America's Pakistan dilemma
The US struggles to increase pressure on terrorists and avert Musharraf's downfall.
from the July 23, 2007 edition
Page 2 of 3
"We are going to battle extremism in every nook of Pakistan and we are going to rid … all of Pakistan of extremism," Musharraf said on national television this month after ending a truce reached in September between the government and the tribal areas. He also said that by year's end security forces along the northern border with Afghanistan will be equipped with weapons, including tanks, to fortify the battle with extremists in the region.
The US provides Musharraf with billions of dollars in military and economic assistance. In June, the State Department announced a five-year, $750 million counterterrorism initiative for the tribal areas, consisting of education, health, and sanitation projects – all aimed at winning over a largely hostile populace.
One policy change the US could adopt immediately, some experts say, is to condition its largesse on clear action and verifiable progress in the counterterrorism arena – in a sense, benchmarks.
"If we're putting in $2 billion a year, we could make $1 billion of it contingent upon developing an effective strategy and undertaking action against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremists," says Stephen Cohen, an expert in South Asian issues at the Brookings Institution.
Publicly, the administration subscribes to this principle. But critics of the Bush administration's Pakistan policy – and of the president's warm embrace of a military dictator – say the fact that Al Qaeda has enjoyed a certain renaissance under Musharraf's rule suggests the need for a change in policy.
Still, the options for US policy in Pakistan after six years of unquestioned support for Musharraf range from "worse to worst," Mr. Cohen says. He says no alternative will be able to deliver a positive result – a stable, democratic Pakistan where the Islamist extremist fringes have withered away – in the short term.
Two military options, both unlikely
Militarily, the US has two options, says Mr. Riedel, now at the Brookings Institution. One would be to seize or kill Mr. bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, in what military officials call a "snatch and grab" operation. But Riedel says the intelligence for such a move must be reliable and timely. "The shelf life of that kind of intelligence is generally measured in hours, not days or weeks," he adds.
A second option, one Riedel says is getting an increased airing in Washington, is for the US military to take out Al Qaeda and Taliban camps in remote tribal areas – with or without Musharraf's accord. But the US doesn't have the forces for such an operation, especially after the "surge" of troops to Iraq, says Riedel. He and other experts say such an action would probably cause more problems than it solves.
"There can be no wait-and-see approach by the US in terms of Pakistan, but neither can there be any unilateral action like a covert operation against these areas," says Karl Inderfurth, a former assistant secretary of State for South Asian affairs. "That would be the kiss of death for any broad move against the extremists, and it would inflame the already strong anti-American feelings in the country."
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