Declining child mortality in Africa: an effect of prosperity, enhanced aid — or both?
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Africa Works." The views expressed are the author's own.
Such are the changes in the African scene that the stunning evidence of declining child mortality in nearly all sub-Saharan countries is the source, not of disbelief or skepticism, but a serious, robust debate over what caused the decline: rising economic prosperity in Africa or improved international assistance.
To step back a moment: credit for attention to the improved health of African child goes to Michael Clemens, who in early May published an assessment of a World Bank analysis that prompted him to comment on what he described as the “stunningly rapid decline” in child deaths. “Nothing like it was occurring even as recently as the first half of the [last] decade,” he added.
The underlying evidence comes from two World Bank researchers based in Kenya who ask in an exhaustive comparative paper, what has driven the decline of infant mortality in Kenya.” Gabriel Demombynes and and Sofia Trommlerova find a complex set of reasons, including rising incomes and the targeted use of antimalarial bed-nets, prompted by aid agencies trying to combat infant deaths from malaria.
The debate over causes is nicely summarized by The Economist, which concluded: “The broad moral of the story is [that] aid does not seem to have been the decisive factor in cutting child mortality. No single thing was. But better policies, better government, new technology and other benefits are starting to bear fruit.”
The relative effect on child mortality of aid versus growth may never be sorted. More critical is the new image of an Africa that is starting to address the importance of improving lives for ordinary people even as the sub-regional economies of Africa continue to boom. The whole affair is “is startling news for anyone who still thinks Africa is mired in unending poverty and death,” Clemens tells The Economist. “That Africa is slipping quickly away.”
In his comment, Clemens, whom I’ve actually never heard of before, is echoing my own perspective that the real problem of Africa today is wealth — what to do with it — and not poverty — which remains a scourge in Africa but which I believe will be most effectively addressed as a consequence of better management of African wealth.
G. Pascal Zachary, editor of Africa Works, is a professor of practice at Arizona State University, in the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism in Phoenix and the Consortium for Science Policy & Outcomes in Tempe.
Students gather at the Mayange B Primary School within the UN Millennium Village (MV) in Mayange, Rwanda, March 20, 2009. The MV started in 2005 as a development pilot project aimed to help villages lift themselves out of extreme poverty. (Mary Knox Merrill/The Christian Science Monitor/File)
Just how effective is the Millennium Village Project at reducing child deaths?
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "A View From the Cave." The views expressed are the author's own.
A study published in The Lancet says the Millennium Village Project (MVP) is responsible for a decline in child mortality three times faster than comparable villages that are not a part of the intervention. The authors say the positive gains are the result of a successful program. However, critics have responded to the study citing serious errors in the analysis.
The MVP was established as a part of the Millennium Development Goals, a set of global targets aimed at reducing poverty and improving the quality of life for people in the world’s poorest nations. Columbia professor Jeffrey Sachs lead the development of the MVP based on the theory that increasing the level of spending per person through a comprehensive set of interventions will help lift people out of poverty.
The MVP is still a pilot program and runs in 9 different villages across Africa. The recent study shares data from the first three years of the MVP. According to the researchers, the under-five death rates in control villages declined an average of 2.6 percent each year over the course of a decade. The MVs averaged of 7.8 percent rate of decline per year. The data published in The Lancet study (click here) show promise for the success of the MVP.
Soon after publication, a few individuals raised some concerns about the study’s findings. An article in Nature quoted researcher Michael Clemens of the Center for Global Development. Using figures in the paper, Clemens calculated that the study authors can be confident only that the annual rate of decline for child mortality in the Millennium Villages lies between 1.4 percent and 14.3 percent. “If you claim to triple rates of decline you must have the evidence to back this up,” he said.
For Clemens, this means that the study’s claim that, “the average annual rate of reduction of mortality in children younger than 5 years of age was three-times faster in Millennium Village sites than in the most recent 10-year national rural trends” is not true.
Further complicating the issue is that the evaluation is done by the people who implement the MVP. Clemens and others have criticized this decision in previous studies. For critics, a new MVP established in Ghana will be evaluated by DfID (the British Department for International Development). Though it is likely all parties will not be satisfied after the independent evaluation, an outside perspective on the project in cooperation with the MVP will quiet some of the criticisms.
Lee Crawfurd further points out the observed differences in 10 of the 18 indicators in the study are statistically insignificant. For example, the increase in the asset-based wealth index for households are nearly identical between the MVP and comparison villages.
Further, Matt Collin analyzes the data from the MVP study and compares it to recent country-level data on under-five mortality published in The Lancet just a few days prior to the MVP study. (See his chart here.)
He determines that the rate of decline in the MVPs are on pace with national averages over the same period. An even closer look at the MVP study by Gabriel Demombynes, author of the national averages study, and Espen Beer Prydz in the World Bank blog uncovers some serious errors by the MVP authors.
In short, the comparison data should be calculated from the midpoint of the observation, rather than the end.
The shift to the middle four years for the MVs and the comparison villages yields very different results. The MVPs are slightly behind national averages for that period, but are so close that it is statistically insignificant. In other words the MVs are reducing under-five mortality at the same rate as the rest of the country.
The discussion is important, say the critics, because of the popularity and cost of the MVP. According to the study, it costs $116 per person per year. For the 30,000 people in the MVs that is an annual cost of $3.48 million per year. “Diverting scarce resources towards this project's approach means that other, competing uses of that money will not occur. Such mass diversion of resources can only be done responsibly when it is shown that the new use of the resources does more to end poverty than the alternative use of the resources,” says Clemens. “The burden of proof lies on the project to demonstrate that the diversion does more to end poverty than other uses of that money.”
This morning, more than a week since the paper’s release, the authors of the paper issued a correction saying, “We thank Demombynes and others for pointing out these corrections, and as noted we have withdrawn the erroneous claims as a result. To improve the performance of the project going forward, we are inviting international public health experts along with critics of the project to join an independent expert committee to review the data collection and help improve its accuracy.”
United Nations peacekeepers from Uruguay ride in an armored personnel carrier as they patrol the road between Rutshuru and Goma, following fighting between the Congolese military and rebels, near Bunagana in Congo, Saturday, May 12. (Marc Hofer/AP)
Congo Siasa: Congolese troops showing progress against mutiny
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Congo Siasa." The views expressed are the author's own.
The military situation in the Kivus of eastern Congo remains volatile, with fighting continuing throughout the weekend as Congolese army mutineers – now dubbed the M23 movement – have migrated from their Masisi stronghold to the border with Uganda and Rwanda. The potential headlines from this week should include: "Congo army finds new confidence," "a mutiny stands its ground," and "army defections spark tensions between Congo and Rwanda."
Beginning late last week, the mutiny's commander, Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and his officers began leaving the Masisi highlands, traversing the inhospitable brushland behind Nyamulagira volcano and crossing the Goma-Rutshuru road in Kibumba. A large convoy clashed with Congolese army soldiers there on the morning of Tuesday, May 8 before making it to the Rwandan border, which they followed on their way northward, toward Runyoni and Chanzu, hills on the edge of the Virunga national park. The rebels captured these two hills on May 10. There was further fighting there on Saturday and Sunday as the Congolese army deployed several of its newly-acquired attack helicopters. They repelled an attack, but have been unable to re-capture the hills.
The fighting has displaced thousands of people, including over 7,000 people who have fled to Rwanda.
The more reliable estimates of the mutineers' strength range between 300 and 800. For some perspective, that should be compared with the 6,000 soldiers from the CNDP militia that integrated with the army in 2009. The group is officially led by Col. Sultani Makenga, the former deputy commander of military operations in South Kivu. Gen. Bosco Ntaganda's whereabouts are the subject of much speculation - every hour a new rumor pops up - but the mutineers still deny they are collaborating with him.
The Congolese army, on the other hand, has deployed several thousand troops in the area, along with tanks, artillery, and attack helicopters. The United Nations blue helmets, who helped the Congolese army defend against a crucial attack in Masisi last week, are not currently participating in the fighting.
Given the mutineers' position on a small patch of land next to the national park, it is unclear how long they can hold out without supplies of food and ammunition. They were reported to have dug up an arms cache when they first arrived there, which may sustain them. However, unless they are able to conduct raids into the surrounding villages, or establish supply routes through Rwanda, they could soon run out of supplies.
Meanwhile, talks have been ongoing in Rubavu and Kigali between the Congolese and Rwandan governments. The Congolese have been represented by Kalev Mutond (the head of intelligence), Col. Jean-Claude Yav (the head of presidential security), Gen. Didier Etumba (the commander of the army), and the new defense minister, Alexandre Luba. Officially, the talks are only consultations, given the Rwandan government's role in bringing about the integration of ex-CNDP in 2009. The talks have been cordial and have discussed issues such as operations against the FDLR (the anti-Rwandan rebel group, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) and the return of Congolese refugees, but, according to officials present in the talks, there has been little progress on the main issue - the fate of the mutineers.
While both sides are still refraining from any overt accusations, tensions are simmering beneath the surface, as Congo officers grumble about suspected support to the mutineers from across the border, and the Rwandan government points to reports of abuses against Kinyarwanda-speakers by the Congolese army. And yet, the peace deal holds.
– Jason Stearns is the author of the book, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa, and the blog, Congo Siasa.
Tough rhetoric on Boko Haram from the Christian Association of Nigeria
• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.sahelblog.wordpress.com. The views expressed are the author's own.
For some time now I (and for some time before that, various commenters on the blog) have been worried about the possibility of Christian reprisals against Muslims in Nigeria in response to regular attacks on Christians by the Northern rebel movement Boko Haram. The nightmare scenario is one in which tensions caused by Boko Haram intersect with other points of political tension and with local conflicts, producing widespread interreligious violence. More immediately plausible scenarios involve continued and severe crises in flashpoint areas such as Jos and Kaduna, both of which are located in Nigeria’s highly religiously and ethnically diverse Middle Belt. One important indicator to track in assessing the likelihood of various scenarios is Christian groups’ rhetoric. Certain Christian leaders have been threatening reprisals since at least last summer. This week marks a reiteration of that rhetoric, and I am tempted to say an escalation of it, by two leaders from the powerful Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) who made headlines with statements about Boko Haram.
AFP:
“I will now make a final call to the Nigerian government to use all resources available to it to clearly define and neutralise the problem as other nations have done,” Ayo Oritsejafor, head of the Christian Association of Nigeria, told reporters.
“The Church leadership has hitherto put great restraint on the restive and aggrieved millions of Nigerians, but can no longer guarantee such cooperation if this trend of terror is not halted immediately.”
The Kaduna State chapter of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) has said that the continued attacks by the Boko Haram sect on Christians and churches across the Northern states, is a deliberate attempt to wipe out Christians from the region.
Chairman of CAN in the state, Reverend Sam Kraakevik Kujiyat, in a statement said the attacks and killings of Christians in Bayero University, Kano were barbaric.
“Nigerians, especially Christians should not be fooled into believing that the Boko Haram sect does not spare anyone. This is because their attacks against their Muslim brothers are either accidental or against those they see as working against their agenda. Their main targets are Christians and their places of worship.”
The first statement is important for the threat it contains, the second for the understanding of Boko Haram it reflects. Boko Haram has claimed the lives of hundreds of Muslims in addition to its Christian victims, but its recent attacks on Christians have reinforced a highly polarized view of what the movement is. Debates over who suffers most from religious violence in Nigeria are also not new; at a conference in Kano in the fall, I witnessed a testy exchange between the Sultan of Sokoto and a spokesman for CAN, with the latter emphasizing tragedies that had befallen Christians and the former arguing for an understanding of violence as affecting Muslims too. Such debates remain unresolved. But the rhetoric from CAN and other groups this spring certainly seems, to me, to be growing sharper. There is not always a clear progression from harsh rhetoric to violent acts, but at the very least the possibility of reprisal attacks on Muslims is real.
– Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
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Burnt newspaper copies are seen in the rubble of a destroyed This Day newspaper building in Abuja April 28. Suicide car bombers targeted the offices of Nigerian newspaper 'This Day' in the capital Abuja and northern city of Kaduna on Thursday, killing at least four people in apparently coordinated strikes. (Afolabi Sotunde/REUTERS)
Killing the messenger: Islamist insurgency widens in Nigeria
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Africa Works." The views expressed are the author's own.
Now the terror bombings in Nigeria are targeting the messenger: the offices of the venerable This Day newspaper.
“The suicide bomber came in a jeep and rammed a vehicle into the gate,” said Olusogen Adeniyi, chairman of the This Day editorial board. “Two of our security men died, and obviously the suicide bomber died too.”
This Day is broadly supportive of the Nigerian government and its president, Goodluck Jonathan. The bombing signals an escalation of the Islamic insurgency in Nigeria. The newspaper's offices in the northern city of Kaduna also were bombed, This Day reported.
The targeting of journalists can only be an attempt at silencing critics of Islamic fundamentalism – and punishing those who promote intelligent debate over Nigeria's future.
[Update: Unknown militants attacked a worship service at Bayero University early on Sunday, killing at least 18 people, and also at Gombe State University in northern Nigeria a few days before. Overnight, militants killed four people at a Christian church in the northern town of Maiduguri, where the Islamist group Boko Haram was founded.]
This Day is only one of many independent media outlets in Africa's most populous country. Does this bombing suggest that journalists will now become routinely targeted by Boko Haram terrorist group? Surely the moment has arrived for the Nigerian government [to] raise the level of seriousness of its domestic terror crisis.
Indeed, when President Jonathan visited the bomb site on Saturday, he suggested that the language describing Nigeria's predicament had changed. In speaking about whether his administration seeks to negotiate a settlement with the Boko Haram insurgents, he said, "Just like a war situation, you may dialogue, you may not dialogue, depending on the circumstances. But we will exploit every means possible to bring this to an end."
Jonathan's comments belie a potential flaw in the Nigerian approach to its urgency: the government tends to view them as criminal conspiracies rather than political movements. In the case of the oil insurgency in the Niger Delta, treating dissent as criminality seems to be working. A series of deals and amnesties for Delta insurgents undercut resistance. But what deals can be made to pacify Boko Haram, whose leaders appear to believe they represent a movement of political autonomy for conservative Muslims. The wave of bombings in Kano – the latest murderous assault came Sunday against a gathering of Christians – suggests, at least to my wife Chizo, that fundamentalists seek to drive all Christians out of the major cities of north.
– G. Pascal Zachary is a professor of practice at Arizona State University, in the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism who blogs at Africa Works.
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What African Evangelicals think of Florida's Quran-burning preacher
The controversial Florida pastor, Terry Jones – well-known for his threats to burn copies of the Islamic holy book, the Quran – is at it again.
The Rev. Jones, pastor of the Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, has said he will torch the book by 5 pm on Saturday unless Youcef Nadarkhani, an imprisoned Iranian cleric, is set free. He has threatened to burn a copy of the Quran and multiple images of the Prophet Muhammed.
The act is likely to stir anger among Muslims worldwide, who view the burning as a great act of sacrilege. Last April, when Mr. Jones threatened to burn the Quran, riots broke out in the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Mazar-e Sharif, in which dozens were killed. In 2011, the Pakistani extremist group Jamaat-ud Dawa put a $2.2 million dollar bounty on Jones' head. This year, as the Afghan fighting season begins, the protests could even be worse.
But here in Africa, the question that many African Christians ask is whether the Florida pastor – who should ideally be a peacemaker – is taking the right path.
American evangelical preachers – such as Jones – can be highly influential in Africa, where evangelical Christianity is growing fast. Here, African Evangelicals take their cues from American brethren on issues such as homosexuality or the ordination of women as pastors, but when it comes to an extreme action such as burning the holy book of another faith, not one single pastor is known to have followed in Jones' footsteps.
At the moment, Evangelical and Charismatic Christians now form 10 percent of Africa’s populations. They are starting to find space in political arenas as well as well as in the development sectors. While preaching “fiery” messages that stress strong devotion to God and the much loved “gospel” of self- improvement, Evangelicals are also building schools, hospitals, providing relief, and taking care of the less fortunate. Destruction of places of worship or burning of sacred books do not appear to be among their priorities.
Across the continent, Evangelical Christians join up with the many interfaith networks to fight common enemies. When disasters such as droughts, floods, or even conflicts or wars strike, you will see pastors, bishops, imams, and sheikhs in towns and villages uniting their people to toil against the challenges. Working together against common challenges has brought about respect, understanding, and tolerance.
Even when extremist members of one faith attack the members of another faith, inter-religious dialogue has been norm, and this trend is strengthening. Where American ideologues might view Islam to be a threat, African pastors and imams view each other’s faith as holding invaluable instruments of reconciliation and peace, including forgiveness, mercy, and love.
While Africans have their shortcomings, when it comes to matters of faith, pastors and imams have a track record of dialogue rather than provocation. Keeping these channels open gives Africans many meeting points; when used effectively, dialogue results in peaceful co-existence.
In northern Nigeria, where an Islamist group called Boko Haram started burning Christian churches, some Muslims volunteered to act as guards for Christians as they prayed. Christians returned the good gesture and protected the Muslims during their prayers.
RECOMMENDED: What is Nigeria's Boko Haram: Five things to know
In Libya, at the height of the war to oust the late dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, the head of Libya's tiny Roman Catholic Church, Bishop Giovanni Martinelli, turned to his Muslim "brothers" to protect the Christian community. Catholics have run several medical and social centers in Libya for years, activities which had endeared them to Libyans. Despite anger among Qaddafi's followers toward Europeans, whose NATO bombers were used against Qaddafi's forces, there were no attacks against Christian churches during the war.
Whether Jones proceeds with this plan or abandons it, it is clear his approach is not finding much following in the continent. For many African Christians, this is a needless, reckless, and ungodly stunt.
Now as the clock ticks toward the pastor’s deadline, the question is whether there is anything he can learn from Evangelical Christians in Africa.
Fredrick Nzwili is a journalist based in Nairobi, Kenya. He reports on a range of issues including religion, politics, environment, gender and sports.
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How Islamists are gaining sway in Mali
• A version of this post ran on the author's blog, www.sahelblog.wordpress.com. The views expressed are the author's own.
The term “Islamist” has become so broad as to be meaningless, but for the present we are stuck with it. A simplified definition for “Islamism” might be an ideology that seeks to bring Islamic values into policymaking at the micro level – ie, not just saying, “The spirit of Shari’a guides our constitution,” but rather, “X, Y, and Z law, regulation, or policy will be explicitly grounded in perceived Islamic doctrine(s).”
If we count groups like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah as Islamists, which most standard definitions would, then we could say that many of the most famous Islamist groups in the world have built much of their popular support by providing services to ordinary people: health care, food, etc. Islamists have sometimes attempted to step into the gaps left by various states – as do many other different kinds of religious actors – and meet people’s needs, whether out of religious conviction, political calculation, or both.
In attempting to understand what “Islamism” is we have an important case underway right not in Gao and Timbuktu, northern Mali. The situation in northern Mali, since the outbreak of a Tuareg-led rebellion in January of this year, has been complex. The Moor Next Door and Andrew Lebovich have recently analyzed the proliferation of armed groups in the region, and I suggest reading their work for more background information. To cut a long story short, Timbuktu and Gao are two of the three regional capitals of the “Azawad,” the territory that the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) claims to have liberated. Yet it appears that Ancar Dine (Arabic: “Defenders of the Faith”) and even Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have the greatest sway in Timbuktu at the moment, and perhaps in Gao as well. Ancar Dine in particular is establishing a political administration based heavily on offering services to civilians, especially but not only in the realm of security.
[Ancar Dine] is stepping up efforts to provide law and order as it tries to gain recruits and the support of local residents.
They’ve even set up a telephone number that residents can call in case of an emergency.
[...]
When bus passengers called the emergency telephone number in Gao a week ago after attackers attempted to rob their bus, the Islamists came, repelled the attack and cut the throat of one of the bandits.
From Timbuktu, there have been reports of Ancar Dine distributing food and offering care (French; h/t Andrew Lebovich).
How these efforts fit with the larger aim of instituting “shari’a” in northern Mali remains to be seen; the immediate aims seem to be (1) recruitment, (2) staking out political turf, and (3) attempting to establish long-term relationships with local populations. Imposing law and order is, of course, not just a means of outreach to locals but also a requirement for solidifying control over an area.
The next step the Islamists want to take seems to be fleshing out their administrative structure. Magharebia reports that Ancar Dine “plans to install Algerian national and al-Qaeda emir Yahya Abou Al-Hammam (real name Jemal Oukacha) as the local governor.” From the rhetoric quoted in the article, it sounds like law and order will continue to be the emphasis for both groups.
Ancar Dine, according to almost every report, has a real partnership with AQIM. But in light of the efforts at law and order, and providing services, how compatible are the two groups, really? And how compatible is the goal of establishing political control with the goals of a terrorist organization? As Magharebia points out, AQIM still holds several Western hostages. On top of that, a Swiss woman was kidnapped over the weekend in Timbuktu by unknown gunmen. Ancar Dine may find that such incidents threaten its political aims. Perhaps hardliners would argue that kidnapping outsiders has no bearing on the security of locals or locals’ perception of the would-be administrators, but it seems to me that the violence, secrecy, money, and outside attention associated with kidnapping could easily disrupt larger efforts at stability. Ancar Dine may well be quite unhappy with the kidnappers, whether they are AQIM or not.
Stepping back, Ancar Dine certainly has a strategy for establishing a durable presence in northern Mali. One of their biggest problems, though, is time. The Malian national army or an outside military coalition hope to return to northern Mali at some point soon, while MNLA hopes to establish its own supremacy. And locals may soon – or already – be disillusioned with the fighting, the uncertainty, and the attempts to turn ideology into policy.
– Alex Thurston is a PhD student studying Islam in Africa at Northwestern University and blogs at Sahel Blog.
QUIZ: A fabled city of the Sahara: How much do you know about Timbuktu?
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Malawian Vice President Joyce Banda addresses a media conference in the capital Lilongwe, Malawi, April 7. (Mabvuto Banda/Reuters)
No coup here: Malawi successfully transfers power
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Africa Works." The views expressed are the author's own.
After the sudden death, by heart attack, of Malawi’s 78-year president, Bingu wa Mutharika, earlier this month, Malawians anxiously suffered several days of uncertainty. First, the government would not immediately proclaim the president dead. Having been flown to South Africa for medical attention, Mutharika seemed to have gone missing rather than ceasing to exist. The confusion, of course, was ultimately explained by the rules of succession in Malawi, which called for vice president, Joyce Banda, to assume executive power. Not only was Banda a women in a Malawi riddled with casual sexism and long traditions [of] patriarchal behavior, she was also a critic of Mutharika, a former World Bank official who seemingly did the impossible in managing an economic revival but tarnished his reputation by displaying increasingly autocratic behavior.
Mutharika’s death, then, had the potential to plunge Malawi, a small and oddly-shaped country in southern Africa that has often flirted with “state failure” over its 50-year history, into crisis. The question of whether Malawi should even be country – in colonial times Malawi, then known as Nysasland — was a thinly-populated British protectorate where a motley collection of whites and Asians controlled the economy, which mainly consisted of tobacco and tea growing. No less a central figure than Hastings Banda, the president of Malawi on its independence in 1964, questioned whether this long, thin and heavily-rural jurisdiction, should simply be rolled into its much larger neighbor, Zambia, which during British rule was known as Northern Rhodesia.
Doubts about Malawi’s viability have never completely vanished and, during the first decade of the 2000s, when Malawi faced a [series] of severe food shortages, questions again arose over whether Malawians ought to voluntarily be absorbed into either Zambia or land-rich Mozambique, neighbor to the east.
Under Mutharika, Malawi settled on a set of policies that reward small farmers, who receive inputs such as fertilizer at reduced prices. The policy contradicted the advice of international assistance experts but Mutharika wisely argued that these experts were the cause of Malawi’s food shortages. He was proved right by Malawian farmers, who grew record amounts of corn under the stimilus of government buying programs. Indeed, Mutharika effectively nationalized the maize crop, repudiating free-market, neo-liberal agricultural policies that remain (sadly) the cornerstone of the international aid community’s approach to African farming.
Mutharika’s vanity, in the end, alienated a voting public that might otherwise have treated him as a hero. His death could have plunged the country into a new crisis, if his inner circle had refused to permit Joyce Banda’s ascension to the presidency. Her path was not blocked and Malawi, for the moment, again seems like a nation that deserves to the world’s admiration, if not Africa’s. Hailed as a grassroots leader, Banda must stand for election in 2014.
– G. Pascal Zachary is a professor of practice at Arizona State University, in the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism who blogs at Africa Works.
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Cote d'Ivoire's commitment to democratic principles questioned
• A version of this post appeared on the blog "Freedom at Issue." The views expressed are the author's own.
Côte d’Ivoire was once a promising model of economic prosperity and stability for West Africa, but in the last decade alone it has fallen prey to two civil wars, untold human misery, and large-scale impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations. The complex problems currently besetting the country are linked to the failure of its leaders to both commit to and successfully foster genuine democratic principles and practices.
The latest manifestation of poor political leadership occurred during the latter part of 2010, when incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo refused to relinquish power following his electoral defeat at the hands of a longtime adversary, Alassane Ouattara. By early December 2010, both men had been sworn in as president in separate, conflicting ceremonies. The stalemate sparked Côte d’Ivoire’s second civil war since 2002, resulting in over 3,000 deaths and the displacement of over a million people before Ouattara finally assumed power in April 2011.
The relative peace that now prevails is tenuous at best, threatened by persistent and deeply rooted political, tribal, and ethnic divisions. The recent discovery of mass graves, mainly located in the western part of the country, has done little to allay fears of renewed violence. The situation is exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and the desperation caused by widespread poverty.
The UN-backed Muntarbhorn Commission determined that serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed by both sides during the post-election crisis. A number of important steps have since been taken to foster national reconciliation and ensure that key perpetrators are held accountable. A Truth, Reconciliation, and Dialogue Commission (TRDC) has been established, as has a separate Commission of Inquiry. A newly appointed public prosecutor assumed office in April 2011, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been cleared to investigate and prosecute those alleged to have violated international law. Gbagbo, for his part, already sits in The Hague, where he will stand trial before the ICC on four counts of crimes against humanity.
The Obama administration has pledged support to the Ouattara government, hoping to reestablish a normal trade and assistance relationship and provide a sense of stability to a country still reeling from a humanitarian disaster. However, this relationship is premised on Ouattara’s demonstrated commitment to advance national reconciliation, implement measures that decrease ethnic violence, and ensure that human rights violations are impartially investigated.
Unfortunately, the requisite progress on these fronts remains to be seen. The TRDC is currently languishing with no timetable or clear mandate in place. And the courts have yet to press charges against any pro-Ouattara factions or individuals, while more than 120 Gbagbo supporters have been prosecuted in military and civil courts. There is mounting evidence, collected by rights groups and independent investigators alike, that Ouattara’s forces may have been responsible for some of the most egregious atrocities committed during the crisis, including the massacre of hundreds of civilians in the western town of Duékoué. In another incident, some 50 civilians drowned in the Cavally River near the border with Liberia, allegedly while attempting to escape pro-Ouattara forces. This is not to suggest that Ouattara and his supporters were responsible for a majority of the violence and crimes committed in Cote d’Ivoire during the conflict. But the lack of any charges against Ouattara backers indicates that victor’s justice has so far predominated in Cote d’Ivoire.
The specter of a government pursuing investigations and prosecutions of the former regime while blatantly ignoring—or worse, covering up—its own crimes and misdeeds will very likely deepen mistrust across the social spectrum and lay the foundation for future conflict. Recent events, including the December 2011 legislative elections, have boosted Ouattara’s political leverage and could reinforce the winner-take-all mentality that has pervaded Ivoirian politics for decades. Likewise, Ouattara’s election as chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in February 2012 has effectively offset outside criticism. And despite the president’s reconciliation rhetoric, some foreign and Ivoirian observers assert that ethnic and political animosities have actually worsened in the last year.
Sub-Saharan Africa is strewn with examples of countries that have endured half-hearted national reconciliation processes, unfulfilled promises of equitable justice, and repetitive cycles of civil conflict. The probability of Cote d’Ivoire falling into this trap will remain high if the Ouattara government fails to change course. Residents of the two areas hit hardest by mass violence—the western part of the country and Abidjan, the de facto capital and largest city—are actively demanding redress and accountability for the chief perpetrators. By pursuing a wholly one-sided campaign for justice, the government risks alienating moderates in Gbagbo’s camp who may be genuinely interested in cooperating on broad reconciliation efforts. One must recall that nearly half—about 47 percent—of the population supported Gbagbo during the last election. Moreover, a small segment of that constituency no doubt has access to arms.
The authenticity of Ouattara’s stated intention to advance peace for all Ivoirians—regardless of political or ethnic background—is in serious doubt at a time when the impartial distribution of justice should be an urgent national priority. It is essential that public officials cooperate in good faith with both domestic and international judicial mechanisms, including the ICC. Until they do, the country will remain perilously unstable, and no one will enjoy the fruits of victory for long.
– Jeffrey Smith is a program officer for Africa programs at Freedom House.
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Congo president counters call for Army defection by rebel Bosco
• A version of this post ran on the Enough Said blog. The views expressed are the author's own.
Following a wave of defections from the Congolese army last week led by rebel leader-turned-commander Bosco Ntaganda, President Joseph Kabila has countered with a show-of-force of his own. Kabila traveled to the capital cities of Goma and Bukavu early this week to meet with high-level military commanders and announced the suspension of the three-year long Amani Leo operations mainly targeting Hutu combatants of the FDLR. All military operations will now fall under the command of the government’s 8th military region in North Kivu province and the 10th in South Kivu.
What this means for the infamously ill-disciplined Congolese army is still unclear. One theory is that ending the Amani Leo operations could take many of the rebel fighters (ex-CNDP, PARECO) now integrated in the army, who play a prominent role in the Amani Leo operations, off of the battlefield. But what Kabila gains in this scenario isn’t immediately apparent, and as blogger Jason Stearns in Goma pointed out, some army officers “are worried that the malcontents may stir up trouble.” Another tactic heard from Enough sources in Goma is President Kabila is planning to restructure the Congolese army into four defense zones, with primary bases of operations in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Equateur, and Kisangani.
While the Congolese government vows justice through military tribunals for the mutineers, the fate of Bosco Ntaganda is a matter of intense talks. On April 8, ahead of Kabila’s own visit, the president sent Kalev Mutond, the trusted head of ANR, the national intelligence agency, to meet with senior Rwandan officials and army officers. According to Enough Project sources, the ongoing discussions are focused on the March 2009 peace agreement forged to officially end the rebel CNDP’s armed insurrection, which was backed by Rwanda, and integrate the rebels into the army under some strict expectations about where they would deploy, among other conditions. But how will Ntaganda fare at the end of talks between Congolese and Rwandan officials? At this stage, several outcomes look possible, and it’s difficult to say which is most likely, especially in light of Congo and Rwanda’s last big, secret compromise on the CNDP, which led to the surprise arrest of former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda and set up the present arrangements that gave Ntaganda so much power. Any of the outcomes will have important ripple effects in eastern Congo and perhaps the wider Great Lakes region, so they’re worth considering ahead of time.
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Arresting Bosco: Following Congo’s fraudulent elections late last year, President Kabila has come under intense international pressure and increasing domestic pressure to arrest Ntaganda, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. In a stunning about-face after claiming that Ntaganda is essential for peace in the Kivus, Kabila indicated yesterday that he would arrest Ntaganda but made a point of saying that his approach is not a result of international pressure. "We have over a hundred reasons for arresting and prosecuting him here and if not here [in Goma], then it could be anywhere else, including in Kinshasa. That said we are not short of reasons [to arrest him],” Kabila said.
The army Chief of Staff Didier Etumba, who traveled to Goma to join in the talks with Rwanda, sounded an unequivocal note: "Someone who refuses to be patriotic cannot serve under the flag,” Mr. Etumba said. “And when this happens, when they take up arms, well, they must be hunted and neutralized and those who have legal problems will have to answer for them.” Helping deliver Ntaganda to The Hague to stand trial for his alleged crimes would earn Kabila praise for (finally) cracking down on impunity. Of course, without a swift apprehension, Ntaganda will likely try to evade capture by drawing from his significant fortune, amassed largely through his dealings in conflict minerals, to convince fighters to stick by his side. The rebellion they could mount would likely lead to widespread insecurity before a “victory for the ICC” could be declared.
Killing Bosco: For the Rwandans, letting their occasional ally Bosco Ntaganda take the stand in The Hague and lay bare their shadowy partnership and dealings in Congo’s smuggled conflict minerals may be reason enough to orchestrate or at least give Congo their blessing to kill Ntaganda. The Rwandan government may calculate that it is in their interest to prioritize its relationship with Kinshasa over continuing to protect Ntaganda, who for Kigali as well has become an object of international criticism. Of course, any actions against Ntaganda apart from a negotiated settlement (see below) that force Ntaganda to ensconce himself in his renewed rebellion will in the meantime have a devastating impact on communities in the crossfire.
Letting Bosco “retire”: Ntanganda’s whereabouts remain unknown. However, he might be forced to step down from his military exploits and retire to his farming land in Masisi, according to an ex-CNDP loyalist colonel who attended recent meetings with senior government officials in Goma. Despite clear calls by the international community to arrest Bosco and transfer him to the International Criminal Court, there is no clear indication that the Congolese government will comply.
Meanwhile, it seems that talks with Rwanda and Kabila’s bold engagement have started to influence the calculations of the soldiers that mutinied alongside Ntaganda last week. In Uvira, South Kivu, 128 defecting soldiers have reportedly returned to their base with their commanders. In Bunagana, north of Goma, 200 soldiers have reportedly turned themselves in so far. The Ugandan army reportedly captured nine mutinous senior officers Col. Innocent Kayina, who had fled to Uganda under FARDC pressure.
As the tense situation continues to unfold, Congo advocates should seize the opportunity of this uncertain time to utilize all possible leverages, including cutting funding unaccountable institutions, to oblige Joseph Kabila to deliver meaningful reforms to the Congolese security sector—a need rarely seen as more urgent than now.
– Read more about the Enough team at Enough Said.
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