How to beat Iraq's insurgents? Ask the British.

Britain's knack for countersinsurgency is being ignored.

from the July 23, 2007 edition

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But the British did know about counterinsurgency and, as a result, they've handled Basra, in southern Iraq, with considerable skill. They've made a point of consulting religious leaders and tribal elders there, patrolling in berets, eschewing scary sunglasses, and gathering detailed intelligence on the Iranian-backed Shiite militias that bedevil the city.

Bound by intense regimental loyalties, they've seemed steadier, more experienced, and more approachable than their US counterparts. Whenever possible, they've dispensed with their Warrior armored vehicles and traveled light and on foot.

US troops, by contrast, can appear sinister in helmets, dark glasses, and body armor. Forever watching their backs, they can often seem brash and trigger-happy. Indeed, in their Humvees, Bradleys, and Strykers, guns trained on likely targets, they've become the occupying army they desperately didn't want to be. While the British focus on winning Iraqi hearts and minds, US troops, imbued with a fierce warrior ethic, have been more reluctant to take up the task.

As the US pitted conventional forces against Iraq's shadowy insurgents, Britain should have urged its ally to drastically change its tactics. It should have shared its counterinsurgency wisdom. Then, it should have insisted on nothing less than a joint command in Iraq.

But as junior partner, Britain has never had more than minimal influence over US campaign planning and strategic deliberations. Essentially, Washington soldiered on with its costly conventional struggle, ignoring Britain's repository of counter-insurgency knowledge.

But with the appointment of General Petraeus as US commander in Iraq last February, the Pentagon appeared to concede that conventional force wouldn't be able to decapitate Iraq's hydra-headed insurgency.

Tough assignment for Petraeus

Instilling the principles of unconventional warfare into his war-weary troops will be a tough assignment for Petraeus. In fact, it could be tougher than he realizes. According to Professor John Tierney of the Institute of World Politics in Washington, America isn't partial to unconventional war. In his 2006 book "Chasing Ghosts," he noted that American strategic culture is actually "disdainful" of it and American political culture regards it as "dishonorable."

It might be argued that any prospect of waging a successful counterinsurgency in Iraq today has evaporated in a welter of sectarian shootings, roadside blasts, and suicide truck bombings. But if Petraeus can start hauling insurgent "fish" from Baghdad's raging "sea," he might still turn the tide in one of the most difficult wars the US has ever fought

He may want to call the British, though. Ignoring a gifted ally is not just impolite. It's not very sensible.

• Stephen Webbe is a former Monitor Pentagon correspondent and editor of NPR's "Morning Edition." He is currently writing a book about Mussolini's long-forgotten role in the Battle of Britain.

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