The reality of Ukraine's revolution

Nevertheless, during the past decade, Ukrainian leaders of all traditional religions have complained about the government's glacial progress in restoring worship buildings confiscated by the Soviet regime – including Orthodox Christian, Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish properties.

Also unsatisfactory has been the continuing record of provincial or municipal bureaucrats harassing religious minorities. For example, the Roman Catholic Church's charitable activities have experienced difficulties with Odessa's city council. Evangelical Protestants have had difficulties trying to buy real estate in order to build new churches.

Observing Ukraine's lack of progress during the past two years, the US State Department's annual reports about religious freedom have concluded, "There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during the period covered by this report." (The 2006 report repeated those identical words from the 2005 report.)

Paradoxically, post-Soviet Ukraine's sluggishness in reforms is linked in some ways with Ukraine's lack of Russian-style despotism. Many would-be reformers instinctively assume that strong, centralized presidencies are preferable, while legislatures or provincial governors are nuisances. Washington's Beltway mentality likes the domestic policies of leaders such as Lyndon Johnson, producing huge federal programs and detailed regulations.

During the 1990s, the Beltway usually found excuses for the "excesses" of Moscow's self-proclaimed "reformer" Boris Yeltsin. Washington looked the other way when the Kremlin decided in 1993 to crush the legislature by means of tanks. Fortunately, Ukraine's three post-Soviet presidents have not imitated the Kremlin's most extreme methods, and Kiev's legislature now has genuine powers.

In the real world, the model of "tough-guy" leadership has both advantages and disadvantages. The principle of the rule of law can obstruct radical reforms. Constitutional checks and balances can impede a president. The majority of Ukrainians may decide that reforms seem too painful. With popular elections, antireform opposition candidates may win against pro-reform incumbents. Democracy has real tensions with freedom.

A continuing global temptation has been the myth of "revolution" inherited from 18th-century France. Revolutionaries have often expected their victories to be swift and unambiguous, but they have usually turned out to be wrong. Ukrainians recall all too vividly the past century's experiences of revolutionary Marxism. We should understand that Ukrainians may prefer evolution, not radical upheavals – without Hollywood-style myths.

• Lawrence A. Uzzell is president of International Religious Freedom Watch.

Page: 1 | 2