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Success in Afghanistan lies where religion and politics meet
US counterinsurgency strategy must take account of Pashto-Islamist justice.
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And finally, no matter where the boundaries are drawn, the Pashtun people do not like armed foreigners in their land – from Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks who belong to Al Qaeda to the NATO coalition and Pakistani forces that are fighting them.
Skip to next paragraphUnfortunately, America's efforts do not seem to actively consider this understanding of justice.
In Afghanistan, the US has established "reconstruction teams" in each province since 2003 to facilitate civilian-military aid from America to the local government.
By most accounts, the results have been mixed. Amid short-term staffing and a lack of guidance, coordination, and funding, there is no discernible evidence that those responsible for coordinating the reconstruction teams have given comprehensive consideration to how the Pashtun-Muslim people understand justice.
That said, Afghanistan is the easy part. Our efforts will make no difference there unless there is better governance on the Pakistan side of the border. Washington has not stressed or funded governance reform in the border regions with Islamabad. The Pakistani Army's offensives, focused on bombing and artillery, and ongoing drone strikes kill too many civilians. Such actions enhance the Taliban, preemptively defeating US counterinsurgency strategy and its focus on providing the people the essential security and services they need.
In cooperation with our allies, effective US counterinsurgency strategy should:
•Enable local cease-fires, gathering local religious and tribal leaders to listen to grievances and governance suggestions;
•Convene a grand gathering of religious and tribal leaders from throughout the region to discuss the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan that divides the Pashtun people, as well as the removal of all foreigners from the "Af-pak" boarder areas;
•Understand that a Pashto-Islamic approach to justice is critical to governance in the border regions;
•Incorporate this understanding into our strategic communications and policies through new training programs;
•Establish cross-cultural training programs for US and NATO personnel, civilian and military, before their deployment to Afghanistan.
•Engage the Pashtun diaspora. They know the language, the faith, and bring skill sets not found in our military and civilian agencies. They also represent the potential for financial investment in Afghanistan and Pakistan;
•Build and equip the local police – they know the culture best and are the bridge back to good governance. The NWFP government's recent call to hire 25,000 retired army personnel as police officers is a step in the right direction.
Understanding a Pashto-Islamic concept of justice and governance is not a panacea and does not promise success. But there will be no success without it.
Chris Seiple is the president of the Institute for Global Engagement, a former Marine infantry officer, and the author of "The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions."


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