As US surges, British start exiting Iraq

Will Britain's planned 25 percent reduction by this summer leave the US's southern flank exposed?

from the February 22, 2007 edition

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In the nearly four years that British troops have been responsible for Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, Shiite militias have co-opted the police and many of the city's political institutions while British forces have been increasingly confined to their bases.

There are two major political militias in the city – one close to Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, another to the Fadila Islamic party of his rival Muhammad Yaqubi – as well as a number of smaller gangs that engage in tribal extortion and kidnap for ransom.

"The British certainly aren't doing what the Americans want them to,'' says Mr. Dodge.

But senior British officers have been arguing that Britain's commitment to Afghanistan, which many see as a more important mission than Iraq, is stretching their forces thin. Last fall, the British general, Sir Richard Dannatt, said he supported withdrawal from Iraq because the British presence in Basra appeared to be aggravating the local population.

In September 2005, British forces assaulted the main jail in Basra to release two soldiers detained by the Basra police. Basra's governor called Britain's actions "barbaric and irresponsible." Though extreme, that is not the only case of enmity between the British and Iraqi security forces they're training.

In his speech Wednesday, Blair appeared to agree with General Dannatt's point. He said that unlike Baghdad, relatively homogenous Basra – it has many Sunnis, but not in sufficient numbers to challenge the Shiites – has little sectarian violence, no Al Qaeda presence and no Sunni insurgents. "The bulk of the attacks are on the multinational force,'' he said, the inference being that the removal of troops would stem the violence.

Britain's approach for more than two years has been one of conciliation and compromise with local militia leaders. British officers in the south have said privately that approach was largely dictated by the small size of their force – making the option of going to war with the Shiite militias unattractive.

At the moment, Britain's 7,100 troops in the south equal one soldier for every 451 residents of Basra and the neighboring Maysan Province, also under British control. A new manual for counterinsurgency written by senior US generals argues for about 20 troops for every 1,000 residents, which in the case of southern Iraq would mean about 70,000 British troops.

"The British long ago essentially ceded the two provinces they control ... to Shiite Islamist factions,'' writes Mr. Cordesman. "The British cuts will in many ways simply reflect the reality that the British 'lost' the south more than a year ago. The Shiites will take over, Iranian influence will expand, and more Sunnis, Christians, and other minorities will leave."

Dodge argues that Britain is well aware of this and is deciding to simply get out of the way of what looks to be a messier conflict.

"The big fear is that the British in the south will be hostages to US policy toward Iran,'' says Dodge. "There is a link between [British] casualties in the south and rising tensions with Iran. What Iran has effectively done is infiltrate its people and bought influence and kept the pan boiling."

Rising British casualties

British casualties have been light compared with American ones: the British have lost 34 troops in the past two years, compared to 996 US deaths. But the trend has inched upward since last fall, according to statistics compiled by Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, an independent website that tracks Iraq casualties.

In the past six months, 17 British troops have been killed. In the six months prior to that period, 12 British soldiers were killed. And in the six months prior to that, 10 were killed.

Mr. Clarke of King's College says that Britain is less worried about expanded US conflict with Iran and more concerned about what's possible given the small size of its Army. "What is at the forefront," he says, "is the idea that keeping major forces in Iraq for the long-term future is impossible."

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