Iraq's Shiite political fissures widen
The Sadrist pullout from Iraq's government highlights a broader political fight within the leading political coalition that is playing out on the street and in parliament.
from the April 18, 2007 edition
Page 2 of 3
More than two years since their ascent to the helm for the first time in Iraq's modern history, Shiites have proven that the UIA is little more than a pragmatic marriage of convenience. So far, they have failed to transcend differences and reach out to the country's other communities, mainly the embattled Sunni Arabs.
"There is a great failure by the government," says Dawod. "And unfortunately, because of the situation in Iraq now, this failure does not lead to an alternative government coming to power but more chaos."
But Faleh Jabar, another Iraq expert, says he believes Maliki, who is under tremendous pressure from Washington to deliver on a number of benchmarks that are primarily aimed at promoting reconciliation and resuscitating the economy, may survive the withdrawal of the Sadrists. They held six cabinet posts: health, transport, agriculture, tourism, civil society, and provincial affairs.
"It's possible if the Kurds and [SCIRI] go on supporting him," says Mr. Jabar, director of the Beirut-based Iraqi Institute for Strategic Studies. "And if the Sunnis feel that Maliki is dealing with security in a fair-handed manner."
Jabar explains that more Sunnis could gravitate toward Maliki if they genuinely feel that he is targeting militias implicated in sectarian killing, namely Sadr's Mahdi Army.
Sadrist lawmaker Nassar al-Rubaie said in an interview Tuesday that the movement has no intention of quitting parliament altogether. He reiterated what he announced on Sadr's behalf the day before: the main reasons for leaving the government were "the heightened sectarianism in running the country's affairs" and Maliki's refusal on the timetable for US withdrawal.
In a statement Tuesday, Maliki thanked the Sadrists for their stance on sectarianism but reminded them that they were contradicting what they had previously agreed to as part of the UIA's political program, which says no timetable would be announced before Iraqi forces were fully ready to take on security responsibilities.
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