Iran's secret uranium site raises stakes for meeting with West
Revelations about the Qom facility could give the US and its partners a stronger hand in dealing with Ahmadinejad. But experts say it's no alternative for sanctions.
The disclosure of a new, clandestine Iranian site for the enrichment of uranium may significantly raise the stakes for a scheduled Oct. 1 meeting between Iranian and Western negotiators on the nuclear issue.Skip to next paragraph
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It's possible that revelations about the site, dug into a mountain near the city of Qom, will give the US and its partners a stronger hand as they press Iran to prove its nuclear program is peaceful, and to eventually agree to suspend enrichment activities.
But the existence of the site also makes clearer the implications of failure in the long US push to rein in Iran's program via diplomatic means. Continued engagement with Tehran may be well and good, but it should not be considered an alternative to sanctions, according to Michael Levi, an expert on nuclear proliferation at the Council on Foreign Relations.
"If Iran is up to no good, the pressure has to be ratcheted up even as we are talking to them," said Mr. Levi in an analysis of the situation published Friday.
G20 summit overshadowed
The public announcement of the existence of the Qom facility by President Obama, together with the leaders of Britain and France, threatened to overshadow other developments at the G20 summit of developed nations, meeting in Pittsburgh.
The US and its allies have known about Qom for some time, said senior administration officials who briefed reporters on condition their names not be disclosed.
They went public with their knowledge only after they discovered that Iran knew they knew, and was itself preemptively going to reveal the site's existence to the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency.
The site is smaller than Iran's existing Natanz enrichment facility, said officials. It has room for about 3,000 calutrons – tall tubes of metal that spin at high speed to separate uranium gas into its component isotopes.
That is not a big enough array to be useful in terms of producing low-enriched uranium for a nuclear power plant, said administration officials. They said it is just the right size for producing, annually, enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb, or perhaps two.
IAEA inspections more likely