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McChrystal planned to move soldiers killed in Afghan siege
Insurgents killed eight US soldiers at a remote outpost Sunday. Part of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's new strategy for Afghanistan includes moving soldiers to population centers.
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The strategy of protecting the cities and ceding the rural areas is reminiscent of the failed Soviet strategy of the 1980s. As many as three-quarters of Afghans live in rural areas, according to a 2003 estimate. Yet in an interview with ABC, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf suggested that the US experience might be different because "the whole world" – including the US – was funding the anti-Soviet mujahideen.
Skip to next paragraphMoreover, it is in remote areas that the Taliban and other insurgents – like the Hizb-i-Islami militants suspected of carrying out Sunday's attack – have achieved their greatest military successes.
• In what was previously the most notorious battle of the Afghan war, insurgents briefly breached the outer defenses of a US outpost in Wanat – also in Nuristan – before being driven back by air support. Nine soldiers died in the July 13, 2008, attack, prompting a series of Pentagon investigations into why the outpost nearly fell.
• In August, 2008, Taliban fighters ambushed French special forces in the mountains east of Kabul killing 10 and wounding 21.
• That same month, the insurgents attacked Camp Salerno, one of the largest US bases in eastern Afghanistan, using waves of suicide bombers to try to blast open the base's defensive perimeter.
Even successes in remote areas have been costly – and of dubious importance. The classic counterinsurgency strategy that helped to turn the momentum in Iraq – clear, hold, and build – is not possible in Afghanistan's hinterlands.
For example, the effort to take Barji Matal, an oasis of 500 farmers amid the barren peaks of Nuristan, took two months. When US troops left recently – handing over the base to a local militia – Capt. Albert Bryant told the Times of London:
"I guarantee the Taliban will be back inside a week. If you can't hold the village then what's the point in going in there in the first place?... That's not worth a soldier's life."
Said McChrystal in his assessment:
"In a country as large and complex as Afghanistan, ISAF [NATO's International Security Assistance Force] cannot be strong everywhere.... ISAF will initially focus on critical high-population areas that are contested or controlled by insurgents, not because the enemy is present, but because it is here that the population is threatened by the insurgency."
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A new kind of war
The counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq represent a redefinition of what war is and what victory means. Click here to read how that could change how American prepares for the threats of the future.
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