South Sudanese Minister of Information Barnaba Benjamin Marial, right, and Military Spokesman Philip Aguer brief the media on Tuesday, March 27, in Juba, South Sudan about recent fighting between Sudanese and South Sudanese forces along the north-south border. The fighting has prompted Sudanese President Omar al Bashir to cancel his trip to Juba on April 3, derailing recent momentum in negotiations between the two countries. (Michael Onyiego/AP)
Sudan and South Sudan say no to war, but violence continues
• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.sahelblog.wordpress.com. The views expressed are the author's own.
When South Sudan attained independence last July, core final status issues – namely oil revenue sharing formulas and border demarcation – remained unresolved between it and Sudan. Since that time, multiple rounds of talks have yielded more frustration than progress. Violence has occurred multiple times in the border areas, whether from the Sudanese government cracking down on alleged internal rebels or in the form of skirmishes between Sudan and South Sudan.
On Monday, violence, the worst yet, flared up again between Sudan and South Sudan, according to AFP. Fighting focused on the area around Heglig, an oil field that lies within Sudan’s borders.
Sudanese warplanes launched air raids on newly independent South Sudan, as the rival armies clashed in heavy battles. Both sides accuse the other of starting the fighting, the worst violence since South Sudan declared independence from Khartoum last July after decades of civil war.
The fighting has now ended, but perhaps not for long, according to Voice of America and the Sudan Tribune. The two sides are holding talks today in neighboring Ethiopia, reports Al Jazeera:
Mohamed Vall, Al Jazeera’s correspondent in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum said that talks would not be occurring at 'a high ministerial level.'
He further reported that it was commonplace for fighting to break out before rounds of negotiations, as 'whenever there is negotiation, and many things at stake, the two sides try to find a kind of bargain chip on the ground, something that shows that they are in control, that they are stronger on the ground.'
Using violence as a negotiating tactic is not new. But it is dangerous. Violence can escalate beyond what tactical planners anticipated. And it is costly, in lives, money, and time. Finally, in this case, it does not appear to be working – violence does not seem to have brought a settlement closer.
The two sides say they do not want war, which is of course good, but they also need resolution. I’ve seen several pieces lately with titles like “South Sudan’s Dreams Already Slipping Away,” by the LA Times. While I would say that South Sudan was always confronting terrible problems of poverty, political inclusion, corruption, internal violence, etc., it is also true that the events of the last nine months, particularly since South Sudan suspended oil production in January, have taken their toll. Sudan does not seem to be in great shape either, economically or politically. The current rhythm of fight, talk, fight, talk is unsustainable.
– Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
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Weapons link South Sudan's White Army to prominent rebel groups
• A version of this post ran on the Enough Said blog. The views expressed are the author's own.
Cyclical violence has been common in South Sudan for decades and the most recent flare-up of heavy fighting in Jonglei state has been going on for months. The continued tension, attacks, and fear of reprisals have displaced an estimated 140,000 people as of early February 2012. The pervasive problem of insecurity, retaliatory violence, and lack of state capacity in service delivery and civilian protection presents a huge challenge to the government of South Sudan.
The layers of support and influence surrounding the Lou-Nuer White Army, a group central to fighting in Jonglei state, have been complex and rather opaque. There have been questions about diaspora support of the armed youth, speculations about the incentives of powerful local politicians in stoking violence, and support for the youth on the part of established militia groups.
A new Small Arms Survey report released last week cites evidence of external support of the White Army. After conducting research in Akobo, Likuongole, and the area surrounding Pibor town, Small Arms Survey found evidence of linking the White Army to weapons and ammunition identical to those used by both the Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA) and prominent rebel groups in South Sudan.
The report identifies several rounds of ammunition that were identical to cartridges seized from George Athor's forces in March 2011, suggesting that Athor’s militia was a potential source of arms and ammunition for the White Army. Similarly, in Akobo, Small Arms Survey researchers witnessed Nuer youths with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades identical to models seized from Peter Gadet and George Athor in early 2011. There has long been circumstantial evidence linking Athor to the provision of weapons to Lou- and Jikany-Nuer youth in Jonglei state.
There is also evidence that supports “allegations that Nuer members of the SPLA supported the White Army’s attack on Pibor.” Several cartridges retrieved from the area surrounding Pibor town point to some level of SPLA support for the White Army. But it is impossible, even with this newfound evidence, to ascertain the scale of support from both Athor and the SPLA to the White Army.
This report was released amid heightened tensions surrounding the South Sudan government-led disarmament campaign in Jonglei state. Regardless of where these weapons are coming from the South Sudanese government must critically reevaluate its disarmament strategy. Jonglei state, as most other regions of South Sudan, is flush with weapons. Compounding this problem, the state lacks the capacity to protect civilians from inter-communal violence, making armed civilians very reluctant to give up their weapons.
Disarmament is only one element of a plan to end violence in Jonglei state. Importantly, disarmament should be sequenced appropriately within a comprehensive approach that includes political processes, peace-building, and reconciliation. Disarmament alone cannot hope to end inter-communal violence; in fact, stand-alone disarmament is likely to further inflame the situation.
Enough has highlighted the dangers of a stand-alone disarmament campaign that attempts to confiscate weaponry before communities have undergone reconciliation and peace-building processes. Moreover, the recently announced disarmament strategy is problematic because it fails to appropriately address high-level political concerns alongside grassroots efforts for reconciliation.
– Anette LaRocco blogs for the Enough Project at Enough Said.
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People gather on a street after the Malian army staged a coup d'etat in the capital Bamako on Thursday. Tuareg rebels in northern Mali pushed south to occupy positions abandoned by government forces, sources said, as mutinous soldiers in the distant capital Bamako sought to complete a coup by hunting down the president. (Adama Diarra/Reuters)
With coup, #Mali generates noise on Twitter
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "CPJ Blog." The views expressed are the author's own.
On Tuesday, while reporting on breaking news in Mali from studios in Atlanta, CNN Wire Newsdesk Editor Faith Karimi made an ominous observation that presaged the outcome of developments unfolding 5,000 miles away. "#Mali president @PresidenceMali has not tweeted in 10 hours after reports of gunfire and a coup attempt," she tweeted.
Earlier – as a mutiny by army soldiers over President Amadou Toumani Touré's handling of a conflict with separatist ethnic Tuareg rebels gained momentum in the Malian capital Bamako – the president's Twitter account had been quick to dismiss reports of trouble.
"Formal denial: the minister of defense is neither injured nor arrested. He is at his office where he is calmly going about his work day," read one tweet. Then came an admonishment to BBC reporter Yacouba Ouédraogo, who was tweeting in his personal capacity while reporting on the crisis. "Can you verify your source? There is no coup d'état in Mali. There is just a mutiny in the garrison of Kati." In another tweet, the person running the presidency's Twitter account offered a personal reassurance, downplaying the situation. "As proof, I am tweeting from the presidential palace. Some deserters and other military who do not want to go to the frontline have mutinied."
SEE ALSO: Top Twitter moments
However, conflicting reports persisted, and journalists and others scrambled to get confirmation. "#Mali: Some mutineers control national TV, Africable TV. Someone to confirm their presence at Bamako's aeroport?" asked Ouédraogo, the journalist. Following the situation online from Farmington, Connecticut, Ousmane Diallo expressed his frustration. "We don't even know what to believe [France-based station] RFI reports that some ministers are under arrest and other news sites say that the mutineers control Bamako," he tweeted. "I'm very upset about the situation in #Mali and I would like to know what's really going on?" he added.
As the news grew into a global headline, Phil Paoletta, an expat based in Bamako, offered some advice for those just tuning in. "Anyone paying attention to #Mali for the first time-pls know that there is a lot more to this country than what you will read+see+hear today," he tweeted.
Indeed, Mali, until yesterday, had been one of the most stable and successful democracies in Africa, complete with free and abundant – though not always professional – media. In fact, the last time the Committee to Protect Journalists documented an attack on the Malian media was 2007.
The unexpected unrest prompted demands for reliable and contextual information. Mike Sefanov, a senior editor at Storyful, jumped on citizen reporter photos of the streets of Bamako and sought to contact their authors. "Hello, is this your photo? Did you take it yourself? Can the news networks use your photos of Bamako?" he tweeted to @ofalsen.
Evan Hill, an Al Jazeera English online producer, offered some direction for balanced coverage. "For news from #Mali follow @presidencemali and @martinvogl," he tweeted. Martin Vogl, a Bamako-based freelance journalist, was reporting for the BBC and other news outlets and became an authoritative source for international media. One of his tweets – "National radio and television in Mali have been cut. Soldiers have taken over the [state broadcaster] ORTM building" – was retweeted 71 times. Fabien Offner, another journalist on the ground, cast some doubt on the suggestion that soldiers were merely mutinying to demand better equipment to fight rebels. "In any case in Bamako, the military have apparently enough munitions for fun shooting in the air," he tweeted.
The military's seizure of state media drew apprehension about the intentions of the mutineers. "Black screen on ORTM....It brings about bad memories," tweeted Mariam Diaby. The station went off the air for a few hours before returning with musical programs. "While dramatic events unfold in Bamako, ORTM offers us all kinds of musical genres," tweeted Daouda Sangaré. Then an indication of an imminent announcement: "#Mali state tv back on air. Statement by 'soldiers' due soon, according to message on screen," tweeted Reuters journalist David Lewis.
The suspense drew some banter on Twitter while the country's fate hung in the balance. "#Malian military does not seem to understand meaning of instant! Over an hour now still no message," tweeted Abdul Tejan-Cole. "So, have they decided or not? They have almost exhausted all the repertoire of Malian music," tweeted @Ogobere. "So, if the mutineers continue to impose [musical program] Top Etoile on us, there will be a revolution as early as this evening," the same user joked.
As the wait stretched into today's early hours, the same @Ogobere turned his humor to the army itself. "Sleep has tried to attack me. But like the Malian army, I have proceeded to a tactical retreat," he tweeted. "Tactical retreat," referred to a term the military used to describe the humiliating rout of troops at the Tessalit army base, a major military installation in the country's north, which was run over by rebels in a deadly armed attack earlier this month.
Finally, images and sounds from state television began to change. "We hear the mutineers in the hallways of the public TV. Beginning of the liquidation of the Malian democracy," tweeted Solo Niaré. For those outside Mali, Natalie Grillon offered a way to get the news directly. "watch ortm here http://tv.senego.com/ortm-en-direct/ for military announcement," she tweeted.
Twitterers like @babtwittter and @Mbokoniko were among the first to post photos showing the faces of the mutineers-turned-coup leaders. "The new masters of Mali" read the caption of a screen shot of the live announcement by @babtwitter. Another screen shot came with chilling news: "the new CNRDRE power calls for the suspension of the constitution, dissolution of institutions. Nothing on [President] #ATT." Soon, videos of the announcement emerged on Youtube.
Calling itself the National Committee for the Redress of Democracy and Restoration of the State (CNRDRE is the acryonym in French), the junta drew immediate criticism. "The Malian military seize power within 1 month and a half of presidential elections scheduled for 29 April, 2012," pointed @JusticeJFK, adding "This is one of the + ridiculous coups d'état that Africa has known. What will the putschists promise? An election? It's in 1 month!"
Journalist and Columbia University professor Howard French offered some contextual analysis about the ousted president. "No political prisoners in Mali. No jailed journalists. ATT not perfect, but far better than many others," he tweeted. Another tweet, by Andrew Lebovich, summarized the feeling of Mali observers. "Sigh. So much for that Malian democracy."
Today, the first post-democracy day, most independent Malian newspapers, including Malijet and Journal du Mali, published as normal and independent radio stations such as Radio Kledu and Radio Kayira were on air covering the coup, local journalists told CPJ. However, the state newspaper, L'Essor, was leading its website today with a sports story and made no mention of the coup.
While the future of Mali's hitherto free press is unclear, the Twitter narrative demonstrated the ways in which traditional media are increasingly less relevant in any case. "Marking papers, with one ear tuned to RFI. But def got more quality reporting from Twitter today about #Mali than from any other medium," tweeted Philippe M. Frowd, a MacMaster University doctoral student living in Canada. As if acknowledging Frowd, traveler Hans-Peter Anzinger opened a Twitter account today, disclosing that he was in Bamako. "Cause of the military in Bamako Mali I desided to be part of the twitter thing ;-)" he wrote on his Twitter profile.
Mohamed Keita is advocacy coordinator for CPJ's Africa Program. He regularly gives interviews in French and English to international news media on press freedom issues in Africa and has participated in several panels. Follow him on Twitter: @africamedia_CPJ.
SEE ALSO: Top Twitter moments
Residents watch the premiere of 'Kony 2012,' a 30-minute YouTube film created by the non-profit group Invisible Children, in Lira district located 234 miles north of Uganda's capital Kampala, last week. (James Akena/Reuters)
Kony 2012: Five heretical thoughts on the fracas
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Congo Siasa." The views expressed are the author's own.
I resisted, now I have to succumb to the temptation of joining the fracas that is Kony2012. Some thoughts about some apparent assumptions, in no particular order.
The Kony2012 video is simplistic and reductive.
Absolutely. Notably, the video says little about what gave rise to the killing and the LRA itself, and what the current situation in Uganda is.
However, the video never says (as some have claimed) that the LRA currently numbers 30,000 child soldiers, just that they have abducted that many over the course of their existence (which is apparently in the correct order of magnitude).
The video also never says that the LRA is still in Uganda, although they could have made this clearer.
This reductionism is dangerous and can only lead to bad solutions.
Hold on - let's not be reductionist ourselves here! The video is a bit weak on solutions - in fact, it isn't clear what exactly their policy rec is. They like the fact that the US has deployed 100 advisers to the Ugandan army, and they seem to think that these advisers are in danger of being withdrawn - which, as far as I can see, is not the case. So the video looks like a bit of ex-post facto self-justification rather than a targeted advocacy effort.
At the end of the day, it is policy makers who call the shots, influenced by what their constituencies tell them to do. In this case, one could argue that the video has successfully put the LRA on their agenda - but not necessarily to do what the video tells them to do. Policy-makers should be smart enough (I flinch as I write this) to dodge the relevant potholes.
The video neglects the fact the northern Uganda is largely peaceful now and needs support for community development and livelihoods more than anti-LRA initiatives.
This argument gets my blood pressure up. En bref, go tell that to the hundreds of Congolese who have been murdered or maimed by the LRA in the past few years. In 2010 alone, the group killed over a thousand people, and on two days over Christmas in 2008 they killed over 620 people in the Congo. The LRA is still a huge threat to the local population of the Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. To say that we should stop caring about the LRA is absurd.
The video exaggerates the role of Invisible Children in getting the US to deploy advisers.
Yes, definitely. Every organization has to fund-raise.
The video pushes us toward a military solution, which provides indirect support to the Ugandan army and the patronage it provided to people in Museveni's government.
This is true, and I am very skeptical of the wholehearted endorsement of the UPDF the video provides.
However, I would like the skeptics to contemplate what a peace process would look like, and what lessons are to be learned from past attempts to negotiate with the LRA. Kony took advantage of the Juba peace talks in 2006-2008 to regroup, cross the Nile and stockpile food and supplies. He emerged stronger, and from sat phone intercepts and testimony of deserters, it appears that he never really intended to sign any deal.
Could there be a peace deal without Kony? Possibly, but instead of just shooting down the military initiative, I would like to see critics propose a viable alternative that takes into account Kony's block-headedness.
Jason Stearns is the author of the book, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa, and the blog,Congo Siasa.
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Progress on citizenship and border issues in Sudan and South Sudan?
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Enough Said." The views expressed are the author's own.
In a surprising move of cooperation, South Sudan and Sudan initialed agreements on citizenship and border demarcation in the latest round of talks in Addis Ababa, in the midst of heightened tensions and rhetoric between the two countries.
The seeming pivot away from the brink by both sides was reflected in rhetoric back in Juba. South Sudan’s lead negotiator Pagan Amum sounded an optimistic note on arrival from Addis on Wednesday, saying that the initialing of the “two very important agreements” signaled “huge progress in the negotiations.”
Amum also emphasized that the two parties had committed to a new spirit of cooperation in approaching the negotiations, in which both sides would cease unilateral actions and demonstrate willingness to compromise. The talks, ongoing for over a year and a half, have produced little progress to date.
The direct involvement of the presidents of both countries will also be a facet of the new approach in the talks, according to Amum. A bilateral summit between the two heads of states will reportedly take place in Juba in the near future, at which time President Kiir and President Bashir are slated to sign the agreements.
“The initialed agreements were concluded in the context of a spirit of cooperation and partnership which was discussed and agreed by the parties,” the African Union panel facilitating the talks said in a statement issued Tuesday evening. “The parties have renewed their commitment to continue negotiations in good faith and to arrive at agreements which will ensure the economic, political and security viability of both states.”
Under the nationality agreement, South Sudanese and Sudanese citizens will be granted the freedom to reside, move, acquire and dispose of property, and undertake economic activities in the other state. It remains unclear how, if at all, the agreement will affect the April 8 deadline for ethnic southerners currently residing in the North to “return” to South Sudan to obtain relevant documents necessary, according to Khartoum, for residence in Sudan.
The border agreement would commit the two sides to begin demarcating the parts of the North-South border that Juba and Khartoum agree on within 60 days, but asks that the demarcation process begin in two weeks. According to the text, demarcation should be completed within three months of the start date. It remains to be seen whether these initialed agreements, even when signed by the two heads of states, will actually be implemented or fall prey to the long history of non-implementation of agreements between Sudan and South Sudan.
– Amanda Hsiao blogs for the Enough Project's blog page Enough Said.
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Chad: a closer look at the food crisis
• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.sahelblog.wordpress.com. The views expressed are the author's own.
The Sahel currently faces a food crisis that could affect as many as 15 million people, according to the United Nations's Food and Agriculture Organization.
This includes 5.4 million people in the Niger (35 percent of the population), 3 million in Mali (20 percent), around 1.7 million in Burkina Faso (10 percent), around 3.6 million in Chad (28 percent), 850 000 in Senegal (6 percent), 713 500 in the Gambia (37 percent) and 700 000 in Mauritania (22 percent).
The looming crisis is due to a combination of factors, including drought; sharp declines in cereal production and high grain prices; a shortage of fodder for livestock; a reduction in remittances from migrant workers in several countries; environmental degradation; displacement; and chronic poverty deepened by chronic crisis.
Total 2011 cereal production in the Sahel was on average 25 percent lower than in 2010, but as much as 50 percent lower in Chad and Mauritania. There were also localized, huge food production deficits in other countries (up to 80 percent).
As the above quotation indicates, Chad is one of the most affected countries. IRIN gives a ground-level perspective on the crisis, and sets Chad’s problems in the context of broader fallout from the civil war in Libya and the violence in Northern Nigeria:
Late Chadian government recognition of a food crisis, a slow build-up from aid agencies, and severe pipeline constraints due to closed Libyan and Nigerian borders mean food aid has not yet arrived in Chad, despite many thousands of people having already run out of food.
Residents of Eri Toukoul village in Kanem Region, western Chad, told IRIN they have nothing to eat. Most are surviving by leaving for towns and cities. Grain stores are empty and the animals they used to rely on are dead.
“Before we had 10-15 animals each, now we have nothing,” said Fatou Su Hawadriss, who has seven children. Almost every family in this village once had at least one relative working in Libya who sent back money, but now all have fled the violence there.
Oxfam, meanwhile, has produced a video on the situation in Chad.
Both Oxfam and the United Nations are calling for millions of dollars to support relief efforts across the region.
The debate continues about how best to address the problem of food insecurity, with NPR recently showcasing new research on where relief organizations should purchase food supplies. The findings seem fairly common-sense to me:
Simple, unprocessed grain or beans were clearly cheaper in local markets; processed food such as oil sometimes was cheaper to ship from the U.S. The lesson from this is a simple one, the researchers concluded: Don’t set up rigid rules that require food to be bought in any particular place. Buy food wherever it makes most sense.
The larger question about the region’s recurring food crises still remains, however: What is the best long-term strategy for reducing food insecurity? For Chad and many of its neighbors, that question is of crucial importance.
– Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
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Amid police firings in Burkina Faso, all eyes on 2015 election
• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.sahelblog.wordpress.com. The views expressed are the author's own.
Last spring, Burkina Faso experienced weeks of protests by trade unions and students, with an overlapping series of mutinies by soldiers and police. For a time it looked as though President Blaise Compaore, who has ruled the country since 1987, might be losing his grip on power. In June, a combination of personnel changes, policy reforms, and crackdowns on mutineers brought the nation’s intersecting uprisings to a close. But nearly a year later, Burkina Faso and its rulers are still sorting through the fallout of last year’s explosion – and looking ahead to 2015, the year of the next scheduled presidential elections.
The 2011 uprisings were back in the news last week when the government announced the firing of over 100 policemen accused of joining the mutinies. A list of the fired officers (in French) shows that most came from units in Ouagadougou, the political capital, and Bobo-Dioulasso, the economic capital. Both cities were centers of protest last year. Given earlier disciplinary firings of mutinous soldiers, the firing of mutinous police came as no surprise (French).
The firings suggest that last year’s uprisings are still on the government’s mind, but also that the government is feeling relatively strong. International actors seem to share that view of the Compaore regime’s strength. The US State Department‘s conclusion regarding the 2011 uprisings is, “As of late July, the government’s actions had produced greater calm and stability.” The IMF’s December review of loan programs to Burkina Faso makes no mention of the uprisings, but generally depicts the country as stable and making progress on the IMF’s desired reforms. The IMF does say, however, “In view of the Burkinabè economy’s vulnerability to exogenous shocks that affect the most vulnerable in the population, the authorities need to place special emphasis on the preparation of a social safety net.” This is noteworthy because two frequently cited drivers of the uprisings were the post-electoral crisis in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire and increases in the price of basic foods.
The Africa Report adds more perspective on the regime’s new strategy and how it has been received internationally:
The new government has increased its actions, most notably by reducing prices of fast-moving consumer goods and agricultural input products, promoting civil servants or suspending unpaid penalties for delayed electricity bills.
In pole position is Luc Adolphe Tiao, who has embarked on a campaign to seduce Burkinabes and economic partners. The former journalist and diplomat has a somewhat pedagogical approach to his duties.
[...]
They also seem to desire an improvement in governance, social dialogue and the economic environment, in line with the recommendations of the World Bank.
[...]
Moreover, while meeting in Paris in the beginning of February, international partners gave their support to the Burkinabe government’s social and economic programmes, with a total budget of US$14.3bn for the period 2011-2015.
Their ambition is to reach a two-digit GDP growth, the only lever to real sustainable poverty reduction.
Many observers, then, agree that calm has been restored for the present. But those same observers are questioning whether stability can hold. The Africa Report wonders whether population growth will overwhelm economic growth. Morale among soldiers and police may have taken a hit from firings. And the shocks – particularly rapid increases in food prices – that contributed to crisis not only last year, but also in previous episodes, could return.
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Some uncertainty about Burkina Faso’s political future centers on the president and his intentions. In Jeune Afrique (in French), Marwane Ben Yahmed writes that Compaore is facing pressures (including from abroad) to step down when his term ends in 2015, but also getting encouragement (especially from his circle) to remain. Ben Yahmed writes (my translation) that Compaore already knows what he intends to do, but that “he cannot commit himself to leave, at the risk of undermining his authority and launching a premature war of succession, just as he could not, evidently, announce that he will cling to power.” The guessing game about the president’s intentions, which could run for over two years, will ensure that a hint of tension remains in Burkina Faso’s politics for some time to come.
– Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
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7 stories on Africa this week, other than Kony2012
• A version of this post appeared on the blog jinamoore.com. The views expressed are the author's own.
Did you hear we halved poverty while we were all distracted by Invisible Children? The Internet is on fire debating Invisible Children and the Kony2012 campaign targeting Ugandan Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army. Rarely does news from Africa so consume the chattering classes – who, as it turns out, are missing some real news. In no particular order, here are some stories from Africa this week:
1. On International Women's Day, Kenya's sex workers offer to pay income tax -- to make the point that sex work is as valid as any other work, and to force the government to recognize the practice as a labor. (Kenya, meanwhile, fired 25,000 striking nurses, arguing that nurse strikes endanger patients lives. Twenty-five thousand missing nurses, however, is apparently totally safe.)
2. The UN claims to have met the clean water Millennium Development Goal, and scientists rebut. The World Bank says the world met the Millennium Development poverty goal.
The maternal mortality MDG, however, looked pretty awful from Gobah, Liberia. Yesterday, I visited a clinic there – in the same county as the capital, Monrovia – that doesn't have a microscope, malaria meds for kids 5-10, or water. That's right, water. Read about it over on the project page for our Pulitzer Center collaborative project on reproductive health in Africa.
3. The International Peace Institute calls our attention to actually underreported topics, namely, security in West Africa. In addition to the notorious drug smuggling, IPI draws attention to the scary combination of terrorism, drugs, crime and insurgency in the Sahel region (especially in Mali, it notes, citing a recent UN assessment) and to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. (That's right. Pirates advance on great white saviors. Pirates, checkmate.)
Bonus points for IPI, which tell us what we can do, rather than wring our hands and feel guilty, or not guilty, or guilty about not feeling guilty, or questionable making others feel guilty about the guilt others try to put on them... er... work it out according to whatever made you angriest on the Internet.
So what can we do to stop these two burgeoning crises? Send planes to the Sahel and patrol boats to the Gulf, says IPI. And maybe some radar and comms equipment.
4. Three men were killed in Burundi in an exchange of gunfire with the police, the latest in a series of killings that have been documented intermittently since the country's troubled 2010 election. The UN has confirmed that the FNL, an ex-rebel group and former opposition party, has relocated to Congo, and some observers fear the ongoing gun battles suggest a return to violence with the FNL.
5. Sam Bell, who knows a thing or two (to say the least) about what it means to do American advocacy on African atrocities, wrote a moving tribute to Representative Donald Payne, a long-time Sudan (and Africa) advocate who died on Tuesday. Bell's tribute is itself an insightful reflection on some of the challenges of advocacy.
6. Ashley Judd listened to this awesome radio piece I did about some incredible Congolese women busting through the countryside to bring women's news to the airwaves. Did you?
7. Goma, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, stares down a cholera outbreak after a month of water shortages.
IN PICTURES: The Lord's Resistance Army
Still thinking about the LRA?
If, after all of this, you're still thinking about the LRA, I urge you to read this piece by indefatigable Elizabeth Rubin. it's from 1998, when the LRA was still in Uganda kidnapping children at night. Not that being in Congo and the CAR and raping women and looting villages is any less of a crime. Just saying, note the time flashback. Also, it's amazing journalism. (Thanks Nicholas Thompson for freeing it from behind the New Yorker's paywall.)
Meanwhile, I find these two things to be the most lasting, as the Internet exploded this week:
Photographer Glenna Gordon, who took the only still picture of Invisible Children you've ever seen, was interviewed about the photo by the Washington Post. Answering a question about whether this IC stuff is all neo-colonial, Gordon said, "I don’t think they think there is a problem with the idea that they are colonial. This photo is the epitome of it, like, we are even going to hold your guns for you."
And novelist Teju Cole said yesterday (on, sigh, Twitter): "The White Savior Industrial Complex is not about justice. It is about having a big emotional experience that validates privilege." All those blog posts, and dude gets it right in 140 characters.
– Jina Moore is a freelance multimedia journalist who covers Africa, human rights and women in conflict zones. She blogs here.
Lisa Longoria, of Kennewick, Wash., uses Facebook after school at the Keewaydin Branch of the Mid-Columbia Libraries, Wednesday, March 7. On Tuesday, the Invisible Children organization launched a program it called Kony 2012 to draw attention to the head of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Joseph Kony. Longoria said she cried when she watched some of the Kony 2012 video by Invisible Families, that has gone viral thanks to social media. (Kai-Huei Yau/Tri-City Herald/AP)
How Kony 2012 campaign went viral and focused rare attention on Africa
On Tuesday, the Invisible Children organization launched a program it called Kony 2012 to draw attention to the head of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, and agitate for his arrest.
By Wednesday, #stopkony was trending on Twitter. On Thursday, “uganda” (one of the bases of operation for the LRA) and “invisible children kony 2012” were trending on Google at no. 5 and no. 11 respectively. At last glance, its video on YouTube has been viewed more than 55 million times.
The effectiveness of this campaign to make Kony famous – and to pressure US politicians to commit to helping stop Kony's two-and-a-half decades of violence – is because of the way that Invisible Children took full possible advantage of current social media tools.
IN PICTURES: Lord's Resistance Army
Other campaigns have used videos and social media to get their message out (consider the Enough Project's campaign against Congolese militias who fund their wars by controlling the trade in "Blood Minerals" such as coltan). But it takes more than having a message worth hearing, and the tools of social media to get that message out, to make a campaign like this one catch fire. It takes an insider’s view of the technology combined with an outsider’s view of the message.
And Invisible Children has some smart nerds at the helm of their operation.
The organization has been around since the film that gave them their name debuted in 2004. They have had the time to experiment with various tech tools and to make the group's name known. So when they came out with Kony 2012, they had a message (“elect” Kony to the public consciousness), online fund-raising, including t-shirts and other gear, “kits” that allowed interested people to promote the message, a very popular video, a healthy Twitter and Facebook presence, a blog, and the LRA Crisis Tracker, a mapping platform built over IC’s incident database.
“Starting with a pretty robust base of supporters, they did a great job of using one of the interesting social features of Twitter - the ability to enter someone's timeline by messaging them directly,” the Berkman Center’s Ethan Zuckerman told the Monitor. “The main thrust of the campaign, as I understand it, was to get 20 ‘culturemakers’ and 12 policymakers to make a statement supporting their campaign. By encouraging the folks they reached via e-mail and then via social networks to message those recipients, they mobilized a very rapid lobbying campaign."
"In the same way that a politician receiving hundreds of phone calls about SOPA/PIPA (the Stop Online Piracy Act and the Protect Intellectual Property Act in the US Congress) will want to reconsider a stance on the issue," Mr. Zuckerman adds, "a person receiving thousands of Twitter messages will want to figure out what they're being asked to do, and may want to join a movement, in part, because it might make the lobbying stop.”
This strategy impelled celebrities such as Ellen Degeneres, Zooey Deschanel, Rihanna, Brent Spiner, and others to jump on their Twitter accounts and talk up the campaign. These folks, with sometimes millions of Twitter followers, acted to amplify the Kony issue.
What Invisible Children has done is difficult to duplicate. Their success is not a result of a new bit of code or a novel mobile application. What they have done is strategy, not technology. Most, perhaps all, of what they use are the standard tools of online outreach. But Kony 2012’s strong message with its emotional appeal, the targeting of "influencers," and the consistency across media are what sets this effort apart from related campaigns.
Additionally, their call to action is extremely simple: Talk about the Lord’s Resistance Army and bug others about it. It may be what other human rights groups denigrate as “slacktivism,” but it is well crafted to take advantage of the desire to be involved, so long as that involvement requires actions that are extremely easy to do from the computer – the same computer that you use to read about the campaign in the first place. Technology can be duplicated, but strategy requires a mind predisposed to its implementation.
Other groups fall short because they tend to have a complicated message, not enough of an emotional plea, or too complex a call to action. Any one of those things is a click-killer.
The campaign’s veracity, the organization’s financing and the general value of such campaigns have all been called into question. However, the fact remains that regardless of the purity of the organization, a strong message persistently propagated through every medium and supported by a stable set of social media relationships has helped to make Kony 2012 the digital cause célèbre it is today.
"I don't think it's social media [that has made the campaign so effective], I think it's their decision to focus on one individual rather than the collective atrocities," said Jillian York, the director for International Free Expression for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a freedom of expression activist group. "People love a good villain."
IN PICTURES: Lord's Resistance Army
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In this July 2011 file photo released by Invisible Children, the antenna installation of one of Invisible Children's 14 high frequency radios used in their early warning radio network to help track the Lord's Resistance Army is seen in Haut Uele, Congo. (Invisible Children/AP/File)
Crisis mapping: How Invisible Children's Kony 2012 campaign changed advocacy
* This post originally appeared on Patrick Meier's tech blog, irevolution.net, on Sept. 29, 2011. The Monitor has reposted it with permission of the author.
My colleagues at Resolve and Invisible Children have just launched their very impressive Crisis Map of LRA Attacks in Central Africa. The LRA, or Lord’s Resistance Army, is a brutal rebel group responsible for widespread mass atrocities, most of which go completely unreported because the killings and kidnappings happen in remote areas. This crisis map has been a long time in the making so I want to sincerely congratulate Michael Poffenberger, Sean Poole, Adam Finck, Kenneth Transier, and the entire team for the stellar job they’ve done with this project. The LRA Crisis Tracker is an important milestone for the fields of crisis mapping and early warning.
See the LRA Crisis Tracker here.
The Crisis Tracker team did an excellent job putting together a detailed code book (PDF) for this crisis map, a critical piece of any crisis mapping and conflict early-warning project that is all too often ignored or rushed by most. The reports mapped on Crisis Tracker come from Invisible Children’s local Early Warning Radio Network, UN agencies, and local NGOs. Invisible Children’s radio network also provides local communities with the ability to receive warnings of LRA activity and alert local security forces to LRA violence.
IN PICTURES: Lord's Resistance Army
When I sat down with Resolve’s Kenneth Transier earlier this month [September 2011], he noted that the majority of the reports depicted on their LRA crisis map represent new and original information. He also noted that they currently have 22 months of solid data, with historical and real-time data entry ongoing. You can download the data here. Note that the public version of this data does not include the most sensitive information for security reasons.
The Crisis Tracker team also provide monthly and quarterly security briefs, analyzing the latest data they’ve collected for trends and patterns. This project is by far the most accurate, up-to-date, and comprehensive source of information on LRA atrocities, which the partners hope will improve efforts to protect vulnerable communities in the region. Indeed, the team has joined forces with a number of community-run protection organizations in Central Africa who hope to benefit from the team’s regular crisis reports.
The project is also innovative because of the technology being used. Michael got in touch about a year ago to learn more about the Ushahidi platform and after a series of conversations decided that they needed more features than were currently available from Ushahidi, especially on the data visualization side. So I put them in touch with my colleagues at Development Seed. Ultimately, the team partnered with a company called Digitaria which used the back end of a Sales-force platform and a customized content management system to publish the information to the crisis map. This an important contribution to the field of crisis mapping and I do hope that Digitaria share their technology with other groups. Indeed, the fact that new crisis-mapping technologies are surfacing is a healthy sign that the field is maturing and evolving.
In the meantime, I’m speaking with Michael about next steps on the conflict early warning and especially response side. This project has the potential to become a successful people-centered conflict early-response initiative as long as the team focuses seriously on conflict preparedness and implements a number of other best practices from fourth-generation conflict early warning systems.
This project is definitely worth keeping an eye on. I’ve invited Crisis Tracker to present at the 2011 International Conference of Crisis Mappers in Geneva in November (ICCM 2011). I do hope they’ll be able to participate. In the meantime, you can follow the team and their updates via Twitter at @crisistracker. The Crisis Tracker iPhone and iPad apps and should be out soon.
* Patrick Meier is an internationally recognized thought leader on the application of new technologies for crisis early warning, humanitarian response, human rights and civil resistance. He currently serves as Director of Crisis Mapping at Ushahidi and previously co-directed Harvard's Program on Crisis Mapping and Early Warning. He also consults extensively for international organizations in Africa, Asia and Europe. Patrick holds a PhD from The Fletcher School, a Pre-Doctoral Fellowship from Stanford and an MA from Columbia University. He was born & raised in Africa. You can follow him on Twitter at @patrickmeier.
IN PICTURES: Lord's Resistance Army
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