Rethink the Afghanistan surge

As difficult as the security surge will be, the key test in Afghanistan – as it was in Iraq – will be whether political, social, and economic progress is made.

In Iraq, the military surge was accompanied by a political surge, with two key objectives: (1) governmental reform at the national level, and (2) increased capacity in provincial and local governments.

To reach the first objective, US commitments to Iraq were tied to measurable progress. Thus were born the so-called benchmarks, which helped prod Iraq's government to achieve important milestones in political, economic, and social conditions. To date, no similar set of benchmarks has been set for the Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai. By handing Mr. Karzai a blank check so far, Washington has undermined the incentives for the central government to make badly needed reforms and win the support of Afghans.

To reach the second objective, the US ramped up the work of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). These small, interagency units strengthened local governments while nurturing political and economic institutions at the grass roots. PRT experts proved quite effective at their work, spurring national reform along the way. So far, the plan for Afghanistan does not include a similar PRT surge. To make matters worse, PRTs there are thinly staffed and resourced. Vital expertise is lacking.

It is doubtful that a military surge, even if accompanied by a strong political surge, can be successful without dealing directly with the growing unrest in the Pashtun territories that straddle the border with Pakistan. US authorities have trouble policing the border with Mexico – how can they expect to keep tabs on the Afghan-Pakistani border, which is roughly as long? The challenges in this region are vexing to both nations. Current proposals include sweeping military campaigns, broad international compacts, programs of economic development and aid granted to the governments of both nations, and grand bargains of all types struck between various parties. All these have been tried before. None have worked.

What has not been tried (because it has been judged too painstaking) is a systematic effort to address problems in the Pashtun areas on a village-by-village, tribe-by-tribe basis. The tools of such an approach are readily available. They include precisely planned and executed military operations to attack extremist networks without killing innocent civilians, microloans, and microgrants that go directly to meet the needs of local markets and small enterprises (which could avoid the corruption that besets the national governments), and reconciliation agreements that target the interests of small groups and recognize the pitfalls associated with applying broad labels ("Taliban," "militant," "drug cartel," and the like). President Obama took a step in the right direction this month when he suggested that he would support dialogue with Taliban moderates.

Critical to the success of such an approach will be careful and meaningful cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani governments and the leadership of the US and NATO headquarters. Washington should also court greater international support from stakeholders who have yet to contribute.

For the secretary of Defense to publicly acknowledge that forces are deploying without a clear plan should indicate the difficulties ahead. But the words of another key military leader are worth recalling. At the time of the surge in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus observed that "hard is not hopeless." "Hard" can become more "hopeful" with a greater – and smarter – effort in Afghanistan, too.

• Eric T. (Rick) Olson was the operational commander of all coalition forces in Afghanistan in 2004-05. He's now working as a senior mentor for Army brigades.

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