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| Princely Sum: For his allegiance, the US and Iraqis have paid Sheikh Sabah al-Hassani more than $100,000. Sam Dagher |
Will 'armloads' of US cash buy tribal loyalty?
The US policy of paying Sunni Arab sheikhs for their allegiance could be risky.
from the November 8, 2007 edition
Page 2 of 3
Unwieldy allies?
A senior official in the Shiite coalition of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki defends the wisdom of partnering with Sunni Arab tribes. Humam Hamoudi, a member of parliament from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council party, says the tribes may ultimately make better political allies than the Sunni political bloc that quit the government in June and has boycotted it since July.
But, he warns, Baghdad has to have more oversight over the tribal outreach project, otherwise the Sunni Arab tribes could turn against the government once the American presence diminishes.
"They need to have dialogue with the government," says Mr. Hamoudi of the tribes. "If their connection remains only to the Americans, then they are a time bomb. In the future they may become enemies of the democratic project."
Maj. Gen. Abdul-Jabbar Rabie, who was once a commander in the Saddam-era Army and now heads a brigade of the new Army in Salahaddin, shares that view. Hassani's men lack discipline and loyalty, he says, and could soon become a militia.
"They can spin out of control. They may be double agents and deal with both sides," says General Rabie.
Based on intelligence provided by Hassani, Rabie says he led a force of Iraqi soldiers and policemen on Oct. 30 to arrest alleged Al Qaeda cell leaders and free hostages at a "kidnap colony" in the province's remote Hamreen mountains. When they arrived, they discovered that most of the men had been tipped off about the operation.
Hsu, the US officer, says that while Hassani's role in that operation was positive, he may be tempted to "do whatever to continue the flow of money."
He recounts how in early October Hassani rushed on a whim to the scene of an Iraqi Army-led operation west of the volatile city of Samarra "to try to claim some credit" only to be hit by a roadside bomb that killed two other sheikhs who were accompanying him.
'A recipe for endless blood feuds'
An Iraqi-born sociologist and expert on tribes says the US strategy has a good chance of succeeding if the military learns from its own lessons and chooses credible tribal figures able to reach out not only to their constituencies but to other tribes, technocrats, former regime military and intelligence brass, and businessmen – what he calls the four main components of Sunni Arab society.
"It depends on the quality of the tribal leaders. Some lack connections, resources, and credibility," says Faleh Jabar, director of the Beirut-based Iraqi Institute for Strategic Studies. "If the Americans do not understand that then they will always be in trouble."
Rumors are swirling that Hassani isn't even a real prince, says Hsu. If the US cultivates a perception that it is funding hucksters, other sheikhs may doubt the "awakening" program's credibility.













