US troop scandals: Is Iraq different?
A military tribunal this week is hearing charges that troops killed an Iraqi family in March.
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"Criminal behavior is a symptom of combat stress," says John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org. "For troops who go outside the wire, as opposed to fobbits [those who remain inside forward operating bases or FOBs], they would be exposed to combat stressors on a daily basis for most of their tour. During previous wars, the probability of dying in combat was higher. But for most soldiers, combat was episodic, rather than continuous."
At the same time, history has shown, counterinsurgency campaigns increase the likelihood that troops may mistreat civilians, because small units spend long periods surrounded by local people whose language and customs they don't understand. Things become even more difficult as a country moves toward civil war.
"Constantly harassed, constantly on guard, not sure who is with us or against us or simply passive, IEDs randomly striking convoys at places that were clear the day before, sectarian strife bordering on civil war, and a political system that seems incapable of getting its act together are some of the factors creating the psychology of lawlessness in which atrocities occur," says Dan Smith, a retired Army colonel who served in Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader and intelligence adviser and is now affiliated with the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the Quaker lobby in Washington.
Other military analysts point to a confluence of trends as the war goes on: the Army's need at times to recruit more soldiers from the lowest acceptable category, extended and multiple tours, and no longer being welcomed by Iraqis.
"The problem is, we're now asking our troops to do something they weren't trained to do," says Charles Peña, a defense consultant and policy scholar at the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a Washington think tank. "The population they feel they were sent to save no longer feels grateful to have been saved."
Some observers note another trend indicating a breakdown in discipline.
"What I see as unusual in Iraq is the number of cases in which officers and noncommissioned officers have been involved, not only indirectly but directly," says Gary Solis, a former judge in the Marine Corps who taught military law at West Point and now teaches at Georgetown University Law Center. "Warrant officers, lieutenants, captains, lieutenant colonels and, now, even a colonel have fallen under suspicion."
A recent Associated Press roundup of criminal cases against US servicemen stemming from deaths of Iraqis includes a major, three captains, a 1st lieutenant, a chief warrant officer, a sergeant 1st class, four staff sergeants, and three sergeants.
While the number and type of alleged atrocities may be troubling, the military response appears to have been deliberate and open. "If there is anything positive to be gleaned from the reports of misconduct, it is that our military leadership in Iraq vigorously pursues reports of wrongdoing and, as far as we know, covers up nothing," says Solis.
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