Pakistan: US ally, US dilemma

So far, the Bush administration has trod lightly on the political uproar. It has expressed concern over some clashes that have turned violent but has reiterated support for Musharraf as a valuable ally in the war on terror.

But even there, cracks are beginning to show. Last month, in what some Pakistanis called the "tough love" visit, Vice President Dick Cheney made a surprise call on Musharraf to warn him that he risked losing support in the United States unless he took tougher steps against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Afghan government has pressed the US for months to get tough with Musharraf over the border issue.

Additional pressure is now coming from Congress, where several moves are afoot to set conditions for US support. Democratic senators John Kerry, Joseph Biden, and Christopher Dodd have introduced a resolution calling for US military assistance to Pakistan to "correlate" to Pakistan's efforts to strike Taliban and Al Qaeda bases on its territory. The House has already adopted even tougher legislation.

The Pakistani military in particular would seem to have good reason to worry about any threat to US military assistance. A study by the Center for Public Integrity in Washington shows that military aid to Pakistan grew from under $10 million in the three years prior to 9/11 to more than $4 billion in the three years after.

Musharraf's approach to the tribal regions along the Afghan border has been to pursue accords with local leaders to deny sanctuary to foreign fighters taking refuge there. The third such accord was signed this week, with some experts suggesting the approach is showing the first signs of results. Critics, however, believe the approach is more reflective of the close ties between Islamists and Pakistan's intelligence services, as well as Musharraf's own ambiguous relations with Islamist forces.

Some experts see an Iran factor in US reluctance to turn the screws on Musharraf. "There's probably more than meets the eye on the administration's resistance to pushing for civilianization in Pakistan," says Harrison. "It is clear we are undertaking covert operations in Iran from Pakistan, aiding disaffected minorities there," he says. "And we have an undetermined agenda with Iran that could include military action at some point down the road, and we would need Pakistan for that."

Still, some see unrest in Pakistan's middle classes as a bigger long-term worry, and they say the US is going to have to take a firmer stand on democratization.

"US policy must be clear that Musharraf can only be elected again as a civilian, and that he must open up to the opposition parties," says Manjeet Kripalani, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

But others echo the State Department stance, saying the US won't get very far issuing orders. "What we can do is present the case for why this is in their interest," says Mr. Inderfurth, now director of graduate international-affairs studies at George Washington University. "We can make the case that if he does not respond to the calls all around him [for political reform], Musharraf risks losing many of the considerable gains he has accomplished."

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