What the US has learned (so far) in Iraq

"One lesson is that we tend to want there to be instant success in the world, and the task in Iraq is going to take a while," Mr. Bush said.

Sen. John McCain (R) of Arizona has also compared Vietnam to Iraq and said that the current generation of US leaders has ignored or forgotten two things learned the hard way in southeast Asia: The White House needs the public's support to wage war, and the military needs to use overwhelming force when fighting it.

But if there is one principle that virtually every expert who reflects upon Iraq might agree on, it might be the obvious point that the US experience there has turned out to be very difficult.

To supporters of the war, it is a hard task at which the US must prevail. To opponents, it has spiraled into something beyond the American ability to influence.

"Regime change, as we've seen in Iraq, is an incredibly risky bet," said Toby Dodge, a Middle East expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, at a recent Council on Foreign Relations event on the impact of Iraq on future US policies.

Beyond that, the lessons one draws from Iraq depend crucially on political belief and personal experience.

Thus Bremer, the civilian administrator who oversaw the development of Iraq's constitution and the beginning of its current political process, staunchly defends the overall US effort – but does criticize the military for its failure to counter the Iraqi insurgency.

"For too long the military assumed that Iraqi forces would be able to carry on the fight themselves in short order," writes Bremer in the new edition of his book "My Year in Iraq."

Mr. Diamond, the expert in democratic process who tried to jump-start Iraqi democracy in the spring of 2004, judges that Iraq may yet emerge from its current chaos, but that the costs of the US invasion and occupation will be higher than necessary and greater than US leaders had imagined.

Among the lessons learned in Iraq, writes Diamond, is that you can't construct a democratic state unless a state already exists and can control its internal security.

"We cannot get to Jefferson and Madison without going through Thomas Hobbes," writes Diamond in his book "Squandered Victory."

A second lesson is that success in circumstances such as Iraq requires a commitment of substantial human and financial resources for five to 10 years, according to Diamond. A third lesson is that the US needs to organize itself more effectively for postconflict reconstruction.

"The final, overriding lesson of Ameri-ca's misadventure in postwar Iraq is not 'don't do it' but 'don't do it alone,' and 'don't do it with an imperial approach,' " concludes Diamond.

The need for a more coalition-based foreign policy is something that many experts might agree with, as the US proceeds with the difficult tasks of countering Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.

As great as US power is, it cannot substitute for coalitions and the effective use of international organizations, said Anthony Cordesman, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in his 2004 testimony to Congress on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US now faces a generation-long period of tension and crisis in the Middle East and much of the developing world, said Mr. Cordesman – a different kind of sustained "cold war."

Given that context, one of the broader strategic lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan may be a deceptively simple-sounding one: the US needs to take the world as it is.

"Policy, analysis, and intelligence must accept the true complexity of the world, deal with it honestly and objectively, and seek 'evolution' while opposing 'revolution,' " said Cordesman in 2004.

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