How to beat Iraq's insurgents? Ask the British.

Even if you're vigorously opposed to the Iraq war, you'd have to agree that Britain has pulled its weight in the conflict. Too bad Washington hasn't fully leveraged Britain's military talents.

As the war began in 2003, Britain couldn't match America's military might, of course. But it boasted an impressive track record of fighting insurgents. That kind of experience would have proved invaluable to US commanders in Iraq as the insurgency gained strength. But the Pentagon didn't take advantage of Britain's knack or know-how.

Britain's impressive military record

Consider the many examples of British prowess in unconventional warfare:

In World War I, Lawrence of Arabia and his camel-borne Bedouins fiercely challenged the Turks along the Hejaz Railway. In World War II, Gen. Orde Wingate and his legendary Chindits drove the Japanese out of the jungles of northern Burma. After 1945, British successes continued in such places as Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Borneo, Oman, and Northern Ireland.

The case of Malaya is especially illuminating. Three years after expelling the Japanese from Burma, British forces plunged into the jungles of Malaya to defeat a communist insurgency. "The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people," declared Gen. Sir Gerald Templer, who cut off the insurgents from the population and wore them down by relentless military, police, and civil action. By 1954, he had effectively won the war.

As Britain's long imperial retreat continued in the mid-20th century, it found itself battling determined insurgents in Aden and Cyprus. Then, in support of newly-independent Malaysia, it expelled Indonesian invaders from the jungles of Borneo. More recently, it has fought a 30-year counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland to persuade the Provisional IRA that it couldn't bomb the British province into the Irish Republic.

The efficacy of unconventional warfare in fighting insurgents has not been lost on Gen. David Petraeus, the latest US commander in Iraq. Last December, he masterminded the publication of "The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual." Earlier this year, he set up a brain trust to assess whether counter-insurgency tactics could restore US fortunes in Iraq.

US Army was unprepared in Iraq

Writing in a recent edition of the manual, Lieut. Col. John Nagl declared that the US Army had been unprepared to tackle the Iraq insurgency when it erupted in the summer of 2003. It wasn't ready for "the time-honored insurgent tactic of roadside bombs," and it hadn't stressed the importance of ensuring the safety of the Iraqi populace. "In 2003 most Army officers knew more about the US Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency," he lamented.

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