Al Qaeda stronger, but is it the major factor in Iraq?

The Washington Post reports that Central Intelligence Agency director Michael Hayden put Al Qaeda low on his list of concerns over Iraq in a meeting with members of the Iraq Study Group last November.

Hayden catalogued what he saw as the main sources of violence in this order: the insurgency, sectarian strife, criminality, general anarchy and, lastly, al-Qaeda. Though Hayden had listed al-Qaeda as the fifth most pressing threat in Iraq, Bush regularly lists al-Qaeda first.

Mark Lynch, a professor of political science at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. who also writes the influential Abu Aardvark blog, says it's a mistake to characterize the Iraqi Sunni insurgency as largely driven by Al Qaeda.

A lot of bloggers have been complaining about the recent American tendency to describe every insurgent attack in Iraq as "al-Qaeda". They are right to complain, simply on the facts. Al-Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq coalition continues to represent only a minority of attacks against American forces or Iraqi government targets.

The architects of American counter-insurgency strategy know this: this team isn't stupid, and is doing its best to deal with the impossible situation bequeathed it by years of failure. So why the exaggeration of al-Qaeda's role? Most commentators have focused on its role in bamboozling American public opinion; I'll leave it to other to hash that out. There's another side to it, which fits the Petraeus method rather well: the 'al-Qaeda gambit' is part of an information operations strategy aimed at turning Iraqi opinion against the insurgency. By playing up the atrocities committed by the Islamist State of Iraq coalition and attempting to equate anti-US and anti-government violence with the unpopular al-Qaeda, the US (I'd wager) hopes do delegitimize violence which currently enjoys considerable support as "resistance."

Anthony Cordesman, a former senior government official who now holds the Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, agrees with Lynch's assessment in an e-mail to colleagues and reporters.

"Far too much reporting on Iraq focuses almost exclusively in Al Qa'ida in Mesopotamia, and tacticly assumes it somehow is dirtected by Bin Laden and Al Qaida in Pakistan… The fact is, however, that while the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) is something of an Al Qaida led facade, the real structure of the hard-line Sunni Islamist extremist effort in Iraq is far more complex.

Reporting needs to be careful about assuming Al Qa'ida "franchises" like the movement in Iraq are under any form of serious central Al Qa'ida control. (Deceased Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab) Zarqawi was no great supporter of Bin Laden and his movement has a stronger Egyptian and Jordanian foreign influence than one tied to Bin Laden and his group. It also is now generally estimated to be about 95% Iraqi.

To be sure, most analysts and reporters agree that Al Qaeda remains a threat in Iraq, and that the war there has helped strengthen the group overall, by providing training and motivation to new recruits. Newsweek reports that Germany believes Al Qaeda-inspired insurgents are flowing from Iraq to Europe.

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