Why 'soft partition' of Iraq won't work
Most Iraqis wish their country to remain unified.
By Joost Hiltermannfrom the March 12, 2007 edition
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AMMAN, JORDAN - In the escalating debate over the US role in Iraq, the latest panacea on offer is an option called "soft partition." However, like "hard" partition (Iraq's breakup) and a military surge, this proposal will fail in its goal to create a new and stable modus vivendi in Iraq.
Soft partition prescribes a weak Iraqi central government; three or four strong regional governments; and the physical separation, with US help, of Iraq's three major ethnic and religious groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunni Arabs. They each would receive a proportionate share of royalties from oil sales. Thus Sunni Arabs, most of whom are residents of oil-poor regions, would still be guaranteed 20 percent of oil income, since they make up about 20 percent of Iraq's population.
Soft-partition proponents argue that a loose federation along these lines reflects reality – that Iraq cannot be kept together as a central state, given the hostility among groups and their attempts at sectarian cleansing. And, say advocates, the proposal is not an American imposition but an Iraqi idea enshrined in the new Constitution.
But the concept of soft partition misreads Iraqi realities. Despite sectarian cleansing attempts, Iraqis remain deeply intermingled and intermarried in a mosaic that could be changed only through campaigns of intimidation and mass murder.
Moreover, in poll after poll, a majority of Iraqis has indicated that they wish the country to remain unified. For example, the International Republican Institute reported in July 2006 that 66 percent of Iraqis opposed segregation by ethnicity or sect.
Soft partition advocates counter that the country's new Constitution, which allows for the type of loose federalism that they support, was adopted by a convincing majority in a 2005 referendum. While true, this claim is undermined by the fact that Iraqis voted for the Constitution as a whole, not its individual provisions. And Iraqis were encouraged to endorse it not only by political parties but, in the case of the Shiites, their most senior religious leaders.
The constitutional language on federalism and revenue sharing, in particular, reflected a backroom deal between the Kurdish alliance and only one of the Shiite parties, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic in Iraq (SCIRI), which reached the final compromise at the exclusion of all other parties and Iraqi society.
There is no question that the Kurds desire independence, and they can make a strong case that they are entitled to it. As realists, however, their leaders have agreed to remain a part of Iraq for now.



