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Containing a Shiite symbol of hope
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The Mahdi Army can be properly understood only in this context. Mahdi Army members make up for their dispossession and exclusion in various ways. They find employment as security personnel for ministries under Sadr's control, borrow ministry cars to carry out their missions, and get involved in racketeering and theft. Membership also has its symbolic rewards: Militiamen carry weapons, defy traditional social hierarchies, and impose their own moral standards.
In all this, the Mahdi Army differs little from the vast array of militias that have sprung up since the war. The state has failed to redistribute resources and ensure basic security, so private militias have stepped into the void, providing alternative means to acquire goods and services, gain protection, or – most perniciously – mete out their version of justice. As more armed groups compete for a limited share of wealth and power, one turns against the other, and their leaders – Sadr included – see their control gradually slip away.
That has been the case in recent months. The Mahdi Army's actions belie Sadr's appeals to his followers not to respond to "US provocations" and not to "fall in the trap" of a new cycle of open confrontations. Most notably, sectarian killings by Sadrists contradict what Sadr claims he stands for – the unity of Iraq.
The right way to handle the militias
What's the right response? Paradoxically, the most pressing step – dismantling the militias – should not be the first one. Instead, Iraq and the US should focus on limiting the militias' role to protecting civilians in places where government forces cannot. Meanwhile, they must take strong action against politi- cal assassinations, sectarian attacks, or attempts to overrun government offices, as happened last week in Amarah when Sadr forces attacked police stations.
Sadr is distracting US policymakers, and it may be comforting to designate him the latest public enemy No. 1. But the real issues that warrant attention are the social grievances that he echoes and the failings of the Iraqi government that feed the growth of armed militias. Neither problem can be addressed by military means, by prematurely pressing the Iraqi government to disarm the militias, or by singling out the Sadrists. There has been enough misdirection in this war already. Let's not choose the wrong target again.
• Robert Malley is Middle East program director and Peter Harling is a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group.
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