Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai (r.) talks to visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (l.) at his Munhumutapa offices in Harare. (Philimon Bulawayo/Reuters)

Are Chinese immigrants undermining African progress?

By Henry Hall, Guest blogger / 02.26.13

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, China Africa News. The views expressed are the author's own.

An increasingly common complaint emanating from the African media is that Chinese immigrants in Africa are having a negative impact in their host economies.

Recent studies suggest that the population of Chinese in Africa now stands at close to 1 million. The chief concern is that Chinese small businesses, often run by Chinese families, are capitalizing on their better access to Chinese markets, more advanced techniques, or superior access to capital, to make profits in key industries in which Africans seek employment – namely petty trading, agriculture, mining, and building work.

Migration has long been a popular route for poorer Chinese workers and traders hoping to make their fortunes. This has resulted in the establishment of Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia, who often set up industries with close connection to the Chinese economy. This model – which has been playing out for hundreds of years – has allowed the Chinese economy to vent excess labour out into the peripheries of its sphere of influence, creating durable linkages with other markets and, more recently, easing the political pressure created by rural poverty and urban unemployment.

This has been a catalyst in the growth of a number of economies in Southeast Asia while also garnering disquiet as local inhabitants complain that Chinese migrants take their opportunities.

Recently there have been moves in Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia to curtail which industries Chinese immigrants are allowed to work in – especially in the realm of market traders. Chinese market traders have a poor reputation in much of Africa because of widespread complaints over counterfeit and poor quality goods.

Their advantage over African traders stems from their superior access to Chinese markets and capital, sometimes earned through working on large Chinese building projects on the continent. In other industries such as building, agriculture, and mining, Chinese laborers and small businesses often bring with them skills and experience lacking in many African markets. 

The question of whether these small scale Chinese businesses and labourers benefit African economies comes down to how far they integrate. Some Chinese entrepreneurs set up in Africa to make their fortune, but use the wealth they accrue to support their families in China or to build up sufficient capital to move home and set up a business there. This is akin to outsourcing industries like petty trading and agriculture to China, because in this case most of the wealth created leaves the country.

However, in other cases Chinese entrepreneurs build up successful pockets of industry, employing local people and transferring skills to the local economy. This is especially useful when considering industries which are not well developed in Africa such as manufacturing. If Chinese entrepreneurs using skills learned in China can successfully set up manufacturing for export in Africa, it could provide a huge boost to the African economy.

The problem for African governments in knowing which immigrants are going to be productive members of the economy, and which will take opportunities away from locals or transfer their wealth back to China. Considering the generally weak bureaucracies in many African countries this is a real challenge. In order to make progress here African governments will need to enlist the support of their Chinese counterparts to help limit the flow of unskilled immigrants, and to send home those who are not creating employment or investing in the local economy.

Henry Hall is the founder and editor of China Africa News, a website and blog covering China’s growing relationship with countries in Africa.

M23 rebels patrol around Congo's Central Bank in Goma, eastern Congo, Monday Nov. 26, 2012. (Jerome Delay/AP)

Is a new peace process starting in eastern Congo?

By Jason Stearns, Guest blogger / 02.22.13

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, Congo Siasa. The views expressed are the author's own.

If all goes well, eleven heads of state (or their delegates) will soon gather in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to sign the snazzily-titled: "Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region."

What can we expect for this framework? An early copy I have seen suggests that it provides more questions than answers, although it does raise hope and expectations. (The copy is here.)

The 2-1/2 page deal rests on two pillars – reforming the Congolese state and ending regional meddling in the Congo. It then creates two oversight mechanism to make sure the eleven signing countries take these imperatives seriously, with four organizations (The United Nations, The African Union, The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICLGR), and the Southern African Development Community) as guarantors.

As such, it marks an improvement in engagement in the current conflict in the eastern Congo: there is a recognition that violence in the North and South Kivu regions of eastern Congo is deeply linked to national and regional developments. The agreement also allows for neutral arbiters to hold the signatories accountable. Perhaps most importantly, we now have the formal involvement of the UN and several other eminent organizations in an official deal, which should mean there will be follow-up at the highest level.

So is this a peace process? I have often complained that, while violence has escalated over the past years in the Kivus, the last genuine peace process –  with a comprehensive peace deal, a strong mediation, and good donor coordination in support – ended in 2006. Will this agreement mean a new peace process?

Not really. Or more precisely: we don't know yet. The agreement is more a statement of principles than a concrete action plan. And some of the principles seem to make that action plan difficult. For example, the oversight mechanism for Congolese state reform in early drafts of the agreement included civil society and donors, but is now only made up of the Congolese government. Donors merely provide support to the government, and civil society is not mentioned at all. Will a Congolese government that has hitherto been reluctant to reform its institutions be able to oversee itself?

On the regional mechanism, as well, details are lacking. The agreement merely says: "A regional oversight mechanism involving these leaders of the region ... shall be established to meet regularly and review progress in the implementation of the regional commitments outlined above, with due regard for the national sovereignty of the States concerned." No mention of how we are supposed to know whether Rwanda or Uganda are providing aid to the M23 – the Congelese rebel group at the center of the latest wave of militancy – or if the Congo has renewed ties with the FDLR, a Rwandan Hutu rebel group in the eastern Congo, for example. 

One of the gaping silences of the agreement is on armed groups, the reason this august assembly was called in the first place. What of the ICGLR talks in Kampala with the M23? What about other armed groups? There is no mention of whether the Congolese government will engage in talks, or whether the UN or anyone else should mediate – leaving in suspense the ailing Kampala negotiations. The document does mention deferentially the ICGLR on several occasions, probably as an indication that this new process will not automatically supplant existing ones.

Finally, the facilitation, which was initially supposed to be given to the UN, through the offices of a new special envoy, has now been converted into four guarantors: the previously mentioned AU, ICLGR, SADC, and the UN. It is unclear from this deal who among these four will take the lead.

If the proof of this process is in the pudding, will too many cooks spoil the recipe?

Jason Stearns blogs about the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region at Congo Siasa.

South African soldiers check the documents of residents of the Diepsloot township north of Johannesburg, South Africa. (Jerome Delay / AP )

How many immigrants does South Africa have? That depends who you ask.

By John Campbell, Guest blogger / 02.21.13

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, Africa in Transition. The views expressed are the author's own.

South Africans often assume that since the end of apartheid and the coming of democracy in 1994, there has been a huge wave of migration into their country from the rest of the continent. Stories abound of entire Johannesburg neighborhoods that are now Nigerian or Congolese – and of immigrants taking over certain crime syndicates. Over the past five years, there have been multiple waves of xenophobic riots against Zimbabwean refugees in South Africa who, with the benefit of high education standards in their home country, are seen by township dwellers as competition for scarce jobs. 

But how many immigrants does South Africa really have? That depends on who you ask. 

The country's Human Sciences Research Council once estimated that there are 4 to 8 million undocumented migrants in South Africa, but later withdrew the figure. Those numbers nonetheless still make their way into the press – and the public consciousness – despite the fact that Statistics South Africa, a government agency, estimates undocumented persons in the country to be somewhere in the range of 500,000 to 1 million.

Using other demographic data, however, a team of academics at the Forced Migration Studies Program (FMSP) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg has produced their own set of statistics. They estimate that the overall foreign population in South Africa ranges from 1.6 to 2 million, or 3 to 4 percent of the total population. They also report that there are between 1 and 1.5 million legal and illegal Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa.

Because of its stability, highly developed infrastructure and first-world amenities, many elites from Nigeria, Congo, and other African countries travel to South Africa, and the wealthiest often have houses there. They are a population of high visibility. So too are the receptionists and others, born in Zimbabwe, who deal with the public. But South Africa has a total population of more than 50 million, and the numbers of these highly visible migrants are relatively small. Most immigrants, on the other hand, work in low-wage and informal sectors of the economy, filling the ranks of the country's security guards, street hawkers, and domestic workers. 

For sake of comparison, about 11 percent of the US population is made up of immigrants, according to the Center for Migration Studies. 

Confiscated weapons are displayed after a military raid on a hideout of suspected Islamist Boko Haram members in Nigeria's northern city of Kano August 11, 2012. (Reuters )

Expat kidnapping in Nigeria fuels questions about rising militant presence

By John Campbell, Guest blogger / 02.20.13

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, Africa in Transition. The views expressed are the author's own.

Over the weekend, a radical Islamist group called Ansaru carried out a sophisticated kidnapping operation in Bauchi, a city in northern Nigeria. The seven victims, all expats, were working for Setraco, a Lebanese owned construction and civil engineering company. The kidnapping, which also resulted in the death of a security guard, appears to have been coordinated with an attack on the local police station. Ansaru, which may have links to Nigerian Islamist militant group Boko Haram, claimed responsibility in a statement emailed to state media.

There is media speculation that Ansaru carried out the kidnapping for ransoms to fund its operations in Nigeria, and perhaps elsewhere in the Sahel. Kidnapping for ransom is common in southern Nigeria and in parts of the Sahel, but it is rare in northern Nigeria – if not unknown. Elsewhere in the Sahel, European governments and private companies pay large ransoms that account for a significant part of the income of groups operating in the region.

Ansaru has claimed responsibility for other, recent terrorist attacks, while Boko Haram has been silent.

Ansaru may be an off-shoot of Boko Haram, but its relationship to the broader movement is unclear. Unlike Boko Haram, which has been focused on domestic Nigerian issues, Ansaru appears to have a more international scope. It may have run training camps in Algeria, and its statement justifying the recent kidnappings referred to “the transgressions and atrocities done to the religion of Allah … by the European countries in many places such as Afghanistan and Mali.” It also denounced the French government’s ban on veils in schools.

Ansaru’s official name, “Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan,” is translated as the “Vanguard for the Aid of Muslims in Black Africa.” Khalid al Barnawi, who was previously designated a 'global terrorist' by the US government, may be a leader. There is little open-source biographic information on al Barnawi. He is described as a Nigerian in his mid-thirties who comes from the northern city of Maiduguri. Some press reports that he is allied with Abubakar Shekau, often identified as the local head of Boko Haram in the area.

Recent Ansaru activities may indicate that the wider Boko Haram movement is evolving from a movement focused on specifically Nigerian issues to one with a transnational character. If so, links with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb could become more important than in the past.

Boko Haram has not specifically attacked non-Nigerian targets (with the possible exception of the UN headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, although that might have been a target because of its close ties with the hated Abuja government). The Ansaru kidnapping may be an indication that that the character of Islamism in northern Nigeria is changing. However, there are few expatriates in northern Nigeria and there are many more potential targets in the south, where Boko Haram has not carried out operations.

In addition to their work in Bauchi, the Lebanese company Setraco is the lead contractor in the construction of a new road from Port Harcourt to Lagos, an important development project that is part of Abuja’s efforts to pacify the oil-rich Niger Delta. It remains to be seen if the northern kidnapping will impact other Setraco operations hundreds of miles away.

Kenyan presidential candidates, from left, Mohammed Abdula Dida, James ole Kiyiapi, Uhuru Kenyatta, Peter Kenneth, Musalia Mudavadi, Martha Karua, Raila Odinga, and Paul Muite, take part in a televised debate in Nairobi, Kenya, Monday. (AP)

Kenyan candidates trade barbs in first ever presidential debate

By Tom Murphy, Guest blogger / 02.13.13

•A version of this post appeared on the blog A View From the Cave.  The views expressed are the author's own.

Kenya held its first ever presidential debate on Monday, a historic event.

The eight candidates gathered in Nairobi to debate the most pressing issues in the first of two televised debates. Candidates from minority parties with no chance of making a dent on election day stood side by side with the frontrunners. Represented were favorites Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga, along with Musalia Mudavadi, Martha Karua, Peter Kenneth, James ole Kiyiapi, Paul Muite, and Mohammed Abuda Dida. The event went over its scheduled two hours – lasting nearly 3-1/2 hours when all was said and done.

However, it was not because the candidates were wasting time or talking too much. An efficient tandem of moderators – NTV’s Linus Kaikai and Citizen TV’s Julie Gichuru – moved the conversation along, kept the candidates to their time limits, interrupted them when the question asked was not answered, and provided immediate follow-ups when necessary.

Twitter followed along with the hashtag #kedebate13 and became a worldwide trending topic (Reminder to Jimmy Kimmel: Kenyans do tweet). Kenyan activist and lawyer Ory Okolloh assembled a list of tweeters who would be fact checking the claims made by the candidates.

The opening topic was related to the issue of the post-election violence and the tribalism that fueled it. Mr. Kenyatta and Mr. Odinga, who come from different tribes, described their previous experiences working together in the government to prove that they were unifying leaders rather than divisive tribalists. Other candidates took on the question rather than deny it being a problem.

“We need to look Kenyans in the eye and tell the truth. We must break historical bondage we have been tied to for the last 50 years,” Mr. Kenneth said.

Post-election violence

The issue is important because it was used to create the divisions during the 2007-08 post-election violence, whose aftermath Kenya has struggled to deal with over the past five years. Roughly 1,100 people died and 650,000 were displaced. An agreement was made between Odinga and Mwai Kibaki with the two sharing power as Prime Minister and President, respectively. The Inter Press Service reported that some 75,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were still awaiting return to their homes in Rift Valley Province, citing corruption and hostility towards the IDPs as the reason for the stalled return. Justice was equally slow with only 14 convictions for serious post-election crimes.

The violence that followed the Kenyan presidential elections in 2007 stemmed from the belief that the incumbent, President Kibaki, stole the election from Odinga, his former ally. Major political figures were accused of fanning the flames of hatred and even helped to plot some of the attacks.

They were referred to the International Criminal Court, which is now pursuing charges against prominent figures including Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate, member of Parliament William Ruto. In March, Kenyans will decide a new president. Eight candidates are running, but it is primarily a contest between the man who lost the presidency in 2007, Odinga, and a pairing that could very well end up jailed by the ICC, Kenyatta and Mr. Ruto.

Zingers and lighter moments

Things turned when the proverbial elephant in the room was addressed. Moderators asked the candidates about the issue of justice and specifically the ICC. Kenyatta was pushed to talk about how he would be able to govern if undergoing a trial at the ICC with the potential of a conviction.

He answered, “If I am elected, these challenges don’t prevent me from undertaking my responsibilities. If people elect me, they have confidence that I can still handle my problems and still discharge my duties as president. The job that I seek is going to be given by the people of Kenya.”

That defense led Odinga to quip, “I know it’s going to cause serious challenges to run the government by Skype from The Hague.”

Other lighter moments came from fringe candidate Mohammed Abuda Dida who, along with Paul Muite, was added at the last moment to the debate. The two men flanked the main field with different podiums set slightly off the main stage. When it came to the question of healthcare, Dida offered this perplexing answer:

“If you want to be healthy eat when you are hungry. I do not know who brought these eating schedules with lunch and dinner. When you are hungry you do not fill up your belly with food – you need a third of food, a third of water then the other third is breathing space.”

What lies ahead

Topics including national security and state sovereignty were covered and the audience had the opportunity to ask questions as well. Social issues like education and maternal mortality were raised with the candidates disagreeing on both the problems and solutions.

For his part, former education minister James ole Kiyiapi offered a plan to expand schools and teachers. “I will take 3 billion Kenyan shillings and go to 300 day schools and build classrooms which in total will take in 150,000 pupils. I would like to hire 20,000 teachers every year,” he said. Kenneth disagreed, saying it was a problem of distribution, not the number of teachers.

He argued, “We have a problem of distribution of teachers. We have to have polytechnics in every constituency. We have not invested in education using the money we have borrowed.”

Despite there being eight candidates on the stage, the only candidates who stand a change of winning are Odinga and Kenyatta. This fact was apparent in the first half of the debate when Mr. Kaikai made sure that the leading candidates had ample time to discusses the issues at hand while the rest were given only 30 second opportunities to interject.

Blogger and Stanford political science graduate student Ken Opalo has crunched the poll numbers, finding that Kenyatta holds a lead of about 740,000 votes over Odinga.

(This article was edited after first posting to make two corrections. Around 1,100 people died in post-election violence, not 13,000; there are eight candidates for president, not six).

In this 2004 file photo, immunizers administer polio vaccine to a child carried by a marketwoman on her back in Lagos, Nigeria. (Saurabh Das/Associated Press)

Were health care workers in Nigeria murdered for doling out polio vaccines?

By John Campbell, Guest blogger / 02.12.13

On Feb. 8, unidentified gunmen killed four health workers and injured three others at a site in the Kano state of northern Nigeria, according to the media.  In what may have been part of a coordinated attack, at about the same time a separate set of gunmen killed an additional five health workers at another site. The health workers were all involved in a polio vaccination campaign.

In a third incident in the same time frame, gunmen killed three foreign medical doctors in Yobe state. One physician was beheaded, and all three had machete wounds. The three medical doctors were identified as North Koreans living in Yobe as part of a state-sponsored technical exchange. Press reports do not indicate whether the three were also involved in the polio immunization campaign.

In the aftermath of these killings, the inspector general of police has ordered “special security” for those involved in the polio immunization campaign.

Commentators, including Senator Bukola Saraki, a former governor of the western Kwara state and former chairman of the Governors Forum, and the national chairman of Journalists Against Polio, see the murders as inevitably setting back the polio immunization campaign. Kano has the largest number of polio cases in Nigeria, which is itself one of only three countries that still have a reservoir of the virus.

According to the press, security operatives believe the Islamist militant group Boko Haram is responsible for the murders.  However, following the usual pattern in the aftermath of attacks over the past several weeks, no one has claimed responsibility.

Opposition to the polio vaccination is longstanding on the basis that it is a Western and Christian plot sponsored by the Nigerian federal government in Abuja to limit Muslim births. It is a radical Islamist cause that builds on opposition dating back to controversial pharmaceutical trials by the American company Pfizer in the 1990s.

There are anecdotal reports that many mothers continue to avoid vaccination for their male children. In 2003, an earlier World Health Organization vaccination campaign was halted because of popular outcry when minute traces of estrogen were found in the vaccine. The campaign only restarted a year later when an “Islamic” source of vaccine was identified (Malaysia) and pressure was exerted by Saudi Arabia, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Western donors, including the United States. 

While the vaccination campaign was suspended, polio of Nigerian origin reportedly spread to seventeen countries previously free of the disease, including Indonesia. More recently, Kano governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso has strongly supported the polio vaccination campaign. Even so, progress towards eradication remains slow. Nigerian commentators are right when they say that the campaign will surely suffer set backs as a result of the murders.

In this 1987 file photo, Chad's then president Hissène Habré is pictured in N'Djamena, the country's capital. (Dominique Faget/AFP/Getty Images/Newscom/File)

Chad's former dictator to be tried in Senegal for atrocities

By Alex Thurston, Guest blogger / 02.11.13

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, Sahel Blog. The views expressed are the author's own.

Hissène Habré, a French-educated political scientist, rebel commander, and politician, took power in a coup in 1982 and ruled Chad until rebel forces led by Idriss Déby overthrew him in 1990. Habré has been living in Senegal ever since. Pressure to put him on trial has come from numerous forces: groups within Chad, officials in Senegal and Belgium, the United Nations, the European Parliament, the African Union, and others.

For years, however, some observers felt that Senegalese authorities were stalling on the question of whether they would try Mr. Habré. Human Rights Watch has a chronology of the case here, an overview here, and a Q&A here.

Last week marked an important event in the case: the inauguration of special tribunal called the Extraordinary Chambers, in Dakar. There are a number of points to be made about this event. For one thing, as Voice of America reports, “this will be the first time a world leader is prosecuted for crimes against humanity by the government of another country.” The case will have major ramifications for future attempts to try former heads of state.

Second, there are questions to ponder about how Senegalese politics interacted with the trial. VOA quotes Reed Brody, a lawyer with Human Rights Watch, framing the shift in Senegalese authorities’ behavior on the case as a result of the change in administration from President Abdoulaye Wade – in office 2000-2012 – to new President Macky Sall.

“In 10 months, Macky Sall and [Justice Minister] Aminata Toure and the government of Senegal have moved this case more than Abdoulaye Wade had done in 12 years.  Finally, the tenacity and the perseverance of the victims is being been rewarded by this government,” [Brody] said.

What happens next? It’s hard to tell – AFP says that no details are publicly available about when the trial will start. RFI (French) gives a broad timeline: fifteen months (maximum) for investigations; seven months for the trial; and five months for appeals. That could mean that there is no final verdict until May 2015. In the meantime, this will be an important case to follow.

Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University.

Men transport humanitarian food aid onto pirogues at Mopti, Mali on Feb. 4, 2013. The aid is meant for an area recently liberated by French and Malian troops. (Alain Amontchi / Reuters)

Elections, ethnic tensions, and aid: Mali faces its future after the headlines

By Alex Thurston, Guest blogger / 02.07.13

• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, Sahel Blog. The views expressed are the author's own.

In addition to the nightmarish physical dangers that wartime brings, there is a conceptual danger that arises for people watching Mali at this moment: the danger of being swept up in a triumphalist narrative of good versus evil.

It is one thing to know, in theory, that an American or Western European military can take territory rapidly from rebel groups. It is another to see, even from a distance, a display of Western military might unfold – to be shocked and awed by French bombs and soldiers reconquering in some 18 days what some observers had thought might take months to do, to see the French sweep Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal without even seeming to break a sweat.

It is one thing to know, in theory, that the early phases of military interventions like these often prove popular with both domestic constituencies and liberated populations. It is another to see French flags waving in Bamako, and President Francois Hollande receive a rockstar reception. There is a danger in a moment like this of falling prey to some kind of intoxication, and pretending there is no hangover to follow.

To their credit, many voices in the international media are sounding quite sober. One hears a drumbeat of stories about ethic tensions and violence in reconquered territories, particularly Timbuktu. In report after report, one reads of Tuaregs and Arabs fleeing their homes and abandoning their shops, afraid that they will be treated as Islamist sympathizers and hurt. One reads of Tuaregs and Arabs, even less lucky, who were caught and assaulted.

At the same time one finds recurring allegations that Malian government soldiers have tortured or summarily executed captured Islamist fighters. Laudably, politicians like Sadou Harouna Diallo, the official mayor of Gao, have promised security to Arabs and Tuaregs if they return – but evidence suggests that such promises might prove hard to keep.

My fear is that actions today are sowing the seeds of conflicts tomorrow.  Historical memory – and northern Mali already has memories of ethnic violence – can play a central role in generating inter-communal violence and rebellion. What memories are being made now? If efforts at national reunification and reconstruction falter, bitterness among northern communities, combined with un-addressed grievances, could plunge Mali back into crisis a few years from now.

So I am afraid that a sense of triumphalism and a focus on preparing for elections will distract much-needed attention from the humanitarian needs of people affected by the conflict. My policy recommendations are simple to state, though I realize they would be less simple to carry out: focus on feeding people, resettling them, and keeping them from killing each other. I am thinking of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

I realize that many people, and for good reason, feel a sense of urgency concerning the question of what formal political arrangement Mali will establish now. What legitimacy the interim government of President Dioncounda Traoré currently has will likely only diminish over time. And I realize that plans are already in motion for elections in July.

But achieving a durable peace in Mali will take more than an election – it will require a durable solution to the economic and humanitarian problems of northern Mali. There is no better time to start working on those problems than the present. It is possible to address humanitarian concerns and prepare for elections at the same time. I am, moreover, recommending that those who make decisions and distribute money give priority to the former.

To give a numerical sense of the scale of humanitarian crisis in Mali, an estimated 380,000 people have already been displaced by the conflict and the UN predicts that as many as 700,000 additional Malians could be displaced. That would mean, for a country of around 16 million, that more than one in sixteen people would be displaced.

The UN also says that “over 4.6 million people in Mali are at risk of food insecurity as a result of climatic hazards and insecurity.” 4.6 million is approaching 1 in 3. This is a reminder that Mali would be in bad shape even if there had been no war. And the war, adding tragedy to tragedy, has compounded the food crisis.

As Monitor correspondent Peter Tinti has written, applying narrow counter-terrorism paradigms to the situation in Mali is a mistake. He warns, “Any intervention not delicately calibrated to local socio-political dynamics risks exacerbating the crisis, undermining the very goals policymakers aim to achieve.”

I agree with him. And what I have written here does not even begin to get at the question of what formal political arrangements might evolve in each locality. But I would submit that addressing the immediate needs of the victims of this conflict – their needs for food, shelter, and security – is one indispensable building block of any policy with a hope of success.

Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University.

Black billionaire in South Africa pledges to give away half his fortune

By John Campbell, Guest blogger / 02.05.13

A version of this post originally appeared on the blog, "Africa in Transition." The views expressed are the author's own.

On Jan. 30, 2013, South African billionaire Patrice Motsepe pledged to give half of the income generated by his family assets to charity. The country's ruling African National Congress (ANC) issued a press release congratulating Motsepe.

“This unprecedented act of good will in South Africa gives expression to our view of the patriotic bourgeoisie whose outlook reflects a deep understanding of development challenges and limitations facing South Africa and its people.”

“Patriotic bourgeoisie” is a term of art. The concept behind it was first articulated by Nelson Mandela and then more fully developed by his successor as South African president, Thabo Mbeki, in 1997. The concept is that just as political power was transferred from the white minority to the black majority, so, too, should economic power.

A black capitalist class would contribute to the poor black majority through racial solidarity. Capitalist profit seeking would be harnessed to improving the opportunities and living standards of the poor. Race would trump class. The creation of such a “patriotic bourgeoisie” was an important underpinning of a policy of Black Economic Empowerment. It was also seen as a response to the ANC’s critics on the left that a “liberation” government was following a pro-capitalist economic policy.

Mr. Motsepe would certainly appear to be a shining example of the “patriotic bourgeoisie.” He is commonly regarded as the richest black South African. He has taken the “Giving Pledge” pioneered by Warren Buffet and Bill Gates. Motsepe has praised by Buffett “for the advice and wisdom he shared with me in Omaha during August 2012 and for inspiring thousands of people worldwide to give and care for the less fortunate.”

He also thanked Bill and Melinda Gates for “their encouragement and for providing us with additional information of the Giving Pledge” a few months later in Cape Town.

He is closely tied to the ANC on many levels. His sister is the wife of Cyril Ramaphosa, nominated by the ANC for the position of deputy president for the 2015 elections. If the ANC retains its present dominant position, he is likely to be a future president of South Africa. Mr. Ramaphosa’s net worth is estimated by Forbes at $675 million, making him also a part of the “patriotic bourgeoisie, though not nearly as rich as Motsepe.

Motsepe is the founder of African Rainbow Minerals, a mining company, though now he has a variety of business interests. He was born into a poor family in Soweto, the huge black township outside Johannesburg.

According to Forbes, there are four South African billionaires. They are Nicky Oppenheimer, worth an estimated $6.4 billion; Johann Rupert, worth an estimated $5.7 billion; Christoffel Wiese, worth an estimated $3.7 billion; and Motsepe, worth an estimated $2.65 billion. All are white except Motsepe. All have highly diverse interests and holdings. That said, Oppenheimer wealth is associated with diamonds; Rupert with banking, mining, and luxury goods (headquartered in Switzerland); and Wiese with consumer retail, especially Shoprite, a huge supermarket chain.