A US plan for simpler, safer nuclear arms

On March 2, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced the selection of a design from Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories for RRW development. Under the program, Navy submarine-launched weapons would be the first warheads replaced.

US officials indicated that the Lawrence Livermore design beat out a competitor from the Los Alamos National Lab in large part because it was based on older designs that have already been proven effective in underground nuclear tests.

The US has maintained a moratorium on nuclear tests since 1992. It has signed, but not ratified, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which bans explosions in all environments for military or civilian purposes.

The chosen design "builds on the successful scientific accomplishments of our Stockpile Stewardship Program, which helps to maintain our nuclear weapons without underground testing," said Thomas P. D'Agostino, NNSA acting administrator, on March 2.

Over the next year, US lab scientists will put together cost estimates and an engineering and production plan that Congress will be able to consider next year, Mr. D'Agostino added.

The point of this effort is not to start a new arms race, said the NNSA acting administrator. But the new weapon design has already drawn opposition from key members of the new Democratic-controlled Congress.

Rep. Peter Visclosky (D) of Indiana, the chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee on Energy and Water – which has jurisdiction over nuclear development funding – says the administation needs to set a coherent policy for the future of nuclear weapons before it starts building new warheads.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D) of California, a member of the Senate Apppriations panel that will consider RRW funding this year, remains adamantly opposed to a new design.

In a statement, Ms. Feinstein said that potential proliferators such as Iran and North Korea would look at the program and see hypocrisy on the part of the US.

"The minute you begin to put more sophisticated warheads on the existing [delivery systems], you are essentially creating a new nuclear weapon," Feinstein said.

Some critics consider the very name of the effort to be a misnomer. To call something a "reliable replacement" is to imply that the thing which is to be replaced is unreliable – but that's not the case, notes Mr. Kimball of the Arms Control Association.

Studies have shown that, with current maintenance programs, the existing stockpile will be reliable for decades, says Kimball.

But is it worth spending billions to add a minute additional increment of reliability, especially when the production of a new weapon might inevitably increase pressure for the resumption of nuclear tests?

It is also arguable, Kimball adds, that new warheads can be certified as safe and reliable without new test explosions.

"With all the associated geostrategic costs, it is not worth it," he says.

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