Razack Munboadan (l.), senior manager with Karuturi, an Indian company with four commercial farms in Ethiopia, talks to his workers at Karuturi's farm in Bako, central Ethiopia. (Reuters/Staff photographer)

Agricultural gains in Africa crippled by funding crisis

By Tom Murphy, Guest blogger / 03.27.13

• A version of this post originally appeared on the blog, A View From the Cave. The views expressed are the author's own.

African countries are making promising agricultural gains, but the progress remains in the balance due to a $4.4 billion funding shortfall, warns a new report by the ONE Campaign. That is in addition to $11 billion in agriculture funding pledged by G8 nations that has yet to be disbursed.

The ONE report cites 2013 as an important year for agriculture in Africa because it is a time when international and domestic funding agreements come to an end.

“African leaders have the opportunity to deliver on their goals of lifting millions from extreme poverty and hunger and preventing chronic malnutrition by meeting these commitments,” write the report’s authors.

Edward Carr of the University of South Carolina was general supportive of the report, but noted that the problem of agriculture may be one that is about markets rather than production.

“There is no discussion on the massive rate of loss between farm gate and market in this region,” Mr. Carr says. “The report raises further questions. Is there really a production shortfall or a marketable crop shortfall?” 

The heads of state for the countries of Malawi, Senegal, Cape Verde, and Sierra Leone have been invited for a two-day visit to the White House at the end of this week. The countries are among the six highest performing African countries in the ONE report and have strong ties to US agriculture initiatives such as Feed the Future and the Millennium Challange Corporation (MCC).

ONE believes that the Obama administration may add Malawi and Senegal to the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a move that further commits US support for agriculture development in the two countries.

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) established by African leaders in Maputo in July 2003 set forward the goal of countries allocating 10 percent of their national budgets to agriculture. Since then, 24 countries signed the agreement and have developed national agriculture plans. The ONE report assessed 19 of the signatory countries and found that only 4 have met the 10 percent spending target.

Despite the fact that the majority of countries are off the spending target, there are signs of promising progress. Eight of the 19 countries are on pace to half extreme poverty by 2015, meeting millennium development goal 1a. Additionally, 13 of 15 countries with adequate data will meet the second CAADP goal of annual agriculture growth of 6 percent or more.

Duke University researcher Marc Bellemare pointed out that trade is missing from the report. He says that development gains will be made through policy changes as opposed to simply increasing aid.

“For 60 years, we have been telling developing countries to open themselves up to international trade, that trade is not a zero-sum game. But international trade only helps a country if it can tap into its comparative advantage, which for developing countries is agriculture,” says Mr. Bellemare.

“We are undermining the comparative advantage and constraining the economic development of the developing world by refusing to liberalize agricultural trade and heavily subsidizing our own agriculture,” he adds.

Ethiopia is one of the countries that performs relatively well in the report’s scorecard. The East African nation spent an average of roughly 15 percent of its national budget on agriculture in the 2000s and spent 19.7 percent of its budget on agriculture in 2011. The money has been invested in disaster risk reduction and food security programs for the country’s drought-prone populations.

The massive famine in Ethiopia from 1983 to 1985 killed an estimated 400,000 people and sparked the massive awareness campaigns like Band Aid’s Do they Know it’s Christmas and the Live Aid concerts (see a news report from 1984 on the famine here).  The cycle of droughts and continuous food insecurity led the country to launch the Productive Safety-Net Programme (PNSP) in 2005 as a way of traisitioning from emergency food aid to cash-based social protection.

PNSP supported the food needs of 7.8 million Ethiopians, rehabilitated roughly 40,000 hectacres of land and undertook infrastructure building projects in its intial four year phase. The World Bank was optimistic about its early progress, but some doubts have been raised about the reliability of the data provided.

“The narrative is that the corner [as far as food security is concerned] has been turned, but that is a narrative carefully controlled by the government. Time will tell,” said an anonymous food security analyst to IRIN humanitarian news service.

ONE’s report called for a greater level of transparency from the Ethiopian government, citing that the information available "does not seem comprehensive."Transparency is among other issues that the report repeatedly presses for more improvements across the countries evaluated. Other areas in need of improvement include increasing the ability of non-state actors, such as civil society and the private sector, to participate in the implementation of programs and a greater focus on women farmers.

“While women farmers contribute up to 50% of labour on farms in sub-Saharan Africa, women do not have the same access, credit or inputs as men and own only 1% of land,” says the report. “More secure property rights for women, and indeed more transparent legal ownership of land overall, would help facilitate access to services as well as responsible investment.”

There is also a small, but important mention about nutrition, says Carr. He adds, “I like the fact that they are pointing to nutrition here, as I do think that is  an under-discussed issue.”

With the African Union looking towards agriculture in 2014 and the upcoming meetings regarding hunger at the G8, the conversation is turning towards agriculture and food security. A coalition of British NGOs hope that their Enough Food If campaign can draw attention to the issue and propel the current momentum towards ending hunger.

“The agenda we have set out is radical – more so than Make Poverty History. This is the agenda we’ll campaign hard for, engage millions in and what we’ll judge by. The real challenge over the coming months is to put all our efforts into making as big a difference as we possibly can,” said the campaign in a statement at their launch. 

Refugees from South Kordofan, Sudan, gather around a small TV set in the Yida refugee camp in Unity State, South Sudan on Saturday May 12, 2012. (AP/Pete Muller)

For refugees in South Sudan, a transit camp becomes a long-term home

By Akshaya Kumar, Guest blogger / 03.26.13

A version of this post first appeared on the blog of the Enough Project. The views expressed are the author's own. 

The United Nations reports that every day approximately 338 refugees cross from South Kordofan, Sudan, into the newly independent South Sudan. Yida refugee camp now hosts more than 70,000 Sudanese who are fleeing atrocities and starvation warfare in their home country.

However, the UN's refugee agency maintains that Yida, which lies mere kilometers from the international border between the two Sudans, is an unsuitable location for an “official” refugee camp.

Notwithstanding the fact that the camp has been hosting refugees for almost 20 months, the UN still classifies the camp as a "transit" facility. But the reality on the ground tells a very different story.

Aid workers report that the camp hosts scores of brick buildings and a bustling marketplace. Convincing refugees in Yida to abandon their new dwellings and livelihoods simply because of their technically inappropriate location will continue to be a huge challenge, especially since the community’s leadership sees benefit from the proximity to the border. Last year, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees attempted, without success, to relocate the camp further south to the established camps of Pariang and Nyeel.

The refugee communities' leaders objected to the transfer, arguing that those camps were located in deforested areas that were prone to flooding during the rainy season. By December 2012, only 853 refugees had relocated to Nyeel camp and 763 to Pariang camp. Pariang temporarily hosted around a thousand people from Yida during the school year due to the education services that it offered.

Camp organizers object that Yida’s proximity to the border allows for Sudanese rebels from the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North, or SPLM-N, to abuse the camp. Both groups are currently engaged in active hostilities with various Sudanese armed forces in Sudan’s Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states.

The UN’s refugee agency has repeatedly warned against the continued presence of armed men in the camps, as they undermine the fundamentally neutral character of refugee camps. In mid-March, Voice of America reported that one person died and hundreds fled as a result of clashes between unknown armed groups in the camps.

According to the UN, rebels cycle through the camp in between offensive maneuvers. In October 2012, a visiting U.S. official confirmed this objection, sharing, "we have asked them not to use the camp, which is supposed to be civilian, as a center for R&R [rest and recuperation] or the recruitment of soldiers." The leaders of the refugee communities, who largely support the SPLM-N, prefer living closer to the border so that they can maintain contact and stay closer to their original homes.

Unfortunately, refugee children are the victims in this standoff between the camp's leadership and the UN agency. The refugee agency has refused to establish schools there, pointing to a policy that classifies the camp as a "transit" point. This decision has been highly controversial, particularly since most of Yida's current residents expect to live there for some time, according to Enough Project sources on the ground.

Nearly 70 percent of refugees in Yida are below age 18, making the lack of educational facilities particularly problematic. Continuing to insist that the children of Yida don't need formal schooling is a bureaucratic mistake. The people of Yida attempted to complain about the lack of schools during a visit from UN officials last year, but this effort failed. In an attempt to force the issue, the refugee agency is now suggesting those who want their children to go to school need to move to one of the new camps.

The UN recently announced that it will be begin transferring refugees out of Yida at the end of this month. The refugee agency plans to open two new camps. The first proposed camp, Ajuong, a portion of which will open at the end of March, is being established in densely forested area, which should respond to the community's concerns about access to firewood and protection from flooding.

However, even when complete, the new camp will only have the capacity to host around 25,000 refugees. Aid workers on the ground confess that they are not on schedule to fully set up Ajuong before the rainy season, further complicating plans for people to move from Yida. No work has started in Gumriak, the planned location for a second camp. Realistically, the tens of thousands of people who live in Yida, which continues to grow, could not be accommodated in the new facilities, even if they could be convinced to move.

Central African Republic rebel leader Michel Djotodia arrives ahead of planned peace talks with Central African Republic's government, in Libreville, Gabon, in January. (AP/Joel Bouopda Tatou)

Meet the polygot who just took over the Central African Republic

By Louisa Lombard, Guest blogger / 03.25.13

On Sunday, a loose rebel alliance known as Seleka captured Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic, and sent the country's beleaguered president, Francois Bozize, fleeing to neighboring Cameroon. In his place, rebel leader Michel Djotodia reportedly assumed power and announced he would form a new government. Central African political expert Louisa Lombard has studied rebel leadership in CAR for several years, and writes of her own attempts to answer a question that has now taken on pressing international relevance: who is Michel Djotodia? 

• A version of this post originally appeared on the blog Foole's No Man's Land. The views expressed are the author's own.

When the Central African rebel group Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR) announced its presence by capturing CAR's northeasternmost town, Birao, at the end of October 2006, a few different men immediately declared themselves the movement's leader. There was Abakar Sabone, formerly best known as a Chadian recruiter of men-in-arms who'd helped Mr. Bozize take power in 2003 but became disgruntled with his former ally over a perceived lack of proper payment for his services. Then there was Damane Zakaria, a counselor in the small town of Tiringoulou who was with the men on the ground.

Finally there was Michel Djotodia, who few people knew much about at all.

Mr. Sabone and Djotodia were in Cotonou, Benin at the time – locked up at Bozize's request. Though they were eventually released, they were both somewhat sidelined during the peace process, and for the next few years whenever anyone asked who was the leader of the UFDR, it was General Damane's name that was put forward.

It was Damane who I got to know while doing research among the UFDR in Tiringoulou in 2009-2010. Nevertheless, I was curious about Djotodia, so I frequently asked about him as well. Overall, the impression I got was of a polyglot, intelligent guy with outsize political ambitions.

He made it into my dissertation, but only in the form of a long footnote:

People in Vakaga [prefecture] remember [Djotodia] as a prolific practitioner of extraversion. He went to the USSR to study and ended up living there ten years, marrying, and fathering two daughters, and then finally returning to CAR with “ten diplomas” and fluency in a number of languages, which made him useful when it came to representing the UFDR to foreigners and media.

People in Tiringoulou tell of one day, long before the rebellion, when a plane of Russian hunters unexpectedly arrived. Upon hearing Djotodia’s rendition of their language, declared him not Central African but Russian and brought him along for their tour of the country. He had political aspirations, and he pursued them fervently. Twice he tried to become a deputy, and twice he failed.

The highest post he attained was Tax Director. He also worked to become close to the Sheikh Tidjani, spiritual leader for many in the buffer zone, who lives in South Darfur. At the time of the UFDR’s first attack, he, like Sabone, was in Benin, where he had friends from his Russia days. Like Sabone, he was jailed in Cotonou for his role in the insurgency.

But then he becomes harder to track. He had a falling out with the Sheikh when he tried to convince the president’s son to name him consul to Sudan in the Sheikh’s place (though technically Sudanese himself, the Sheikh occupies this post as a result of the respect and legitimacy he enjoys throughout the region). The break in this relationship has made it harder for him to claim to represent people in the area.

Damane said that he had pushed him out when Djotodia had attempted to make an alliance with Charles Massi, another sidelined politician aiming for power through the form of insurgency. Whatever the specifics of his fall, people described it as a function of his failure to properly negotiate alliances. This diplomatic capability is central to maintaining power in a place of plural authorities. People surmised that this “intellectual” is now trying his luck somewhere far away.

Well, now we know a bit more about what Djotodia was up to. He has been in Nyala, in South Darfur, cultivating working alliances with the remnants of Chadian rebel groups that have been hanging out in the area. It was these fighters from the Chad/Sudan/CAR borderlands who became the military backbone of the Seleka rebel coalition that first threatened the CAR capital, Bangui, in December.

And through these alliances, Djotodia has come out on top. Hearing the stories of his ambition during my research, I almost felt embarrassed on his behalf -- he seemed like a Jamaican bobsledder convinced he'd win gold. And yet here he is, ten years after Bozize took power, getting ready to move into the presidential palace.

Here's hoping he lives up to his intellectual reputation and does a better job than his predecessor. Goodness knows Central Africans have suffered far too much already.

General Bosco Ntaganda addresses a news conference in Kabati, a village located in Congo's eastern North Kivu province, Jan. 2009. (Abdul Ndemere/Reuters)

A broken rebellion and Rwanda's cold shoulder: Why Congo's Terminator turned himself in

By Jason Stearns, Guest blogger / 03.22.13

• A version of this post originally appeared on the blog Congo Siasa. The views expressed are the author's own.

There has been a lot of conjecture and speculation surrounding the Rwandan-born Congolese warlord Bosco Ntaganda's "surrender" to the US embassy in Rwanda on Tuesday morning. In recent weeks, various parties to the conflict have been purposely spreading false information about "The Terminator" – who was wanted in connection with war crimes by the International Criminal Court – which has made it difficult to parse the facts in the case. Here are my own thoughts on some of these points.

Why did he surrender?

His time was up. On Feb. 24, an internal battle had broken out among the M23 rebels, pitting Mr. Ntaganda's wing against that of Sultani Makenga (for more information about Ntaganda's career and the divisions within the M23 see the Usalama Project's briefing here). While Ntaganda led a large group of soldiers – at least 500 were reported to have crossed the border on March 14 – he was short on ammunition. After weeks of fighting, he decided to run.

The larger and perhaps more important question is: Why did the M23 implode? Divisions existed since the group's creation in April 2012, driven by ethnic considerations – Ntaganda is from the Gogwe sub-ethnic group, many of Mr. Makenga's officers are Banyajomba – as well as historical differences (Makenga was close to Laurent Nkunda, whom Ntaganda replaced in January 2009), and struggles over money and power (each carried out promotions behind the other's back and set up separate tax structures).

The final straw, however, appears to have been the looming possibility of a peace deal, or at least Ntaganda's perception that one might take place. With an international arrest warrant looming over his head, and declarations by the Congolese government concerning his arrest, he knew that he would have no chance of re-integrating into the Congolese army.

Nonetheless, important questions persist. Allegations abound, for example, that Congolese President Joseph Kabila exacerbated the divisions with bribes. But which side did he bribe? Each accuses the other for having received blood money.

Rwanda's role is also curious. Reliable reports point to Rwandan backing for the M23 up until the capture of the eastern Congolese city of Goma on Nov. 20, 2012. Since then, however, support appears to have declined, perhaps also because there has been a de facto truce with the Congolese army during the Kampala negotiations.

However, if the Rwandan army had wanted to prevent the implosion, it most likely could have. Also, if it had wanted to solve Ntaganda's ammunition problem, they could have easily sent bullets and mortar rounds across the border. So why didn't it? Had the aid cuts affected its view of the conflict, and the M23 squabbles looked like a way out?

How did Ntaganda get from the eastern Congo to the US embassy in Rwanda?

It is obvious that Ntaganda thought his choice was the International Criminal Court or probable death, but at the hands of whom? And was it his choice to make?

The first version, supported by many current and former M23 soldiers, has Ntaganda crossing the border along with the rest of his troops, probably on March 14 or 15, then being arrested by the Rwandan army and debriefed. They then decided that they didn't want yet another Congolese rebel under house arrest in Rwanda – Laurent Nkunda and Jules Mutebutsi are enough of a headache and Ntaganda's ICC warrant would certainly make him a more difficult case.

But why would the Rwandan government hand Ntaganda over to the US embassy, where he immediately asked to be transferred to the ICC? The Rwandan government opposes the ICC, and is probably concerned by some of the revelations that Ntaganda could make on the stand. After all, Kigali backed the Union of Congolese Patriots armed group for whose crimes Ntaganda is now answering, as well as the the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and M23.

If this version is correct, it may be that Rwanda was not left any good options and preferred Ntaganda being sent to the ICC than having him sit around under house arrest in Rwanda (or worse). After all, Ntaganda's former UPC boss Thomas Lubanga stood trial for five years without any revelations being made about outside support to his group.

The second version, supported by ex-CNDP officers, diplomats, and Congolese and Rwandan intelligence agents, suggests that Ntaganda slipped across the border, evading detection and eventually arriving at the US embassy in downtown Kigali. According to this version, he took advantage of his contacts in the Rwandan army, as well as his ethnic kin and family in Ruhengeri, to escape arrest. There have even been reports of Rwandan intelligence agents being arrested for failing in their duties to detect him.

True?

Hard to say – Ntaganda does have friends and family in Rwanda, as well as a lot of money. But if he wanted to hand himself over to the ICC, why not just go to the MONUSCO base in Kibati (just north of Goma), which was under his control up until the last minute? It would probably have been safer for him. And could he really escape detection by Rwandan security services, who have extensive contacts with M23 members and good control over their own country?

What will the impact be of his transfer to the ICC?

In part, it strengthens his rival Makenga's hand – he is now rid of a large faction of his officers and political leaders who had been a thorn in his side. While he has probably lost over a third of his troops to death or defection, he has rationalized his military chain of command and now has more reliable politicians to represent him in Kampala. While he is now rid of all of the officers with serious legal problems (except himself), it is unclear whether this will result in a peace deal in Kampala.

M23 delegates say that they can't accept the terms proposed by President Kabila, which amount to integration with almost nothing in return. In particular, they insist on good ranks, political positions, the return of refugees, and generous amnesty. As one of Makenga's officers told me today, just before a meeting of the officer corps, "Alituambia: vita ingali. Kungali njia mrefu." (He told us: there is still war. The road is still long).

On the other hand, Rwanda emerges with a boost to its reputation. While it isn't clear what role it played in Ntaganda's surrender, at the very least the country signed off on the implosion of the M23, which makes it look like their are more part of the solution than the problem.

In recent weeks, the World Bank has disbursed $50 million of the previously cut aid, and other donors may soon follow suit.

What will happen at the ICC? Ntaganda is reportedly more of a slam dunk that other cases currently being tried. Given his direct involvement in military operations, there is strong evidence against him for the crimes of rape, recruitment of child soldiers, murder, and pillage. In addition, the prosecutor will seek to add charges related to his time as chief of staff of the CNDP (2006-2009).

So, in sum, Ntaganda's arrest won't bring peace to the eastern Congo, but it does spell a victory in the battle against impunity and the dismantling to one of the barriers to a peace process in the country.

Supporters of Kenya's Prime Minister Raila Odinga protest outside the Supreme Court as a case is filed over claims of massive fraud that took place during the country's March 4 election, in Nairobi, Kenya, Saturday. (Khalil Senosi/AP)

Kenyan candidate turns to court to challenge defeat in presidential election

By Ken Opalo, Guest blogger / 03.21.13

• A version of this post originally appeared on the author's blog. The views expressed are his own. 

Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga filed a court petition last Saturday challenging the declaration of Uhuru Kenyatta as president-elect – with 50.07 percent of the vote to 43.28 percent – after elections earlier this month.

In the petition, Mr. Odinga cites a host of factors that, in his view, significantly compromised the integrity of the election – including an unstable voter register, inconsistencies and errors in final vote counts, and failures in the electronic tallying system.

In a rally in the coastal city of Mombasa this week, Odinga claimed to have won the election with 5.7 million votes to Mr. Kenyatta’s 4.5 million.

With the filing of the petition, the country’s attention has now shifted to the Supreme Court. The court is constitutionally mandated to issue its ruling within two weeks from last Saturday. That gives them until Mar. 30 at the latest. 

Should the court find in favor of Odinga’s petition, Kenyans will have a re-run election in late May, with a possible runoff a month after that. The law says that in case of irregularities the court has to nullify the entire presidential election. It is unclear if the judges can rule on limiting the re-run to a runoff between Kenyatta and Odinga, rather than the entire slate of candidates. If the judges dismiss the case, however, Kenyatta will be sworn in on April 9.

It is obvious that the ruling will be as political as it will be legal. Six judges (see here) will hear the case as the nominated deputy chief justice is yet to be confirmed by the National Assembly.

Under normal circumstances five judges would have heard the case to avoid a tie, but since the selection of the five would have tilted the case one way or the other all six will be present. Should there be a tie the status quo will hold and Kenyatta will be sworn in early next month.

So how might the judges vote?

Based on my conversations with people in the know, it appears that the swing justices will be Chief Justice Willy Munyoki Mutunga and Justice Mohamed Ibrahim. The two are largely expected to adhere the most to the legal merits and implications of the petition. The eventual ruling will therefore partly depend on the ability of the two to persuade their colleagues. As president of the court, Mr. Mutunga will be under pressure to be on the winning side of the ruling.

A tie would be the worst of possible outcomes as it would suggest that the court – by far the most trusted Kenyan institution – is just as divided as the rest of the country.

The court’s only other ruling before this was on affirmative action to increase the proportion of women in the Kenyan parliament to a third. They voted against (arguing for a gradualist achievement of the same), with Mutunga the sole dissenter.

On the left-right spectrum Mutunga is the most progressive member of the court (and the highest rated public official, despite Kenya’s socially conservative bent). Justices Ibrahim, Smokin Wanjala, and Njoki Susanna Ndungu are considered centrists, while Jackton Boma Ojwang and Philip Kiptoo Tunoi are considered conservative.

Kennedy Opalo is a PhD candidate in political science at Stanford University, where he studies, among other things, elections and governance in sub-Saharan Africa.

In this Jan. 16, 2009 file photo, Bosco Ntaganda, seated center, holds a press conference with Congo Interior Minister Celestine Mboyo, right, in Goma, Congo, as Mr. Ntaganda agreed to work with the Congolese government. (AP/T.J. Kirkpatrick)

Why 'The Terminator' may have surrendered: Turncoats

By Enough Project, Guest Blogger / 03.20.13

• A version of this post originally appeared on the blog of the Enough Project, an anti-genocide NGO. The views expressed are the author's own.

In a startling development Monday, Rwandan-born Congolese rebel leader Bosco Ntaganda turned up unannounced at the US embassy in Kigali, Rwanda, asking to be transferred to the International Criminal Court.

Wanted by the ICC since 2006, Mr. Ntaganda, who is known as “The Terminator” for his ruthless tactics – including recruitment of child soldiers, murder, and sexual slavery – has been elusive ever since international pressure mounted for his arrest in early 2012. Protecting Ntaganda and his lucrative links to eastern Congo’s illicit minerals trade is seen as a key rationale behind the formation of the rebel group M23, which he headed, in April 2012.

What might explain his decision to give himself up? Ntaganda, a Congolese Tutsi born in Rwanda, once served in the Rwandan army alongside Rwandan President Paul Kagame and is implicated by the United Nations Group of Experts to have maintained links to President Kagame's government through various roles commanding rebel groups in eastern Congo.

But as this connection proved increasingly awkward for the Rwandan government, Ntaganda’s decision to go underground suggests he questioned the strength of that loyalty. Ntaganda would have considered all his options before deciding to turn himself in to the US embassy, so he may have felt his best chance for survival was to surrender to people he believes can ensure his safety.

Ntaganda's decision to surrender is a consequence of a profound crisis within M23. During recent weeks, the group has been consumed by infighting. Early Saturday morning, Ntaganda’s rival in the M23 and leader of its competing faction, Sultani Makenga, seized control of the town of Kibumba – 30 kilometers north of the provincial capital of Goma – from Ntaganda’s forces.

Meanwhile, Ntaganda's political head, Jean-Marie Runiga, fled into neighboring Rwanda with over 700 combatants, where Rwandan authorities said they have been detained. Two eyewitnesses at the Congo-Rwandan border crossing in Kibumbu told the Enough Project that they had seen Ntaganda cross into Rwanda along with his affiliates Colonel Charles Muhire, Colonel Seraphin Mirindi, and Innocent Zimurinda (allegedly wounded and carried on a soldier’s back).

While all eyes will now be on the fate of Ntaganda, the handling of his affiliates will also have a significant impact on efforts to stabilize eastern Congo. The United States government and the UN Security Council have enacted sanctions on Mr. Runiga, Mr. Ngaruye, Mr. Kaïna, and Mr. Zimurinda.

The UN Framework agreement signed by regional heads of state in Addis Ababa three weeks ago should obligate Rwanda to break with its tradition of providing a safe haven for people wanted in eastern Congo, such as Colonel Jules Mutebutsi and General Laurent Nkunda. (Read more about the framework and its uncertain future.)

Rwanda must comply with Congolese and international efforts to prosecute all Congo war criminals in refuge on its territory. Kinshasa has already requested Rwanda to extradite Runiga, who, in turn, requested for Rwandan authorities to deport him to Uganda.

Rwanda’s potential role in the surrender of Ntaganda and cooperation in holding the others accountable is still unclear. Colonel Olivier Hamuli, spokesman for Congo's army in the province North Kivu, asked: "Is it an arrest or are they hiding him [Runiga] away?"

If Runiga is extradited to Kinshasa, Congolese authorities must provide for a fair trial and not set suspects free in exchange for a temporary "peace" deal with the M23.

What implications does Ntaganda’s surrender and M23 infighting have for the peace talks currently held between the government of Congo and the M23 in Kampala, Uganda? As of yesterday, the talks are suspended for a week but until they resume, uncertainty prevails.

In pursuing further peace talks with the M23 – and seeing the potential end of the group suddenly close at hand – Kinshasa must not settle for a shady deal with a wanted war criminal such as Sultani Makenga or offer him amnesty.

A man walks past a signage decoration for the BRICS summit in Sanya, Hainan province, China, April 2011. The BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – gathered in Beijing Tuesday. (Jason Lee/Reuters)

China steps up to support Africa's development

By Ryan Lenora Brown, Correspondent / 03.19.13

One week into his tenure as China’s president, Xi Jinping is already stressing his country’s ties to the African continent and the interconnected future of the world’s developing economies, in what may be an effort to highlight China's growing economic clout.

"No matter how international landscape may change, China will continue to support and promote Africa's efforts to achieve peace, stability, prosperity, and development, seek strength through unity and participate in international affairs on a basis of equality," Mr. Xi told a group of reporters from the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – gathered in Beijing Tuesday.

The timing of the announcement may be key. That seemingly magnanimous declaration comes on the heels of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s announcement Monday that the new president will make his first trip to Africa beginning later this week, visiting Tanzania and the Congo Republic and attending a BRICS summit in Durban, South Africa. 

At that summit, the BRICS countries are expected to announce the creation of a new global development bank, a World Bank-like financial institution to be based, for the first time, in the so-called global south.

The bank is meant to increase the economic clout of the world’s developing economies whose stature in global financial institutions has trailed behind their explosive economic growth. By 2020, the combined economic output of just three of the BRICS – Brazil, China, and India – will overtake that of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada combined, according to the 2013 United Nations Human Development Report.

Despite this potential rising economic power, however, no BRICS leader has ever run the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. 

"These are 20th century institutions dealing with 21st century realities," says Khalid Malik, lead author of the UN report. 

BRICS leaders say the new bank will be a significant step in realigning the orientation of global economic power. And for the world’s most aid-dependent countries, which are disproportionately concentrated on the African continent, the bank would continue the growing trend of looking east – not west – for development. 

“I believe the proposed BRICS-led bank … provides the opportunity to mobilize funding for infrastructure development, which is needed in most emerging markets, and in particular in South Africa at present, and which would benefit the wider region as well,” said Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s BRICS ambassador, in an interview with Voice of America. 

All BRICS are not created equal, however.

The gap between Xi’s China, the world’s second-largest economy, and South Africa, the 27th, is cavernous. According to a report by South Africa’s Standard Bank, each of the BRICS would be expected to pay $10 billion into the new bank. For China, that’s well under 1 percent of its gross domestic product – for "little bric" South Africa it’s about 3 percent. 

But whatever balance of power the BRICS strike with its new bank, China under Xi will likely continue its blitz of private and public investment in the African continent. Over the past decade, China has sped past the US to become Africa’s largest trading partner, and its direct investment in the country rose from $200 million to $12 billion between 2003 and 2011.

Whether that investment is, as Xi claims, strengthening Africa’s ability to “participate in international affairs on a basis of equality,” however, is contested.

“Africa must shake off its romantic view of China and accept Beijing is a competitor as much as a partner and capable of the same exploitative practices as the old colonial powers,” wrote Nigerian central bank governor Lamido Sanusi in a recent Financial Times op-ed. “China takes from us primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also the essence of colonialism.”

China’s ministry of commerce flatly denied that charge.

"I suggest the governor carefully study the history of colonialism," said ministry spokesman Shen Danyang at a press conference Tuesday. "The trade and economic cooperation between China and Africa has nothing to do with colonialism."

Senegalese President Macky Sall responds to journalists' questions during a joint press conference with Mali's President Dioncounda Traore, prior to Traore's departure, at the airport in Dakar, Senegal, last week. (Rebecca Blackwell/AP)

In Senegal, a new president confronts an ancient tradition: child beggars

By Whitney Eulich, Staff writer / 03.18.13

Slowing to a stop at an intersection in the developing world, it’s not uncommon to look out the car window and see children – often clad in tattered clothes or without shoes – buzz into traffic to solicit donations.

The West African nation of Senegal is no different, except that many of these youngsters are "students" at informal religious schools called Daaras – and their begging is said to be a part of their Quranic education.

It is a system that is deeply ingrained in the country's Muslim history and culture, but while some say begging teaches humility, others argue it is simply a way for religious leaders to exploit poor children for their own monetary gain.

“The ... phenomenon is ancient, it is religious education,” says Senegalese President Macky Sall, who was in Cambridge, Mass., this month as part of Harvard University's African Development Conference. “But it is very informal and has not been supported by the government, which has led to some abuse.”

This abuse is an issue that President Sall, who is one year into his term, has already had to confront.

Called talibés, from the Arabic word for student, these boys are generally between 4 and 13 years old and come from poor families throughout the country and neighboring Guinea Bissau. They spend a large portion of each day begging for money and food on the streets – with scant time spent in a classroom under adult supervision. Begging is an accepted way to teach the Islamic tenet of humility, something that is well understood in a nation that is 95 percent Muslim (though wealthier families don’t turn to Daaras to teach these lessons).

Living conditions for talibés are dismal, often consisting of cramped quarters, flaps of cardboard for beds, and unsanitary surroundings.

The extreme day-to-day reality faced by these young boys was once again brought to the fore this month when a fire ripped through a Dakar-based Daara housing scores of youth, killing nine of the children.

“This is a tragedy…. It is something we regret,” Sall told The Christian Science Monitor just days after the deadly fire.

Human rights organizations have repeatedly denounced Daara-related abuse: Seven children killed in the March fire were locked in their room, unable to escape. A 2010 Human Rights Watch report called their conditions “akin to slavery,” noting that, based on interviews with 175 former and current talibés, the children are “forced to endure often extreme forms of abuse, neglect, and exploitation by the teachers, or marabouts, who serve as their de facto guardians.”

“[Talibés] are at the center of an intense and longstanding social debate” in Senegal, says Leonardo Villalón, associate professor of African Studies at the University of Florida and author of “Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal.”

“It comes down to human rights issues. Is this child abuse or is it not?” Mr. Villalón says.

Villalón says the fire was awful, but he worries that some people, particularly outside of Senegal may “jump from there to say Islamic schools are bad.”

Daaras are “very legitimate,” he says, noting that the vast majority of Senegalese seek some form of religious instruction. The state incorporated religious education – typically Islam, due to the population breakdown, but Christianity as well – into public education in the early 2000s. “The conditions [of Daaras] are a real problem, but it’s a problem rooted in … poverty.”

“Boys are often sent to Daaras in urban centers [by families] believing they are providing their children with an opportunity to learn the tenets of Islam,”

Mohamed Chérif Diop, a child protection specialist at the Senegal-based, international nongovernmental organization Tostan, says via e-mail. The children are able to receive an education without having to pay for food or fees for school, and many parents feel they are helping their child create a brighter future for himself by sending him to a Daara.

"It is the families who make the decision to send their children to the Daara, choosing a particular marabout [teacher] because of family connections or because of a marabout’s reputation for being a good teacher," Mr. Diop says.

There are already laws on the books in Senegal to curb begging by minors, such as a 2005 law passed by former President Abdoulaye Wade that carries a maximum five year sentence and fines for sending children out to beg. The law – which was reinforced in 2010 – clearly hasn’t been effectively enforced, though, and some ask whether or not the government must target the Daaras themselves.

No law has yet been passed that lays out minimum standards for all Quranic schools, but Sall says the government has made the decision to stop “this kind of institution, and help the [country’s] rightful religious schools educate in better conditions and give children a better environment” in which to learn.

“We’re working very hard on that,” says Sall, who worked in President Wade’s 12-year administration before defeating him with nearly 66 percent of the vote in a runoff last March.

What “better conditions” means exactly is yet to be seen. Sall says the government will close the Daaras based on investigations carried out by the police and ministry of welfare, and will involve religious associations.

“It will be very important work [involving] social dialogue to find an appropriate solution,” Sall says.

The government’s program to modernize the Daaras could eventually be a solution to the many problems associated with these informal schools and religious education, Diop says. But all levels of society must be involved in the process.

“Collaboration and mutual support for the protection of our children are essential at all levels – from the government to the grassroots – to create sustainable social transformation.”

Ghanaian soccer star Anthony Annan speaks to journalists in Nelspruit, South Africa, in February. (Themba Hadebe/AP)

Foreign correspondents in Africa still struggle to tell the whole story

By Tom Murphy, Guest blogger / 03.14.13

•A version of this post first appeared on the author's blog, A View From the Cave. The views expressed are the author's own.

Western journalists were rightly criticized for the overall level of coverage surrounding the Kenyan elections.

However, it is a case that is a part of what seems to be the rule rather than the exception when it comes to how Western reporters will tell stories from the African continent. (Read about how Kenyans reacted to foreign coverage of their election with the Twitter hashtag #tweetlikeaforeignjournalist)

The image of a western journalist interviewing a "traditional African" may seem like a trope of the past, but look no further than this linked image from a PBS MediaShift report.

Cornell University English professor Mukoma Wa Ngugi makes the case in on the blog Africa is a Country that Western journalists in Africa continue to fail to “tell the whole story of humanity at work.”

He says that American reporting on tragedies that took place in the United States, for instance, show dignity of the victims and tell stories of heroism and triumph during tragedy.

A three paragraph article in Reuters offered the choice terms “tribal blood-letting” to reference the 2007 post-electoral violence, and “loyalists from rival tribes” to talk about the hard-earned right to cast a vote. Virtually all the longer pieces from Reuters on the elections used the concept of tribal blood-letting. CNN also ran a story in February of this year that showed five or so men somewhere in a Kenyan jungle playing war games with homemade guns, a handful of bullets and rusty machetes – war paint and all.

Such stories do not make it into the coverage of tragedies from Africa. However, Mr. Ngugi neglects to recognize the constraints on foreign correspondents or journalists who report on Africa. Page space for stories about Africa is few and far between these days.

This is not to excuse poor reporting. Rather I point it out to say that it is far more challenging than domestic news. Major tragedies in the United States feel like they are over covered as the press corps descends upon the location of the event and tries to pump out every story possible. 

Conversely, a similar tragedy in Sierra Leone may only get one or two articles in a paper like The New York Times. The one reporter who is likely not based in the country, but has to cover it, is going to try to get as much information in as possible. The unfortunate outcome is that the gruesomeness of the violence is often played up for the lack of ability to add in any real stories. As Ngugi writes,

But when it comes to writing about Africa, journalists suddenly have to make a choice between the extraordinary violence and ordinary life. It should not be a question of either the extreme violence or quiet happy times, but rather a question of telling the whole story within an event, even when tragedy is folded within tragedy. There are activist organizations in the Congo standing against rampant war and against rape as a weapon. The tide of the post-electoral violence in Kenya in 2007 turned because there were ordinary people in the slums and villages organizing against it.

There are different rules applied to reporting stories from Africa than from the United States. It is problematic.

However, addressing these problems also requires the admission that the two are not even on the same playing field. Domestic reporters have the length of a soccer field to completely develop a report. Meanwhile, reporters in Africa are stuck on the penalty line trying to score on a hockey goal with a soccer ball.