due to the stabilization of post-conflict situations, while 23 countries experienced overall, and often rapid, declines in democracy. In the most recent edition of Freedom in the World, covering calendar year 2011, only nine countries were rated Free, 21 were rated Partly Free, and a shocking 19 were designated Not Free.
Improvements in 2011 were evident in Niger, which held competitive and transparent elections, and Côte d’Ivoire, where Alassane Ouattara assumed the presidency following extensive fighting triggered by the refusal of the previous president, Laurent Gbagbo, to accept defeat in the December 2010 elections. In addition, Zambia achieved modest gains due to elections that led to a peaceful transfer of power to Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front, ending over two decades of rule by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy.
The most notable declines in democracy for sub-Saharan Africa in 2011 took place around elections. The Gambia was downgraded from Partly Free to Not Free in the aftermath of presidential elections that were judged neither free nor fair. The electoral environment was rendered toxic by President
Yahya Jammeh’s suppression of the political opposition, media, and civil society. In Uganda, the government of Yoweri Museveni brutally cracked down on independent journalists and employed repressive tactics against peaceful protesters. Antigovernment protests were also subjected to a violent crackdown in Djibouti, which witnessed the intimidation of opposition political parties prior to an election that resulted in a third term for President Ismail Omar Guelleh. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the flawed November elections sparked widespread violence that continues to engulf Kinshasa and threatens to become a nationwide conflict if a timely political solution is not reached.
The causes for sub-Saharan Africa’s setbacks in the period from 2005 to 2011 vary from country to country, but upon deeper analysis, a clear pattern begins to emerge—Africa has suffered a noticeable decline in all of the fundamental components of freedom that inform Freedom in the World. The sharpest declines occurred in the categories of Freedom of Expression and Belief (22 countries), Political Pluralism and Participation (20 countries), and Rule of Law (20 countries). The score for Organizational and Associational Rights declined in 18 countries, while that for Electoral Process decreased in 14 countries.
The deterioration in these areas reflects the determination of political elites to hold on to power at any cost, and particularly to hijack elections. Excluding countries that suffered armed conflicts or coups over the last two decades (and the newly formed nation of South Sudan), all of the sub-Saharan African states rated Not Free this year have been ruled by the same parties or leaders for at least 20 years, and in some cases much longer.
There is a clear link between the length of ruling parties’ tenures and the steady decline in democracy. Even sub-Saharan Africa’s powerhouses, such as Ethiopia (21 years), Kenya (10 years), Nigeria (13 years), and South Africa (18 years) have experienced an overall stagnation or decline in freedom. The poor performance of precisely these largest and most influential countries, which had previously inspired hope for democratic progress, is perhaps the most disturbing trend in the region. Kenya, despite its previously modest democratic gains, has not fully recovered since the flawed elections of 2007, following which politically motivated ethnic violence broke out. To date, impunity has largely reigned; those responsible for directing and participating in the violence have yet to be held accountable. Similarly, Nigeria’s stagnation since the disastrous elections of 2007 has included pervasive corruption; elections in 2011 that, while somewhat improved, were still marred by numerous cases of political violence and suspected vote fraud; and increasing levels of sectarian and religious violence.
Ethiopia continued a decade-long trend of growing authoritarianism. In 2010, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi masterminded national elections that were thoroughly tainted by intimidation of opposition parties, independent media, and nongovernmental organizations. Meles has increasingly employed so-called antiterrorism laws to brazenly suppress any semblance of political opposition or independent media. South Africa, although still categorized as a Free country, has seen its democracy deteriorate as a result of political interference in the judiciary and threats from top government officials against the media.
Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 is a political minefield where in almost any election, desperate incumbents could trigger an outburst of repression, political violence, and ethnic conflict. With 18 countries scheduled to hold some form of elections in 2012, including Angola, Cameroon, Senegal, and potentially Kenya and Zimbabwe, democracy may deteriorate further if the balloting is not free, fair, and accepted by all parties.
The continent suffers from leaders who have overstayed their welcome and would in fact be replaced if elections were fair. The international community needs to engage early in electoral processes; step up the pressure to prevent political elites from cracking down on the opposition, media, and civil society in the run-up to voting; and ensure that the electoral results are respected and a transfer of power takes place. Otherwise, sub-Saharan Africa will continue to slip back toward where it started in the early 1970s.
– Vukasin Petrovic is the Director for Africa Programs at Freedom House.
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Sahel Blog: Tuareg rebellion in Mali's north sparks protests in South
Protests yesterday in Mali’s capital Bamako showed that the ongoing Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali is seriously affecting politics and interethnic relations in the southern part of the country. Reuters describes the scene:
Hundreds of Malians set up barricades and burned tyres in the streets of Bamako on Thursday, shutting down the capital in the latest protests against a rebellion that has seized several northern towns, and the government’s handling of it.
[...]
A Reuters reporter in Bamako said shops were shuttered early in the afternoon and smoke hung over parts of the city after tyres had been set on fire.
The centre of town was largely deserted except for groups of youths wandering around, the reporter said.
Yesterday’s demonstrations made international news, but protests actually began several days earlier. Military families began protesting in Kati, a town near the capital Bamako, on January 30th. Le Pretoire (French, my translation), writes that on Tuesday the 31st, “The women of the military base in the town of Kati went out and marched in the direction of Koulouba [the presidential palace], burning tires on the Kati-Bamako highway.” On Wednesday, military families reportedly “attacked government buildings and targeted at least one business run by a Tuareg in…Kati.” Protesters have also, the BBC says, targeted Tuareg shops in Segou. Jeune Afrique has begun to speak of “anti-Tuareg pogroms.”
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Protesters are angry in part over what they see as the military’s lack of proper equipment. The protesters may also feel scared about the difficulties (French) and setbacks the military has faced so far. There also seems to be a perception among some protesters that the Tuaregs in the south are sympathetic to, or to blame for, the actions of their fellow tribesmen in the north. As Reuters comments, “The demonstrations, sparked by local reports that the military ran out of ammunition and that dozens of soldiers may have been executed during rebel attacks, have raised the prospects of clashes between Malian communities.”
Mali’s President Amadou Toumani Toure, who has only a few months left in office, has attempted to reassure his nervous nation and to defuse ethnic tensions. For the first time since the Tuareg rebellion resumed, he addressed the nation on Wednesday, “pledg[ing] not to give in to separatist demands but, in a sign of concerns that the conflict could spread, call[ing] on Malians to refrain from attacks on any particular community.” (Read the full text of Toure’s speech here, in French).
The administration is doing a lot of talking behind closed doors as well. Government representatives are meeting Tuareg representatives in Algeria; all signs indicate that thegovernment wants a diplomatic solution and believes one is still possible. Toure is also moving to assuage the protesters’ anger; yesterday morning he met with military wives.
So long as the situation remains bad in the north, though, the possibility of protests and pogroms will remain in the south. This is a bad moment for Mali, and indeed for the region. As Fatoumata Lejeune of the UNHCR wrote on Twitter yesterday, “Touareg uprising in Mali, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Wade reelection bid in Senegal. Too much trouble in West Africa these days!”
For updates on the situation in southern Mali, I recommend following Martin Vogl, a journalist based in Bamako who frequently writes for major news outfits.
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- Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
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Wave of arrests in Sudan targets nonviolent student activists
• A version of this post ran on the blog, www.enoughproject.org. The views expressed are the author's own.
Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party’s grip on power seems to be tightening to the point of suffocation. In the past week, Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services, or NISS, has targeted non-violent, pro-democratic student activists in a wave of arrests and harassment.
On January 25, following a forum on the human rights situation in eastern Sudan held in commemoration of the 2005 Port Sudan massacre of unarmed civilians by government forces, the NISS arrested five members of the non-violent, student-led, pro-democracy group Girifna.
The five students arrested—Girifna Co-founder Nagi Musa, Amar Dirar, Ghazi Eltayen, Mohammed Mahjoub, and Sharif Kamal—have since been moved to Kober prison, notorious for brutal NISS interrogation tactics. News of the arrests sparked an explosion in the Twitterverse, with Sudan influentials such as New York Times columnist Nick Kristof and author Rebecca Hamilton calling for attention to the NISS's actions, interspersed with real-time updates from Girifna members.
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But the January 25 arrests are just the tip of the iceberg. Four more student activists have been arrested in recent days—Mohamed Omer Al Amin, Girifna member Omar Ahmad Hamid, Youth for Change members Khalaf Saeed, and Taj Elsir Jafar. Girifna reports that a Youth for Change student leader, Gasm Allah, has been missing since Friday. And members of Girifna reported the NISS tapping their phones and staking out youth activists’ homes.
In a statement to the Enough Project, Girifna said that the detention and abuse at the hands of the NISS is widespread and targets not only students, but also journalists and other activists. Girifna asks the media to focus on the detainment of its own members but to also highlight the wider issue of the NISS’s detention and arrest policies.
Girifna told Enough that Sudan’s National Security Forces Act allows NISS officers to detain suspects for up to six months without taking them to court.
“Several aspects of this act are troubling when viewed from the perspective of human rights, in particular, the provisions that allow the NISS to hold individuals for extensive periods of time without charge or trial and without notifying their relatives,” said Enough Project Sudan Policy Analyst Jennifer Christian.
Girifna, which translates into Arabic as “We’ve Had Enough,” is one of several Sudanese student groups that have voiced public opposition against the Khartoum regime and been met with arrests, intimidation, and detainment.
So far, the government of Sudan has been silent on the issue, though that comes as little surprise. Violence and arrests of student protesters is becoming common practice in Khartoum, and this latest round of arrests demonstrates the standard protocol of the NISS.
A round of protests slated for January 30 was canceled. But Girifna has tweeted, “It is 31/Jan/2012 and the fight for freedom, democracy, equality and social justice for all Sudanese will be long and we are ready for it.” For updates on the whereabouts of detained student activists, follow Girifna on Twitter.
– Tracy Fehr blogs for the Enough Project at Enough Said.
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South Sudanese express their support as President Salva Kiir declared a halt on all oil operations in South Sudan, in Juba January 23. The Republic of South Sudan in their sitting on Monday decided unanimously to halt all oil operation in South Sudan immediately. (Isaac Billy/UN/REUTERS)
South Sudan's oil cutoff: brilliant negotiating, or suicide?
The current stand off between Sudan and a newly independent South Sudan made me recall an anecdote told by Henry Kissinger, after a series of negotiations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's father, the late President Hafez al-Assad.
“Assad never lost his aplomb. He negotiated daringly and tenaciously like a riverboat gambler to make sure that he exacted the last sliver of available concessions. I once told him that I had seen negotiators who deliberately moved themselves to the edge of a precipice to show that they had no further margin of maneuver. I had even known negotiators who put one foot over the edge, in effect threatening their own suicide. He was the only one who would actually jump off the precipice, hoping that on his way down he could break his fall by grabbing a tree he knew to be there. Assad beamed.”
I will leave it to you to calculate who might be Hafez: South Sudan's President Salva Kiir or Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir? Or both?
South Sudan's top negotiator, Pagan Amum told reporters in Addis Ababa Saturday: "Tomorrow the [oil] shutdown will be complete and what will be remaining to be done the day after is finishing the cleaning and flushing of facilities." South Sudan is shutting down its oil production, last put by officials at 350,000 barrels per day in November. Approximately 99 percent of the new state's income is from the sale of oil.
Earlier in the week, South Sudan's Information Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin announced that South Sudan and Kenya had signed a memorandum of understanding to build an oil pipeline to the Kenyan port of Lamu. Construction of the pipeline will begin “as soon as sources of funding are made available,” which should take about a month, he said.
Minister Benjamin is reckoning that the pipeline could be completed in 10 months. That's a bullish call. The biggest problem is surely the sky-high risk of asymmetric guerrilla-type sabotage. I would think it's highly likely. Therefore, insurance for the pipeline might well prove punitive. However, the point remains that we in Kenya have an embedded geopolitical advantage in this region, that being the route to the sea. It is like the jugular vein for many of our East African neighbors.
Neither Juba or Khartoum are ranked AAA by credit rating agencies. Khartoum has lost a great chunk of their revenues. The South, meanwhile, can hardly afford to lose the cash flow that comes from the sale of its 350,000 barrels per day. And that's why I started with Henry Kissinger's description, "I had even known negotiators who put one foot over the edge, in effect threatening their own suicide."
Now, there is a back story to this. You see, through 2011, Sudan provided China with 5 percent of its total oil imports. You will recall that 35,000 Chinese workers were evacuated out of Libya in nine days last year and China was rolled back and right out of Libya. Not so long ago, President Obama authorized the deployment to Uganda of approximately 100 combat-equipped US forces to help regional forces ostensibly to “remove from the battlefield” – meaning capture or kill – Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony.
Then in January this year, President Barack Obama issued this memorandum.
"By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, I hereby find that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to the Republic of South Sudan will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace," said the official text of Obama's decision.
It seems to me Sudan has become the epicenter of the US and China's collision in Africa and that we are watching a 21st-century, high-stakes proxy war. I have to surmise that the US is underwriting Salva's overdraft, what with all these demobilized soldiers roaming around Juba, it would be suicide to have them unpaid for any length of time. I wonder who is underwriting Bashir? Maybe, he is calling in favors in Libya?
Aly-Khan Satchu is the CEO of the East African financial portal http://www.rich.co.ke and can be followed on Twitter @alykhansatchu
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Supporters of opposition UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi gather in Democratic Republic of Congo's capital Kinshasa, December 23, 2011. (Jonny Hogg/REUTERS)
Will Congo re-do its flawed elections?
Congolese politics, usually full of fire and scandal, seem devoid of hope these days. The presidential and legislative elections were both so badly botched that it is apparently impossible to figure out who won what. And yet, there is little hope of any far-reaching solution. The donors are divided, with the United States "deeply disappointed," the Belgians wanly congratulatory, and the South Africans outright buoyant. In the meantime, the opposition has not been able to mobilize any significant protests, largely because they are arrested/beaten/tear-gassed. While the Catholic church has announced a major demonstration on Feb. 16 - the twenty-year anniversary of the "March of Christians" of 1992 - it is unclear whether kinois, the residents of Kinshasa, still have the capacity to mobilize on a large scale.
The latest sign of this despondency is an initiative reportedly mooted by Washington in recent days: a power-sharing agreement. According to various sources in the opposition and US government, the proposal that has been put forward in the past several weeks would have the opposition sharing power with President Joseph Kabila, either by forming government under a UDPS prime minister, or by getting a fair share of ministerial positions. The only problem is: neither Etienne Tshisekedi or Mr. Kabila seem to be interested (Vital Kamerhe and Kengo wa Dondo have apparently expressed interest).
It is difficult to see how such a power-sharing deal could be pushed through, given the divisions among the donors and Kabila's opposition (he is having hard enough a time managing the quarrels within his coalition without giving half the cabinet positions to the enemy camp). Nor is it clear whether this would make right the glaring flaws of elections; one could argue the opposite, that it could undermine the creation of a strong opposition and just postpone the troubles for a couple of years - the consensus among many Africans is that neither Kenya nor Zimbabwe have been great successes, and that Cote d'Ivoire managed to dodge a bullet by avoiding a power-sharing deal.
But for those who would immediately cry foul, let's consider the options. They aren't pretty:
- Declare the elections null and void and hold new polls. In an ideal world, this is probably what should be done. Both legislative and presidential elections were deeply flawed and, except for electoral districts where there is little doubt which MPs won, should probably just be reheld. This could be done at the same time as provincial and local elections, currently scheduled for March but which will almost certainly have to be pushed back to August or September due to delays. But the larger question is: Would Kabila accept this solution? Of course not. And donors, who could apply financial pressure, face a serious collective action problem. None of them seem in the slightest interested in this option. So should we pursue this path, even though it appears hopeless, just out of principle? Advocates of this path are hoping that the demonstration on February 16 will provide traction.
- Recount the ballots. Again, Kabila would almost certainly oppose this. But even if he didn't, too many ballots have gone missed or have been tampered with to make this a feasible solution. Also, it wouldn't deal with the fact that many people didn't vote, voter lists may have been flawed, and there wee other abuses before the polls took place.
- Give up on the presidential polls and try to salvage the legislative elections, as well as the subsequent polls. A few weeks ago, this seemed to be the approach. Ok, so the presidential polls were a debacle, but perhaps we can save the legislative ones - American election experts arrived and the CENI suggested they were stopping compilation. However, now CENI has indefinitely postponed announcing the results, the foreign experts have departed, saying they weren't able to observe or contribute in a meaningful manner, and many of the legislative ballots have been compromised by weeks of storage in unprotected warehouses and compilation centers. So how can the legislative elections be "saved?" It's unclear, at least to me. As for the following polls, the donors I have spoken with do seem to agree that there have to be changes to the CENI before they continue to fund the rest of the election cycle; many would like to see Mulunda Ngoy resign. I have also heard some say that they want to use the election fiasco to get leverage on Kabila: "we'll let you off this time, but now carry out the reforms you have been promising (justice, security sector, etc.) or we will cut aid."
- Do nothing. Nobody will say this, but it is a possibility. But consider this scenario: Kabila manages to get his coalition to agree on a distribution of seats in parliament and imposes himself over the divided opposition. His coalition forms a majority in parliament, forms a government and makes some key concessions (governance reforms, bringing in opposition parties, reforming CENI). Already, the moderates around Kabila seem very sensible, ignoring Tshisekedi's calls for an army mutiny. What will donors do then? Prevent the consolidation of democracy and not fund the rest of the elections? Withdraw aid and punish the Congolese people?
Which brings us back to the power-sharing deal. If these reports are true, the Americans should be applauded for at least not just giving up (which is apparently what the Belgians have done) and accepting the botched polls. But will it work?
Jason Stearns is the author of the book, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa, and the blog,Congo Siasa.
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A mural of Senegalese Mouride Brotherhood's figurehead and spiritual guide, the late Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacke, adorns a wall in Dakar, on Jan. 19. (Joe Penney/Reuters)
Senegalese politicians court leaders of age-old Muslim sect
• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, Sahel Blog. The views expressed are the author's own.
Senegal's presidential elections are scheduled for Feb. 26, and politicians are courting the leaders of the country's large Sufi brotherhoods, also called "marabouts." They are one of four main Muslim communities who have contributed to shaping Senegal's democracy, reports Reuters. President Abdoulaye Wade says he has never hidden that he is a Mouride, a 129-year-old order of Islam which counts millions of devotees within the West African country.
Wade’s affiliation with the Mouridiyya is definitely salient for many Mourides, including youth. When I was in Senegal in 2006-2007 I heard several young Mourides repeat with pride a prophecy that Senegal’s first president would be Christian (this was Leopold Senghor), the second Muslim but not Mouride (this was Abdou Diouf), the third Muslim and Mouride (they saw Wade as the fulfillment of this part of the prophecy), and all of the rest Mouride.
This feeling was not, however, universal. Even before the 2007 elections, many young Mourides were already dissatisfied with Wade’s performance, particularly with regard to the economy, and a shared religious affiliation did not seem to dilute their opposition to the president.
Another wrinkle in the relationship between Wade and the Mouridiyya is the growing complexity of the marabout “field” in Senegal. The key lines for me in the Reuters article were these:
A heavily-set figure in a pristine white robe and with an earpiece connected to his Apple iPhone, Cheikh Abdoul Ahad Mbacke Gainde Fatma has seen more Dakar politicians in the last 24 hours than most Senegalese will see in a lifetime.
Ahad Mbacke is the great-grandson of revered Mouride founder Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacke and heads the organizing committee for the “Grand Magal,” the annual Mouride festival which draws millions to Touba for a week of praying, eating and revelry.
Why did I bold “great-grandson”? Let’s do a little math. Sheikh Amadou Bamba died in 1927. The Sheikh had a number of sons. In Senegalese Sufi brotherhoods the system of hereditary succession works laterally – ie, leadership typically passes from one brother to another inside the same generation before passing to the next generation. In polygamous families, the number of descendants can multiply rapidly, to the point where there can be dozens of potential male heirs. As political scientist Dr. Leonardo Villalon wrote in 1995 with regard to Senegal (see his book Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal, p. 137),
Marabouts each face the thorny problem of legitimating their influence and maintaining the cohesion of the saintly lineages in the face of a large and ever-growing number of heirs…In the first generation, that of the founder’s sons, it has frequently been possible to achieve such legitimation. Every indication, however, points to the potential for fragmentation in the next generation.
Such fragmentation spills over into the political realm. One way that young marabouts, disgruntled about having to wait for their “turn” as brotherhood leader (or doubting that their turn will ever come), can make a name for themselves is by entering politics. A few have flirted with running for office, and some have become prominent public backers of candidates and politicians. This fragmented arena also includes rising religious stars who don’t come from the families of the founders; rising stars who build mass youth followings can become serious political actors.
All of these developments threaten the centralization of political influence in the person of the brotherhood leader or khalifa – a process that has been going on for decades now. Politicians must therefore navigate a more complicated field than before when they are trying to court support from the brotherhoods. In the 1960s, Senghor built a strong relationship with the Mouride khalifa Sheikh Fallou Mbacke (a son of Sheikh Amadou Bamba – see a photograph of Senghor and Mbacke here) and his successors, and therefore enjoyed a considerable degree of political support from Mourides throughout much of his twenty years in office. In 2012, Wade, and everyone else, will have to court a larger number of religious leaders.
– Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
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