The sheikh behind Hizbullah
Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has made Hizbullah a potent military and political force.
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"[But] don't judge the man based on this strategic mistake," says General Abdel-Kader. "Because he did not foresee that the Israelis were waiting for him ... to free their war machine against Lebanon."
"Where they went wrong, they did not think of the humiliation element," adds Goksel, noting that Israeli commanders have sought to "set the record straight" after their 2000 pullout from Lebanon was branded a defeat.
"This perception of Israeli invincibility was a key asset, and they wanted to get it back," he says. "The misjudgment was not only on the Hizbullah side, but a bad one on the Israeli side, too. They did not realize that Hizbullah is not afraid of them."
Battling Israel for 18 years in southern Lebanon, under Nasrallah's guidance, taught Hizbullah that "these are people who can be hurt, people who make mistakes, and can be blown up and forced to retreat," says Goksel. "I've seen four [Israel wars in Lebanon], and I've never seen the Israeli army move so slow, so shy."
One reason is improved tactics and a thorough commitment to security that starts at the top.
"Even Nasrallah's life and daily activities are under the microscope of Hizbullah's security," says Hamzeh of AUK. "Nasrallah's daily life is scripted all the way from delivering his speech to going to bed. He is protected by people who can't be penetrated."
All Nasrallah's experience underlines his certitude and calm, despite the violence engulfing Lebanon and northern Israel.
The same care is applied to evolving tactics, even in peacetime, in preparation for possible war.
"Even the fight on the border is not a classical guerrilla [action], but modified in a certain way that fits the terrain, and depends on the mood of the conflict," says Hamzeh. "So there is always a triangle, with three to five people. You may get to [the southern village of] Bint Jbail, only to find two other angles coming at you; then they regroup and reform."
Nasrallah's "measured tone since the beginning of this conflict has really struck me, because it does reflect in the field," says Noe, who is editing a book of key Nasrallah speeches. "They are a very calculating group; they're not crazy. They're not going to use their whole arsenal, [but] ramp things up in a very specific, proportional response.
"Ultimately, this is why Hizbullah is considered a very politically savvy and responsible actor" by many in Lebanese politics, says Noe.
Goksel notes that one of Nasrallah's achievements has been to give Hizbullah a "monolithic appearance," when in fact there are serious political and religious rifts rarely aired in public.
"What if the Israelis kill Nasrallah?" asks Goksel. "[They] would start looking for a new one.... Hizbullah will probably go to four or five different pieces, but everybody will keep their guns with them.
"Now, there is definitely a sense of control over the firing of those guns," says Goksel. "But look at that force that is fighting: Do you want [it] to be without a leader?"
