How US sanctions in Sudan will work
President Bush moves this week to squeeze the regime, but what can blacklisting 30 companies achieve?
By Mark Trumbull | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitorfrom the May 31, 2007 edition
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This January, the US Treasury took an action aimed at a particular bank halfway around the world.
The move – putting Bank Sepah of Iran on a blacklist of institutions barred from access to America's financial system – bore immediate fruit, Treasury officials say.
"Banks in the United States were legally required to cut off relations.… But banks in Europe, Japan, and other financial centers also responded, limiting or cutting off entirely their ties to this bank of their own accord," Adam Szubin, who heads the growing Treasury effort called the Office of Foreign Assets Control, told a congressional hearing in April.
The goal of such actions, which have been expanding since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, is to put a financial squeeze on regimes, individuals, or institutions that threaten national security. And although the impact of such financial sanctions is limited, they are becoming an important tool of US policy in nations of concern, such as Iran and North Korea.
Blacklisting in Sudan
Now their efficacy will be tested in Sudan. The Bush administration this week added 30 companies and three individuals in Sudan to its blacklist, citing the goal of pressuring the Sudanese government to halt the violence that plagues the Darfur region.
By itself, the action isn't expected to force any policy shift in Khartoum. But financial experts say the move is more than mere symbolism. Financial sanctions, even if imposed by the US alone, can send a powerful signal.
"It is potentially a very strong tool," says Raymond Baker of the Center for International Policy in Washington. "An awful lot of foreign institutions will look at that list and say, well, we don't want to take the chance that we will end up violating US law."
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