A US plan for simpler, safer nuclear arms
Cold War-era US warheads are too complex for the needs of today's geopolitical climate, some say.
from the March 9, 2007 edition
Page 3 of 3
Not everyone likes the plan
The point of this effort is not to start a new arms race, said the NNSA acting administrator. But the new weapon design has already drawn opposition from key members of the new Democratic-controlled Congress.
Rep. Peter Visclosky (D) of Indiana, the chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on Energy and Water – which has jurisdiction over nuclear development funding – says the administation needs to set a coherent policy for the future of nuclear weapons before it starts building new warheads.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D) of California, a member of the Senate Apppriations panel that will consider RRW funding this year, remains adamantly opposed to a new design.
In a statement, Ms. Feinstein said that potential proliferators such as Iran and North Korea would look at the program and see hypocrisy on the part of the US.
"The minute you begin to put more sophisticated warheads on the existing [delivery systems], you are essentially creating a new nuclear weapon," Feinstein said.
Some critics consider the very name of the effort to be a misnomer. To call something a "reliable replacement" is to imply that the thing which is to be replaced is unreliable – but that's not the case, notes Mr. Kimball of the Arms Control Association.
Studies have shown that, with current maintenance programs, the existing stockpile will be reliable for decades, says Kimball.
But is it worth spending billions to add a minute additional increment of reliability, especially when the production of a new weapon might inevitably increase pressure for the resumption of nuclear tests?
It is also arguable, Kimball adds, that new warheads can be certified as safe and reliable without new test explosions.
"With all the associated geostrategic costs, it is not worth it," he says.
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