The Guards run the show in Iran

They have a hand in the nuclear program, attacks in Iraq, and politics.

from the October 5, 2007 edition

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"The corps is not just a military organization," Jafari said in 2002. "It is a politico-military organization. The corps is different from the military." He went on to explain why it was speaking out on a wider range of subjects than before. "Today, America is issuing threats and, unfortunately, there are groups that are prepared to sacrifice the main goals and principles of the revolution in pursuit of their own political aims. That is why the corps has expressed its views." He suggested that the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, does not have the gravitas of his predecessor, also necessitating greater activism by the corps.

Recent personnel moves suggest that the corps is being prepared to play a key role in parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2008. In August, corps officer Alireza Afshar was selected as the Interior Ministry official in charge of elections. Mr. Afshar replaced a close ally of President Mahmood Ahmadinejad, himself a former Guard, and joined former deputy corps commander Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr.

The corps also is a major player in the Iranian economy. It is connected with more than 100 business entities ranging from defense industries to smuggling. Its engineering arm – Khatam ol-Anbiyeh (Sword of the Prophet) – employs 40,000 people, and in just one month it won three contracts worth some $7 billion.

Designation of the corps as a terrorist organization would require freezing any assets it has in the US. In practical terms this is meaningless, because the corps does not have any assets here. UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 – passed in connection with Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs – identify several corps officers and call for restrictions on their overseas travel and assets. This too is fairly meaningless, because corps members are unlikely to travel to the US or Europe or keep money in foreign banks. As these efforts demonstrate, and in light of the corps's decisive role in Iranian politics and its significant economic power, the ability of sanctions to restrain the organization is questionable. A combination of assertive diplomacy and robust sanctions that target the real engines of the regime – its energy sector, trade, and finance – is more likely to affect Iranian behavior.

Abbas William Samii is a regional analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, and for eight and a half years was a regional analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. The views expressed here are his own.

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