'Anbar model' under fire
Four Iraqi Sheikhs tied to the US's anti-Al Qaeda plan were killed Monday in Baghdad.
from the June 26, 2007 edition

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"I've been pushing for four years to deal directly with the tribal leaders," said Sen. Joseph Biden (D) of Delaware at a Monitor lunch in Washington Thursday. The US, he added, has to "give up on … the possibility of having a strong central democratic government trusted by all the major constituencies.... It's simply not capable of occurring."
If Iraq is, as President Bush says, the central front in an international war of terrorism, it may make sense to cast one's lot with whatever forces in Iraq are best capable of working against a common enemy in that war – in this case Al Qaeda. But the approach, some say, ignores the possibility that the new allies are enemies themselves of other US priorities in Iraq – or could eventually turn once again against the US.
Old enemies, new friends
"Most of these Sunnis who were formerly targeting US and coalition forces and are now willing to fight on our side aren't doing it as a result of some deep ideological transformation," says Riedel, now at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "They are doing it for reasons of financing, to make money, and to control turf in the Sunni parts of the country. It's unlikely they will be reliable allies in the long term."
As an example, Riedel points to one Anbar sheikh among the leaders of the front against foreign fighters "who essentially is a highwayman," having worked with Al Qaeda to rob travelers on the Baghdad-Amman highway and divide the "take."
"At some point such 'allies' can be bought back by the opposing side," he adds, "and then it becomes a bidding war."
Mr. Maliki has said the plan could end up creating new militias for the government to contend with. But government critics say what some see as US "desperation" might not have been necessary if Maliki had moved against militias in the first place. Other government supporters say the US may unwittingly be arming sides in a future full-blown civil war.
Some point to history and note that attempts by outside powers to divide insurgencies by buying off factions does not have a good track record. They cite French efforts in Algeria or similar attempts in Vietnam.
What seems clear is that tribal leaders across Iraq are fully aware of the "Anbar model" and are seeking to follow it – either to "cash in," as critics say, or to help defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq.









