US signals permanent stay in Iraq
Critics say a long-term US military presence may provoke greater Iraqi resistance of the 'occupier.'
from the June 12, 2007 edition
Page 2 of 3
What Gates and Snow broached
In recent comments to the press, White House spokesman Tony Snow broached the idea of a long-term US military presence in Iraq and specifically drew a comparison to Korea and the 30,000 troops the US keeps there five decades after the end of the Korean War. At the same time, Defense Secretary Robert Gates spoke of a "protracted" US presence in Iraq.
Such comments from the civilian leadership increasingly mirror the perspective of US military leaders on the ground in Iraq. An Army officer who requested anonymity on the issue because he is not authorized to discuss long-term policy said, for example, that a consensus is growing among US military leaders for the need for long-term training of Iraqi forces and a continued US presence to fight Al Qaeda.
In making public statements about the possibility of permanent bases in Iraq, the Bush administration sought to send a signal to the Iraqi government, say some experts.
"The reason these ideas were floated out of the White House now basically lies in the context of all the speculation and congressional debate over a big drawdown being just over the horizon," says Michael O'Hanlon, a military affairs expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
"This is the Bush administration wanting to send a message of resolve, to Americans but mostly to the Iraqi people," he adds. "If Iraqi leaders believe we are getting ready to leave, they are more likely to focus on preparing for full-blown civil war and less on the steps needed for national reconciliation."
The Korea comparison and comments from military officers in Iraq suggest the US may be contemplating a long-term presence in Iraq of 30,000 to 50,000 troops – perhaps one-quarter of the numbers there today. But many experts caution against equating Iraq in the 21st century with South Korea in the 20th.
"The analogy doesn't make sense," says Mr. O'Hanlon. "South Korea was threatened by an external enemy. Iraq is threatened by internal chaos."
Others single out the perception of US forces as the essential difference between the two cases.
"Korea was pro-American, and there was a sense of common cause in the face of the communist threat," says Stanford's Diamond.
Planning permanent bases in Iraq could backfire and set back the progress the US has made against Al Qaeda by turning some newly acquired US allies back into opponents, Diamond adds.
"Certainly this would not sit well with the Sunnis, who are finally willing to engage with us and ally with us against Al Qaeda," he says. "If we start talking about permanent bases with 30,000 troops, they'll go back to seeing us as something they need to resist."









