Libya doesn't deserve the red carpet

It still acts like a rogue state. Why restore relations?

from the December 17, 2007 edition

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But in late-2004, US law-enforcement officials uncovered a Libyan plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.

Because the deal only indemnified Libya for past and not future terrorist actions, this episode of terrorist recidivism delayed the State Department's determination on Libya until June 2006. By the time Libya was removed from the terrorism list, the funds in escrow had reverted to Tripoli. A year later, Libya has still not disbursed them.

Questions of compensation aside, there are plenty of reasons why the US should not have good relations with Libya. Libya today remains a ruthless dictatorship. Its human rights record is "appalling," according to Human Rights Watch.

Tripoli has also engaged in state-sponsored kidnapping and blackmail. Five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor held in Libya for eight years for allegedly infecting children with HIV were only released in July after France agreed to sell Tripoli $400 million in advanced weaponry – commitments made good last week.

And finally, there is the ongoing matter of state sponsorship of terrorism. The problem, as the 2004 assassination plot suggests, has not gone away.

Imperfect as it is, Libya's rehabilitation remains the best working model available. Washington's decades-long commitment to sanctions and the administration's policy of aggressive WMD interdiction succeeded in bringing Tripoli to the table. But the structure of the deal – front-loaded with rewards and absent human rights and terrorism guarantees – left the US with little leverage to counter ongoing problematic Libyan behavior.

America's experience with Libya provides an important lesson for the future. The US should realize that authoritarian states do not readily change their stripes. In this regard, the Libya experience does not bode well for the future. After all, if Washington cannot convince Libya to meet even modest financial commitments, what can we expect of deals with even more challenging states such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria?

David Schenker is a senior fellow and director of the Arab Politics program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 2002 to 2006, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as country director for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories.

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