Will MRAPs become white elephants?
Concerns arise that the massive bomb-resistant vehicles may not be practical outside Iraq.
from the October 19, 2007 edition
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"Wrap them in shrink wrap and put them in asphalt somewhere is about the best thing that we can describe at this point," Conway said. "And as expensive as they are, that is probably not a good use of the taxpayers' money."
Conway's public statements reflect an emerging private dialogue in defense circles that the program is answering a "tactical" call today that may not be there tomorrow.
"The rhetoric right now in the Beltway is highly emotional. It's highly stated in absolute terms of 'moral imperatives,' " says Dakota Wood, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel and now an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, another think tank in Washington. On Wednesday, CSBA issued a 65-page report titled "Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations," which pointedly questions many of the assumptions underlying the MRAP program.
"No one would argue against trying to protect men and women fighting in defense of the nation," the study says. "However, given the resources involved, the decision to mass produce the MRAP warrants careful thought and consideration."
The study raises questions about the impact of the MRAP program on future military acquisition programs. It also asks how the technology could be employed in more practical vehicles and how troops can operate effectively in environments with IEDs (improvised explosive devices).
Mr. Wood acknowledged that the study is effective political cover for officials within the Pentagon who have doubts about the MRAP program but who can't publicly challenge the program for fear that it will look as if the military doesn't want to protect troops.
"It's very difficult for the services to say or make a statement or take a position [questioning MRAPs]," Wood says. "How can you credibly argue against protecting your force? But it comes with a cost."
In a classic counterinsurgency campaign, forces must interact with the local population to "win" them away from insurgent influence and create stability. The MRAPs with their high ground clearance, darkened windows, and menacing appearance keep forces much safer, but they take troops away from the street.
Still, questioning the lifesaving benefits of the MRAP is a tough sell to troops in the field. "White elephant or not, we have them and they are saving lives almost daily," wrote one Marine officer in an e-mail, noting that IEDs remain the greatest threat to forces. "I am all for shrink-wrapping after war, but let's have them on hand for the next war because our enemies have watched and learned the use and value of IEDs – IEDs aren't going to go away, we'll see them wherever we go in the future."
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