How Kim Jong Il controls a nation

But a busy populist

One side of Kim only now emerging is how closely he stays in touch with the people. The Dear Leader is on the road, working the crowds, a great deal. Studies of Korean media show Kim averages about 150 local visits a year. He may not make live televised speeches, but he's at a school, a factory, a farm, a military base - every three days. (He shows up at a military unit once a week.) This suggests a populist streak.

"When someone you worship comes to your factory, it's a personal connection. We tend to overlook this simple fact," says Mr. Mansourov, who has tracked Kim's appearances. "Kim knows the local leaders, the opinion makers, the local cadres. He's not in a fishbowl. He may be a dictator, but he's also a populist."

Kim Jong Il 01/03/07 N. Korea escalates 'cult of Kim' to counter West's influence 01/04/07 How Kim Jong Il controls a nation

E-mail a friend Print this Letter to the Editor Republish E-mail newsletters RSS

Kim also appears today to be intensifying his ethnic nationalist message: Korea is different, special, unique, pure - and must remain so. The message has more affinity with Imperial-era race-based fascism in Japan, than to the Stalinism he's often depicted as emulating, argues Mr. Myers.

"The North may not have plasma TVs and shiny cars, but it has people with character and virtue, that's Kim's message," says Myers. "South Korea is physically and spiritually polluted, misogynistic, occupied by the US, [has been] sold down the river, [and] lets its young people grow soft. The real Korean spirit is being held in trust in the North - that message appeals."

There's another fact often overlooked, say North watchers: Kim is getting older. There may be a new urgency to resolve the nuclear question, to seal his dynasty.

Kim was born "Uri" or George, in Khabarovsk lower Siberia in 1942 or '43 (the date is disputed), in a medicine supply house of the Soviet 88th Reconnaissance Brigade, according to South Korean scholar Suh Dae Sook. Kim Il Sung's guerrilla brigade had been bloodied in Manchuria by the Japanese, and he escaped to Russia with his wife. Young Kim was cared for by Korean and Russian servants. This early mix of foreign contact continued later in Pyongyang, so Kim never entirely imbibed Korean habits, where "sameness" is prized. He was early an individualist - adopting different hair-styles, dress, shoes, and behavior.

That "difference" has helped set Kim apart. Now he has nuclear capability. Yet the depths of Kim's pride, how he views his place in history, or how he would react in a threatening crisis, is not clear. In the former Soviet Union and China, and presumably in India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons are held by "mediating structures" of party and military decisionmaking committees. But Kim alone controls the dreaded button in the North.

It is unknown if Kim might ever find it "rational" to use his weapons, say experts. For example, might Kim behave like a jilted husband or postal worker who shoots his family or co-workers, then turns the gun on himself? Mostly, it is felt that Kim wants to avoid the fate that befell dictators such as Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, who was overthrown and killed.

"If we aren't careful, Kim could see using his weapons as rational," argues Mr. Lee.

Army lore in North Korea, in fact, has Kim telling his generals that if " 'we are ever losing in a war, I will destroy the world if I can. I will not go down quietly,' " Mr. Martin points out.

Opportunities lost?

Despite Kim's adroit nuclear card playing, Asia watchers say any appraisal must weighed against what Kim might have done with his rule. Fifteen years ago, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, there was genuine hope in Asia that Kim might be a new kind of leader. He might open up the economy, tone down the cult worship, act more like former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Kim could have created special economic zones as China did. Yet Kim has systematically quashed his own reforms, including those of a brilliant technocrat, Kim Dal Hyon, former deputy prime minister of the economy who experimented with the free market in the Tumen River project.

In one sense, Kim is prisoner to his own fantastic ideology of isolation. To allow outside influences into the regime could snap the spell of his own Oz-like deification, experts say.

"North Korea actually has everything," says Krzysztof Darewicz, a Polish journalist based in Pyongyang during the 1990s. "There's a wealth of valuable minerals, uranium and gold. It is smack-dab in the crossroads of Asia's current economic rise; trade and wealth surround the North. But what has it become? Nothing.

"Kim inherited a nuclear card with no idea what to do next," he adds.

"Kim is one hell of a tactician, but what is his strategy and where will it lead?" asks Martin. "What about his people?"