As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum
What happens in the city may may provide a window on the future for the rest of Iraq.
from the September 17, 2007 edition
Page 3 of 4
The governor's dilemma
Mr. Waeli, who is a member of the Fadhila Party, is accused of mismanagement of public funds, corruption, and using the 15,000-strong oil facilities protection force, dominated by Fadhila partisans, in Basra and neighboring provinces as a paramilitary unit specializing in crude oil theft.

His enemies have a chant, making the rounds here on cellular phones, that derides Fadhila, which means virtue, as "Radhila," meaning sin.
Some of his detractors also charge that he's an agent for British forces and the Kuwaitis.
Fadhila follows the teachings of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Moqtada's father, but it does not believe the young cleric is fit to carry the Sadrist mantle. Fadhila leader Ayatollah Muhammad al-Yacoubi, one of the senior Sadr's disciples, has fashioned the party as a Shiite Arab Islamist party opposed to Iran.
This has made Fadhila's relationship with the Mahdi Army tense and put it on a direct collision course with the Supreme Council, the pro-Iranian heavyweight.
Waeli has accused Iran and the council of wanting to remove him because he tried to contain their influence and opposed a plan that would include Basra in a nine-province region friendly to Iran.
"In concert with its allies in Iraq, Iran wants to change the governor of Basra by hook or crook," says the portly Waeli, sitting in his enormous office. He has challenged a no-confidence motion passed by a majority of the provincial council members and a subsequent request by the central government that he quit.
"Arab countries have noticed my nationalist tendencies and have supported me," he adds.
Waeli regularly travels to Gulf Arab countries in what's billed as investment promotion trips.
Throngs of heavily armed bearded men in military pants and black shirts guard the perimeter of Waeli's provincial headquarters.
To up the ante against Waeli, Mussawi from Thaar Allah was tasked with organizing and leading a demonstration in April that degenerated into clashes. The governor himself took up arms to defend his office.
His rivals do not hide their desire for a super Shiite region comparable to the Kurdistan region in the north. They deny any military or intelligence links to Iran and say ties are economic and social in nature.
"Iranians are anxious to work with us, but the Arabs are absent and they keep labeling us as an extension of Iran. There is no truth to this," says Qassim Muhammad, a provincial council member from the Sayed al-Shuhada Movement, which was founded by Dagher al-Mussawi, a former anti-Hussein guerrilla fighter based in Tehran, who is now a parliament member close to Mr. Maliki.
Although Iran is closest to the council and its affiliate parties like Badr and Sayed al-Shuhada, it's also backing many other Shiite groups in southern Iraq including those that are openly using violence to oppose British and coalition troops, according to Ali Ansari, an Iran specialist at London's Chatham House.
"The Iranians are backing as many horses as they can," he says. "But there is a limit to their influence, given how fractious Shiites are in Iraq."
Baghdad's bid to control Basra
Amid this chaotic and dizzyingly complex picture in Basra, the central government has attempted to wrest control in this vital province which, with its oil exports, accounts for nearly 90 percent of Baghdad's revenues.
In June, one year after Maliki had declared a state of emergency in the province, he appointed Lt. Gen. Mohan Hafidh to head the Basra Operations Center (BOC), a body in charge of security in the province in coordination with the British. Iraqi Army forces under General Mohan's command were the ones that took over the palaces vacated by the British. The Army routinely sets up checkpoints now at night all over the city to try to curtail militia movements.
"The BOC and Mohan are the last hope for Basra and many parties want to see him defeated because they do not want to see their gains eroded," says Majid al-Sari, an adviser to General Mohan.
Maliki also appointed Maj. Gen. Jalil Khalaf to purge the police force of militias. He has already faced two assassination attempts and street protests as he seeks to fire unqualified officers, prevent policemen from using the force's vehicles when moonlighting as militiamen, and enforce a requirement that all policemen shave their beards.
"Criminal activity in Basra is a virus being nurtured by the police force's weakness and its multiple loyalties," the police chief told the Basra-based Al-Manara newspaper.
Few people, let alone the police force, can offer any explanation of the brazen crimes that occur in broad daylight such the theft Aug. 19 of an armored truck transporting nearly $1.2 million worth of funds belonging to the local agricultural board, according to an official with one of the city's main transport companies.
A group of doctors protesting in July the killing of two of their colleagues, possibly because they were former military doctors in the Hussein era, and the kidnapping of leading Basra surgeon Zaki Faddagh, were bluntly told by a provincial official to hire their own guards for protection, according to one of the protesting doctors.
Dr. Faddagh has left Basra after a ransom was paid for his freedom, and the doctor recounting the story says he now will sell all his belongings and leave Basra after his teenage son was kidnapped in August and held for two weeks. He was freed once a hefty ransom was paid. He says he has proof that policemen were aiding the kidnappers.
"If the British took their role as occupiers seriously and dealt with things firmly from the get-go, we would not have gotten to this situation," he says.

















